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ABSTRACT 
 
MICROFINANCE AS A TOOL FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES 
RECONSTRUCTION IN POST-CONFLICT COMMUNITIES 
       A STUDY OF POST-CONFLICT MICROFINANCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 
 
Lukumu Nicodeme Matabisi, Ph.D. 
Southern New Hampshire University, 2011 
 
 
Since its inception in the 1970s, modern microfinance has emerged as a strategy to 
reduce vulnerability of the poor and promote microenterprise. This dissertation proposes 
that microfinance plays an additional role as a tool for reconstructing financial services 
in post-conflict communities.  
 
During major conflicts, the provision of financial services is usually disrupted; and 
financial institutions are often targets of lootings by militia or military of factions in 
conflicts; resulting in weak, insolvent, and non-operational financial services sectors 
when post-conflict reconstruction begins. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)‘s 
financial services system was greatly disrupted by years of conflicts that ended in 2003. 
In the post-conflict DRC, the provision of financial services has shown some 
improvement, and an important share of this improvement can be attributed to 
microfinance. The central question becomes whether microfinance is an effective tool 
for post-conflict reconstruction of financial services.   
 
Using financial data from the DRC and surveys; this study, first, performed a trend 
analysis of outreach (employment, clientele, loans, savings/deposits) and financial 
performance (assets, profitability, efficiency, risk) of financial institutions using a 
microfinance approach; and second, compared the level of outreach and financial 
performance by financial institutions using a microfinance approach to those using a 
traditional financial approach; and third, compared the reconstruction level (business 
development, education, assets acquisition, and standard of living) of microfinance 
clients to the level of non-clients of financial institutions.  
 
This study found that, in post-conflict communities, microfinance - as a mode of financial 
services provision is active, agile, and is a better tool than traditional financial services 
in terms of outreach and some aspects of financial performance, at least in the early 
interim phases of reconstruction. When compared to non-clients, this study found that 
clients of microfinance institutions experienced greater business development, acquired 
more assets, saved more, and enjoyed a higher standard of living. All these 
reconstruction variables performed significant differences. The only non-significant 
difference between clients and non-clients was found in the area of education. 
Microfinance should therefore be considered as a tool for post-conflict reconstruction of 
financial services and be emphasized as an intervention in the early stages of 
reconstruction of financial services.  
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This study evaluates whether microfinance serves as a tool for rebuilding the financial 
services sector in post-conflict communities. It seeks to determine the extent to which 
(a) microfinance institutions show increases in outreach and financial performance 
during consecutive years in a post-conflict situation, which serves as evidence of their 
post-conflict rebuilding role; (b) microfinance financial services translate into 
reconstruction in post-conflict communities and do it faster than traditional financial 
services; and (c) microfinance institutions display a faster reconstruction of financial 
services than do traditional financial services at the earlier stage of post-conflict period 
by displaying higher comparative increases in outreach and performance. This study’s 
findings may offer a path to speedy reconstruction of financial services in post-conflict, 
using the agility of microfinance approach in providing financial services.  
 
Preliminary evidence of microfinance as a post-conflict reconstruction tool has been 
reported in the areas of microenterprise development (Frasier & Saad, 2003; Santos, 
2003; Tucker & al., 2004); household reconstruction (Matul & Tsilikounas, 2004); social 
capital enhancement (Meissner, 2005); ethnic conflict mitigation (Marino, 2005; 
Meissner, 2005); and housing development (Cain, 2007). Previous studies have also 
recognized that microfinance can play the role of financial services reconstruction 
(Kuehnast, 2001; Frasier & Saad, 2003). This study aims to provide additional evidence 
that microfinance serves as a financial services reconstruction tool.  
 
2 
 
Using data from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), this study analyzes post-
conflict levels of outreach (employment, clientele, lending, savings/deposits) by 
providers of financial services and their financial performance (assets, profitability, 
efficiency, risk). It also compares providers using a microfinance approach (MF) and 
those using a traditional financial services (TFS) approach. A survey is used to assess 
whether microfinance services are translated into reconstruction (clients’ business 
development, education, assets, and standard of living) by comparing MF clients versus 
non MF clients.   
 
This study’s main hypothesis is that MF is a financial service reconstruction tool in post-
conflict communities. It displays more rapid and profound increases in outreach and 
financial performance during consecutive years in post-conflict situation; and its 
services translate into reconstruction. MF is a better tool than TFS particularly at the 
earlier stages of post-conflict reconstruction because MF displays more rapid increases 
in outreach and financial performance during the immediate years post-conflict when 
compared to TFS. 
 
DRC recently emerged from thirteen years of political and armed conflicts (1990 to 
2003) that claimed over 4 million lives (Fonseca, 2004) and the country’s financial 
services system was greatly disrupted during those years of conflicts (Santos, 2003). 
Today, however, DRC seems to show some improvement in the provision of financial 
services, and an important share might be attributed to microfinance. For instance, 
Procredit Microfinance Bank showed a 517% net profit, 105% income, and 170% 
3 
 
account deposits increases in 2006 when compared to its 2005 level (Central bank of 
Congo, Annual Report 2006). 
  
Armed conflicts have devastating consequences on the development, not 
only in terms of depleting economic and organizational capital, but also in 
decreasing social capital through loss of trust, diminished interaction and 
increased tensions between ethnic groups, and in declining human capital 
through death and displacement, loss of self-esteem; and trauma (Marino, 
p., 2005, p.1).  
 
In most cases, financial services structures and infrastructures are targeted, looted and 
destroyed (Williams, 2002). In a developing context such as the DRC, the majority of 
the population is poor and most often excluded from access to financial services offered 
by traditional financial institutions. Moreover, in a post conflict situation, there is greater 
probability for the poor majority to be more excluded from accessing financial services 
(Santos, 2003). Microfinance programs have been embraced around the world as an 
important strategy for poverty alleviation, although their contribution to poverty 
alleviation on a global level remains limited (Hishigsuren, 2004). Yet, microfinance 
institutions might play another important role: they offer a tool for financial services 
reconstruction in post conflict communities. Kuehnast (2001); Frasier & Saad (2003); 
and Barr (2005) suggested that microfinance can play this role in financial services 
reconstruction. Be that as it may, the literature reveals that the impact of microfinance in 
post-conflict communities has not been completely addressed, particularly its 
significance in reconstructing sustainable financial services and its reconstruction 
contribution from the standpoint of a financial provider. This study aims to fill this gap. 
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The literature review chapter defines post-conflict reconstruction and its linkage with 
development issues such as growth, inclusiveness, stability, and sustainability. This 
study approaches the activities of financial services providers as subdivided into three 
sectors: the Traditional financial sector (TFS) or the formal financial sector, the 
Microfinance sector (MF), and the Informal financial sector (IFS). Microfinance is 
discussed with an emphasis on its role as a tool for post-conflict reconstruction. The link 
between microfinance and the informal sector, women, government and aid policy is 
also addressed. The literature review concludes with a discussion on the provision of 
financial services in the DRC. The conceptual framework chapter proposes a research 
framework, reseach questions, and hypotheses. The methodology chapter presents the 
research design and emphasizes on the constraints of data collection in the DRC. Data 
collection procedural and souces are discussed; the analysis process of data, validity, 
reliability, limitations, and the significance of this study are also discussed. Financial 
data from various financial institutions, 95 structured interviews, and 16 unstructured 
interviews provide this study with a set of quantitative and qualitative data. The findings 
are discussed; conclusions and recommendations are made.  
 
The DRC’s post-conflict reconstruction of financial services appears to be a success 
story. Still, there is a lot to be done by the providers to maintain it success. A summary 
of complaints and suggestions by clients of financial services providers is attached as 
Appendix 5.   
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Post-conflict reconstruction  
There is a period between the formal end of a conflict and the return to normality usually 
called the post-conflict era, or transition period (Kumar, 1997). “Post-conflict 
reconstruction refers generally to the set of strategies and efforts to rebuild societies 
destroyed by war.” (Steifel, 1999, p.4).  
 
Post-conflict reconstruction was defined by the World Bank in 1995 as the 
rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of society and the 
reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime 
society [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law (Hamre & 
Sulivan, 2002, p. 89 ). John Hamre and Gordon Sulivan expanded this 
definition to include justice, reconciliation, and security, which according to 
them are central (ibid). (Zenkevicius, 2007, p.30). 
 
Stiefel (1999) argues that the challenge of rebuilding after war is essentially a 
development challenge in the special circumstances of a war-torn society, pointing out 
that problems faced by different societies emerging from war are similar to development 
issues. They are related to growth, inclusiveness, stability, and sustainability that are 
amplified and compounded by the multiple impacts and legacies of the conflict. 
Development is therefore related to post-conflict. Barbanti (2004) said: 
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Development should be understood as a process, not a product because 
societies are always changing: some improve, while others fail. 
Development theory aims at explaining both processes while development 
practice intends to provide tools that can be applied to entire societies or 
specific communities; development interventions are intended to move 
communities or societies from a situation in which they are believed to be 
worse off to a situation in which they are assumed to be better off. Current 
links between development and conflict theory stress the provision of aid 
in cases of violent conflict. Peace-building interventions after violent 
conflict address the same concerns as development interventions; 
therefore development is at the core of post-conflict interventions (p.1).  
Wedgwood & Jacobson (2001) stated that there exist many aspects of post-conflict 
reconstruction, including the return of refugees, the reshaping of school curricula and 
public culture, the structure and mandate of peacekeeping forces, and the appropriate 
international structures for consultation among interested powers. Reconstructing 
financial services after conflict is another important aspect of the reconstruction 
process. Wilson (2001) claims that in many armed conflict settings, financial institutions 
are targets of lootings by militia or military of factions in conflicts. In the case of 
Cambodia, for instance, the entire financial infrastructure and the local currency were 
destroyed during the Khmer regime (Wilson, 2001; Addison, Geda, Le Billon & 
Murshed, 2005). “The protracted civil wars experienced in Mozambique and Angola 
damaged the entire rural banking system…” (Addison et al. 2001; cited by Wilson, 2001, 
p. 44). In other cases, the financial sector is non-operational due to insolvency as in the 
case of Afghanistan:  
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At the end of 2001, Afghanistan’s formal financial system was virtually 
non-operational, with insolvent public financial institutions, and no private 
banks. Hence dependency on informal sources of finance (such as family 
and friends, moneylenders and shopkeepers, traders, and landlords) 
increased. In Afghanistan, microfinance had limited outreach 
(approximately 10,000 clients at the end of 2001) and weak institutional 
structures. Savings services were limited to few informal schemes and in 
kind savings such as opium in poppy-growing areas. (CGAP, 2002 cited 
by Marino, 2005, p. 3).  
 
2.2. Financial Services Sector  
Financial services refer generally to the range of activities of the finance industry which 
includes lending, savings, insurance, investments, pension/retirement, payment 
services, mortgage, and money transfer. Financial institutions are organizations that 
provide financial services. Major financial institutions are commercial banks, investment 
banks, investment companies, brokerage and clearing companies, and insurance 
companies (Liaw, 2004). In addition, “most countries have a central bank that serves as 
the bank of both the government and the banking system. Although each central bank 
has a slightly different range of activities, all central banks play a key role in determining 
the availability and cost of money and credit.” (Liaw, 2004, p. 15). These financial 
institutions are generally considered as part of the “formal financial sector”, while a 
range of other providers of financial services (money lenders, pawn brokers, rotating 
savings and credit associations or ROSCAs, friends and relatives, and community 
groups) are known as the “informal financial sector”. Formal and Informal financial 
sectors have been subject to various definitions and demarcations; still, their raison-
d’être is not always clear.  
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The coexistence of formal and informal credit markets is a widespread 
phenomenon in developing nations. Within the literature, there are two 
competing views as to why formal and informal credit markets coexist. The 
first is a policy-based explanation: government interest rate ceilings and 
other regulations create an informal market that develops at uncontrolled 
interest rates. The alternative hypothesis is that differences in the cost of 
screening, monitoring, and control enforced across lenders leads to a 
fragmentation in credit markets. (Mohieldin & Wright, 2000, p. 1).  
 
Aryeetey (2008, p.1) also argues that “most African economies are characterized by a 
financial system that has both formal and informal segments.” Mohieldin and Wright 
(2000); and Morris, Lobao and Wavamunno (1995) distinguished a third segment they 
called “Semi-formal finance” in their study on the role of such a third segment in 
Uganda. The Semi-formal finance segment combines characteristics of both the formal 
and informal finance (Morris et al., 1995).  
 
This study approaches the activities of financial services providers as subdivided into 
three sectors: the Traditional financial sector (TFS) or the formal financial sector, the 
Microfinance sector (MF), and the Informal financial sector (IFS). This approach 
adheres to Barr (2005, p.286) where “microfinance institutions can position themselves 
as intermediaries between the formal and the informal sectors.”  
 
Considering microfinance as a separate segment of a country’s financial sector might 
be a subject of controversy since some studies and reports (Germidis, 1991; Srinivas, 
1991) have classified microfinance activities as part of the informal sector. The 
consideration of microfinance as a separate sector contrary to the classical dualism 
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known as formal and informal sectors can be justified by the tremendous change that 
microfinance institutions or “MFIs” have brought to the finance field during the last four 
decades, starting with the pioneering work of the economist Mohamed Yunus of 
Bangladesh:   
 
The modern origins of microfinance date back to the mid-‘70s. Among the 
key innovators was Professor Muhammad Yunus of Bangladesh. He had 
the idea of making loans to the very poor, especially women. He started 
the Grameen Bank Project in 1976, and transformed it into a bank in 1983. 
According to the bank, it now has nearly 6 million borrowers - 96% of them 
women – and almost 2,000 branches in some 64,000 villages. The 
repayment rate for loans is 98%, and the bank has earned a profit every 
year but three since its inception. (Farrell, 2006,p.1).    
 
Gonzalez and Rosenberg (2010) have consolidated data from various sources and 
concluded that the microfinance industry includes around 2600 MFIs servicing 
approximately 94 million borrowers. The Mix Markets (2010) reported that as of 2008, 
consolidated data of 1690 MFIs indicated that they had $39.1 billion in Gross Loan 
Portfolios; $ 22.5 billion in deposits; 75.2 million borrowers; and an average loan per 
borrower of $557.2. 
2.3. Microfinance  
In this study, modern microfinance is traced as originating from a combination of 
elements of development and finance theories and practices. Indeed, Muhamed Yunus 
was able to come up with a model that mixed finance ideas (loan, saving, interest rate, 
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risk mitigation) with development issues (access, housing, nutrition, production, health, 
education) to create and promote the modern microfinance industry.  
I first began to see societal problems being solved, one Grameen family at 
a time, during annual workshops…These workshops gathered together 
center leaders to review their problems and achievements, to identify 
areas of concerns, and to look for solutions to social and economic 
challenges… At our second national session in 1982, we concluded the 
workshop with Ten Decisions. These ten decisions were increased to 
sixteen in our 1984 workshop… (Yunus, 2003, p. 135).  
The major development goals found in the Grameen’s sixteen decisions to be mixed 
with the financial tools were: bring prosperity to families; stop living in dilapidated 
houses; grow and eat plenty of vegetables all year around; maximize production during 
plantation seasons; family planning resulting in fewer children; Healthy environment; 
assure children’s education; use clean water; commitment to societal justice; collective 
investments for higher incomes (Yunus, 2003). 
Grameen Bank is also pioneering a low-cost cooperative health insurance 
scheme, in which an annual fee of $1.25 provides half of the health costs 
for an entire family for a variety of services. The Grameen housing 
program can lend up to 30,000 takas (about $500) as home loans. To date 
there have been more than half million Grameen-financed houses built or 
rebuilt, adding iron roofs, cement pillars, and sanitary latrines… The 
houses are substantial in size, with an electric fan overhead and usually 
other basic appliances in electrified villages. Grameen has also started 
offering higher education loans for its members… It is a remarkable 
transformation. (Todaro & Smith, 2006, p. 247).   
11 
 
“Microfinance generally refers to the provision of financial services to poor and low-
income households which are deprived access to mainstream financial institutions.” 
(Daley-Harris & Awimbo, 2006, p. 3). “Financial services provided by MFIs include one 
or any combination of the following: lending, savings, and deposits. Increasingly, mature 
microfinance institutions also provide diverse products, such as housing loans, 
insurance and pension.” (Hishigsuren, 2004, p. 14). Barr (2005) approaches 
microfinance as a form of financial development aimed to alleviate poverty by giving the 
poor access to financial services. “Most people think of microfinance, if at all, as being 
about micro-credit, lending small amounts of money to the poor. Microfinance is that, 
but it is also broader, including insurance, transactional services, and importantly 
savings.” (Barr, 2005, p. 278).  
 
Microfinance practice is generally guided and defined by two competing 
paradigms: financial self-sustainability and poverty alleviation. The poverty 
alleviation approach (also referred to as the welfarist approach) claims 
that the overall goals of microfinance should be poverty reduction and 
empowerment. The financial self-sustainability approach ( also referred to 
as the “profit” or “financial systems” or institutionalist approach) views the 
overall goal of microfinance as the provision of financial services to low-
income people, but not to poorest among them. (Hishigsuren, 2004, 
pp.17-18).  
 
According to Hulme & Moore (2006), microfinance programs and institutions have 
become an increasingly important component of strategies to reduce poverty or 
promote micro and small enterprise development. However, knowledge about their 
achievements remains partial and, in some cases, contested.   
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The impact of microfinance has been the topic of an increasing number of 
studies. These studies have ranged from a `proving impact’ approach, 
seeking answers for donors and policy makers on the positive impact of 
microfinance; to an ‘improving practice’ approach, trying to give insight on 
how programs can better respond to client needs and improve 
productivity. Those studies normally look at how programs contribute to 
alleviating poverty and reducing vulnerability of the poor through analysis 
of different units such as the individual, household, enterprise, and the 
economy.” (Santos, 2003, pp. 20-21).  
  
 
2.4. Microfinance as a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Tool 
Previous studies have brought preliminary evidence of microfinance as a reconstruction 
tool in post-conflict in the area of microenterprise development (Frasier & Saad, 2003; 
Santos, 2003; Tucker et al., 2004); household reconstruction (Matul & Tsilikounas, 
2004); social capital enhancement (Meissner, 2005); ethnic conflict mitigation (Marino, 
2005; Meissner, 2005); and housing development (Cain, 2007); and financial services 
reconstruction (Kuehnast, 2001; Frasier & Saad, 2003). 
 
Post-conflict microfinance as a microenterprise development tool: Post-conflict 
microfinance helps reconstruct small enterprises destroyed by armed conflict by 
providing the necessary capital to consolidate existing business or create new business. 
Santos (2003) suggested that in the post-conflict DRC, microfinance should seize the 
opportunity to finance small, medium and micro enterprises. Matabisi, Beyene, and 
Kiremidjan (2007) found that almost all FINCA-DRC clients are owners of some kind of 
microenterprise; 3.6% of clients in the sample used their loan to start a new activity 
while 94.5% borrowed to continue their existing businesses. They also found that 37.1% 
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of all businesses had at least one additional employee beside the business owner, an 
indication of job creation. FINCA DRC and other major MFIs are today the most 
important providers of capital and financial services to small, medium and micro 
enterprises in the post-conflict DRC. Frasier and Saad (2003) also found that in the 
case of post-conflict Mozambique, microfinance enabled the self-employed to resume 
their economic activities. Learning from previous post-conflict experiences, Tucker, 
Nurse, Gailey, Park and Bauman (2004) suggested that in post-conflict Liberia, 
microfinance emphasis had to be put on building an entrepreneurial sector though well 
structured grants and loans programs to maximize the positive impact for 
microenterprise development.    
 
Post-conflict microfinance as a household reconstruction tool: Matul & Tsilikounas 
(2004, p.1) found that “micro-enterprise credit in Bosnia-Herzegovina stimulated 
household reconstruction as it provided an efficient and long lasting coping mechanism 
for household after war”. Accordingly, after looking at the impact of post-conflict 
microfinance between 1996 and 2002 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, microfinance proved to 
be a tool for household reconstruction by providing individual clients and their families 
with the resources needed to jumpstart household economies destroyed by years of 
armed and ethnic conflicts. At the end of the conflict, households were highly vulnerable 
to risks as shown in Matoul and Tsilikounas (2004) due to the financial, physical, human 
and social capital destruction. “Income generated from micro-enterprises was perceived 
during the research as the most efficient coping mechanism among households affected 
by conflict so as to fill some of their most important needs over the reconstruction 
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period” (Matul & Tsilikounas, 2004, p.1).  These findings corroborate the fundamentals 
of microfinance that emerged as a tool for poverty alleviation through the provision of 
financial services to the poor bypassed by formal financial services. From the Grameen, 
Aka Khan, ACCION, FINCA lending approach through recent innovation of OXFAM, 
CARE and many other programs using a savings-led approach, microfinance’s major 
and ultimate goal has been the reduction of vulnerability to risks experienced by the 
poor and the poorest. This has been proven true in peaceful areas of intervention and it 
should even be truer in conflict and post-conflict zones of intervention, using 
microfinance as a tool.  
 
Microfinance as a social capital enhancement and ethnic mitigation tool: Heen (2005) 
conducted a study in Cameroon to answer the question whether the microcredit process 
in Foyet decreases conflict among clients. She concluded that her study did not provide 
evidence to sustain this claim. However, Heen’s study is very limited and subject to 
serious threats to validity. Indeed, her study is based on only 30 interviews: 20 with 
members of the microfinance institution and 10 non-members used as a control group. 
In addition, she used a non probability sample, considerably diminishing the credibility 
of her findings. Nevertheless, she speculates and suggests that greater availability and 
access to credit can resolve ethnic tensions through direct mitigation, indirect mitigation, 
and process mitigation. However, other studies (Meissner, 2005; Marino, 2005) have 
found some evidence of microfinance playing a role in conflict mitigation and social 
capital enhancement. In a study conducted in Guatemala among women village banking 
clients ten years after the end of thirty-six years civil war, Meissner (2005) concluded 
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that post-conflict microfinance had positive outcomes that include: social capital 
construction, rekindling of social interaction, women empowerment, smoothing refugee 
re-entry into communities, and reconciling ethnic groups. Meissner’s study is a 
qualitative study and has its own limitations: non probability sample and convenience 
focus groups; more emphasis on MFIs and practitioners’ goals. However, Meissner’s 
preliminary evidence corroborate the work of Doyle (1998) and Larson (2001) who 
provided substantial evidence of microfinance as a tool for reconciliation and conflict 
resolution.  
 
Marino (2005) provides a comprehensive survey of literature on the contribution of 
microfinance to post-conflict recovery in Asia and the Pacific. He draws from his own 
experience and the works of Forster and Pearce (2002) in Afghanistan; Collier et al. 
(2003) and Nagarajan (1999) in Cambodia; Wilson (2001) in India; Wehnert & Shrestha 
(2003) and Shrestha (2004) in Nepal; Newsroom (2004) in Papua Guinea; Rivera 
(2003) in Philippines; and Sheehan (2003) in Sri Lanka. He concluded that 
“microfinance promotes conflict resolution, encourage democratic procedures that help 
people surmount conflicts, while providing a way to bring people together, focusing on 
economic activities and cooperation rather than differences” (Marino, 2005, p.1).  
 
Post-conflict microfinance as a tool for housing development: When an MFI starts 
operations in a new area, whether in a peaceful, conflict or post-conflict region, savings 
(deposits) and loans are usually the main products of their portfolio. Remittance, 
insurance and housing are additional products that mature MFIs offer. Among all these 
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products, micro-housing seems most challenging to provide because it requires long-
term commitment, a greater amount of loan capital that becomes a mortgage, and the 
legal issues related to land tenure and ownership in developing countries. Grameen 
Bank of Yunus initiated its housing program in 1984 and six years later had a portfolio of 
almost 80,000 housing micro-loans financed. The initial amount financed was $500 per 
unit and repayment was scheduled over a 20-year period at a 5% interest rate on a 
weekly basis, making it less than a dollar per week (Anzorena, 1994). “Housing 
microfinance is a growing part of the portfolios of many MFIs. Among ACCION’s 
partners, institutions in the Dominican Republic, Peru, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Ecuador, 
Haiti, Paraguay, Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala and Honduras have introduced housing 
loans. As of December 2008, affiliates in these countries had housing microfinance 
products with a portfolio of more than $230 million and nearly 108,000 borrowers”. 
(ACCION, 2010, p. 1). Angola offers a case of post-conflict housing microfinance 
through the work of Development Workshop (DW) Angola, a development organization 
operating in Angola since 1981. According to Cain (2007), DW’s ‘kixiCasa’ program, a 
housing microfinance initiative has been able to rehabilitate the housing of its clients in 
post-conflict Angola. Starting in 2005, the program offered $2,500 to its graduate micro-
entrepreneur clients to own a house. The success of this program with its micro-
entrepreneurs clients led DW to extend this program to civil servants and salaried 
employees.     
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Microfinance as a tool for post-conflict financial services reconstruction:  
Barr (2005) approaches microfinance as a form of financial development and explores 
how it can contribute to the development of the financial sector. He extends the original 
understanding of microfinance as a poverty alleviation tool into a broader role of a 
specific financial development tool that has to be understood in a larger context of a 
country’s entire financial sector.   
 
The financial services commonly available to the poor in developing 
countries often have serious limitations in terms of cost, risk, and 
convenience. Microfinance institutions play a complementary role to the 
banking system by extending credit to borrowers whom banks view as too 
costly or too risky to reach. Lacking collateral, and often living far from 
banks, poor households often turn to expensive informal moneylenders 
when confronted with urgent credit needs… Microfinance institutions 
attempt to compete with moneylenders by offering credit to a broader 
range of households on more favorable terms. (Barr, 2005, p. 279). 
 
Kuehnast (2001) and Frasier & Saad (2003) suggest that microfinance can play the role 
of financial services reconstruction in a post-conflict context.  
 
There are specific reasons why microfinance may be appropriate in post-
conflict situations: providing liquidity to facilitate the resumption of 
economic activity in the informal sector; fulfill a strong demand for financial 
services during periods of reconstruction; an alternative to humanitarian 
relief for a long-term development; also the establishment of microfinance 
programs in the early stages after the conflict may give practitioners the 
ability to influence future policies regarding microfinance and 
microenterprise development more generally and to contribute to the 
overall reconstruction of the financial system. (Foundation for 
Development Cooperation, 1999, pp. 6-7).  
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Barr (2005, p. 284) also adds that “microfinance might be an important financial 
development strategy in… post-conflict reconstruction efforts”. Examining evidence 
provided by microfinance studies, Morduch (1999, p. 1586) pointed out that “most 
theoretical propositions are supported with anecdotes from particular programs, but they 
have not been established as empirical regularities. Better research is needed to 
sharpen both the growing body of microfinance theory and ongoing policy dialogues.” 
Ten years later, Petrikova (2008) observed that “the field of post-crisis microfinance is 
still young but the existing literature has already defined the roles of microfinance in 
crises in an extensive and fairly congruent manner.” Indeed, Petrikova (2008) 
characterized the literature on post-conflict microfinance (PCM) as showing an 
‘ideological unity’ going from country case-studies in the 1990s to best-practices 
recommendations nowadays. Still, Petrikova (2008) suggests that:  
 
Authors interested in contributing to the pool of post-crisis microfinance 
literature should strive to improve the best-practice set on one hand by 
carrying out case studies of countries that have been thus far ignored, and 
on the other hand by conducting comprehensive impact and financial 
evaluations of the case studies already published. Researchers have thus 
far evaded the conduct of more analytical evaluations of the post-crisis 
activities of MFIs and thus many conclusions they reached have been 
based more on observations and perceptions than on firm evidence. This 
problem has been further exacerbated by the omission of protracted 
conflicts and disasters from the sample, as well as the exclusion of 
developing-world views on the topic. Incorporation of the critiques into the 
design of recommendations for MFIs in post-conflict and post-disaster 
settings would undoubtedly generate a more reliable collection of best 
practices. (Petrovika, 2008, p.7).  
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Clearly, the impact of microfinance in post-conflict communities has not been 
completely addressed, particularly its significance in reconstructing sustainable financial 
services and its reconstruction contribution from the standpoint of a financial provider.  
 
When discussing microfinance and post-conflict reconstruction, other variables are 
closely related to the subject: (1) informal sector, (2) women, (3) government policy, and 
(4) aid policy. In this study, however, none will be considered as a dependent or 
independent variables but treated instead as intervening variables that need to be 
controlled and explored. 
 
 2.5. Microfinance and Informal Sector 
 
There is a direct link between the existence of the informal sector and microfinance. 
Indeed, the very existence of microfinance appears to be the need to provide financial 
services to operators of the informal sector and those in rural areas. Todaro and Smith 
(2006, p. 333) assert that “the lack of capital is a major constraint on activities of the 
informal sectors and the provision of credit would therefore permit these enterprises to 
expand, produce more profit, and hence generate more income and employment”. In 
developing countries, the size of the informal sector is important and can reach up to 
80% of the national economy. Todaro & Smith (2006) argue that “In many developing 
countries, about half of the employed urban population works in the informal sector” 
(Todaro & Smith, 2006, p. 328).  
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2.6. Microfinance and Women 
 
Traditional and modern microfinance have been dominated by women. One reason is 
that most women have been operating in the informal sector.   
 
Women often represent the bulk of the informal sector labor supply, 
working for low wages at unstable jobs with no employee or benefits. The 
increase in the number of single female migrants has also contributed to 
the rising proportion of urban households headed by women, which tend 
to be poorer, experience tighter resource constraints, and retain relatively 
high fertility rates… The vast majority of institutional credit is still 
channeled through formal sector agencies, and as a result, women 
generally find themselves ineligible for even small loans. Government 
programs to enhance income in poor households will inevitably neglect the 
neediest households so long as governments continue to focus on formal 
sector employment of men and allocation of resources through formal 
sector institutions. To solve the plight of poor urban women and their 
children, it is imperative that efforts be made to integrate women into the 
economic mainstream. (Todaro & Smith, 2006, pp. 333-334). 
 
Grameen Bank reached 6 million borrowers in 2006 and 96% of them were women 
(Farrell, 2006). Saving for Change, a saving-led microfinance project of Oxfam-America 
has reached 221,900 households in Mali, West Africa and almost all clients are women 
(Ashe, 2009). In 2007, women comprised 95% of clients of FINCA-DRC, a national 
program of FINCA International (Matabisi, Beyene, and Kiremidjan, 2007). The 
Internationla Labor Organization (ILO) argues also that women are targeted by MFIs 
because they appear to be better borrowers than men.    
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2.7. Microfinance and Government Policy 
 
A government’s attitude and approach towards economic actors in its nation’s 
boundaries are critical factors in the development of economic activities of a country. 
Unfortunately, in many developing countries where microfinance operates, governments 
are an obstacle to economic development. Governments can be enablers or obstacles 
in the development of a country’s financial sector. The microfinance industry recognizes 
the key role that governments play in the development of MFIs:    
 
Growth is unlikely to succeed if at least one arm of the government does 
not effectively give its blessing to the existence and growth of 
microfinance…Bank prudential regulation and supervision become 
necessary when MFIs start mobilizing deposits from the public or when 
microfinance activities pose systemic risks to the financial sector, and not 
before that. (Counts, Zafar & Connor, 2006, p. 52). 
 
The Grameen Bank is an illustration of the role a government policy can play to promote 
microfinance. Yunus worked closely with the government of Bangladesh from the 
inception of his idea in 1976 to the chartering of the Bank in 1983. “Yunus began the 
operation in 1976 after convincing the Bangladesh agricultural development bank to 
provide initial loan money, the first loans guaranteed personally by Yunus” (Todaro & 
Smith, 2006, pp. 241-242). Special provisions to the banking sector policies of 
Bangladesh had to be adopted by the government to allow the Grameen project to 
operate as a Bank.  
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2.8. Microfinance and International Aid Policy 
Todaro and Smith (2006) argue that there are two main forms of international flow of 
financial resources: (a) private foreign direct and portfolio investment and (b) public and 
private development assistance or foreign aid that has two sources: first, individual 
national governments and multinational donor agencies and second, private 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In most developing countries, formal and 
informal financial sectors depend in their majority on foreign money. Most microfinance 
programs have started their activities using grants from foreign institutions. Morduch 
(1999) sustains that most programs continue to receive subsidies of some sort, either 
as grant or soft loans and that many programs are not yet able to break even. In the 
DRC case, the majority of traditional financial services (TFS) institutions are owned by 
foreigners or foreign corporations (e.g. Citibank Congo, Stamic bank, Rawbank). The 
microfinance industry is also fueled by foreign money, at least at the beginning of the 
programs.  
 
2.9. DRC and the Provision of Financial Services  
In 2003, DRC emerged from thirteen years of a multiform conflict (political, ethnic, 
military, and regional) that started at the beginning of the 1990s. When, in 1990, the 
former dictator Mobutu announced the end of one-party rule and opened the country to 
a multi-party system, political turmoil started in the DRC. In 1991 and 1993, the former 
Zairian national army revolted against the Mobutu regime and looted civilian assets and 
businesses, including banks and credit unions. In 1994, Hutu and Tutsi tribes in 
Rwanda could not agree on their national leadership. The civil war that erupted resulted 
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in the genocide of some 800,000 Tutsi, the death of many Hutu and their ejection from 
their country, bringing to Eastern DRC millions of Hutu refugees whose unexpected 
arrival disrupted the life of Congolese already going through their own political conflict 
and economic debacle. The Tutsi-led power in Rwanda feared that Hutu refugees in the 
DRC would get support from the Mobutu regime and renew civil war in Rwanda. A 
coalition formed by Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi decided to invade the DRC and 
supported a civil war led by Laurent Kabila starting in 1996. During a year, the entire 
DRC experienced a civil war that ended up with the end of thirty two years (1965-1997) 
of a brutal, corrupted, incompetent and destructive regime by Mobutu. As soon as the 
new Congolese government started some type of reconstruction, the new coalition 
(Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola) supporting Laurent Kabila could not agree on 
the management of the new DRC under Laurent Kabila. New armed conflicts erupted in 
1998 and soon became a regional war involving officially six nations:  Rwanda, Uganda, 
Burundi, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. The first three supported the new rebellions 
while the last three supported the DRC government under Laurent Kabila. In January 
2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated but the war kept continuing until 2003 when the 
Sun City Agreement in South Africa brought together all major belligerent factions to 
agree to share power (one President and 4 Vice-Presidents) in prelude of free elections 
in 2006. Although minor tribal and armed conflicts still occur time to time in the DRC, the 
Sun City Agreement of 2003 put an end on major wars and is therefore considered the 
beginning of the post-conflict DRC.  
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The DRC has suffered enormously from the thirteen years of conflict in its myriad forms: 
political, ethnic, regional, military, psychological and so on. The conflict claimed over 4 
million lives (Fonseca, 2004).  
Economic and financial mismanagement, corruption, political turmoil, civil 
strife, and war have contributed to extremely low and falling per capita 
income, appalling living conditions, human rights violations, and dismal 
prospects for human development. The brutal war that broke up in 1998 
put major pressure on public finances and public enterprises, with the 
economy sinking into hyperinflation and the currency becoming worthless, 
savings and investment plummeting, and financial intermediation 
collapsing. (Del Castillo, 2003, p.5).    
 
The DRC financial services system was greatly disrupted by these years of conflicts, as 
depicted by Santos (2003):  
 
When major conflicts in DRC ended in 2003, banks operated in survival 
mode… the diversity of banking services available is very small and 
outreach (geographic and client types) is minimal, concentrated in the few 
urban centers and on some large clients… In the DRC, there are currently 
9 banks accredited with the central bank (the BCC – Banque Centrale du 
Congo), of which only 5 to 6 work properly… the number of total bank 
accounts in the country is ridiculously small, estimated at around 35,000. 
Savings are, unsurprisingly at an extremely low level, estimated at only 
USD 150 million for the whole of the Congolese banking sector. Credit 
activity represents less than 1% of the GDP. The DRC’s banking sector 
activity consists of currency exchange service and trade financing (around 
80% of bank revenues on average). Corporate banking and other only 
account for 20% of total bank revenues. (Santos, 2003, pp.50-51).  
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When major conflict ended in DRC, only a few cooperatives and credit unions which 
survived the long conflict period were functional and the informal financial sector 
emerged as the dominant financial sector when the DRC started its post-conflict 
reconstruction process.   Today, DRC seems to show some improvement in the 
provision of financial services, and an important share of this improvement can be 
attributed to microfinance. According to the Banque Centrale du Congo (BCC), DRC 
commercial banks deposits showed a 250% increase in 2006 from their 2005 level 
(BCC, 2008, p. 159). Procredit Microfinance Bank showed a 517% net profit, 105% 
income, 170% account deposits increases during the same period (Procredit Annual 
Report, 2007). 
 
In its 2009 Annual Report (BCC, 2010), the Central Bank of Congo published a list of all 
financial institutions recognized to operate in the DRC, as of December 2009. The 
complete list is displayed in Appendix 1 (page 142). The list includes 19 banks, 101 
nonbanking financial institutions, 17 microfinance institutions, 12 change agencies, and 
30 money transfer agencies.     
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3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
3.1. Research Framework 
Post-conflict reconstruction is approached in this study as resulting from two constructs: 
economic development and conflict resolution. Understanding those constructs helps to 
conceptualize post-conflict and contextualize the theoretical stream of that concept. 
Economic development is interested in processes and policies that increase or 
decrease economic, political, and social well-being of nations and their people 
(O’Sullivan, 2003). Conflict resolution diverges from power-based conflict and focuses 
on needs-based conflict resolution, emphasizing the fundamental human needs and the 
essential goodness of humanity (Mills, 2006). According to Hasic (2004), the body of 
knowledge related to post-conflict reconstruction lacks a strong and cohesive theory. 
Nevertheless, Hamre & Sulivan (2002) identified four main domains of post-conflict 
reconstruction: security, justice and reconciliation, governance and participation, social 
and economic well-being. This study aims to address one of the four domains of post-
conflict reconstruction: social and economic well-being. The study concentrates in one 
specific area, which is financial services reconstruction in post-conflict settings. “Social 
and economic well-being addresses fundamental social and economic needs. In 
particular, it addresses the provision of emergency relief, restoration of essential 
services to the population in areas such as health and education, laying the foundation 
for a viable economy, and initiating an inclusive and sustainable development program.” 
(Hamre & Sullivan, 2002, p. 91). The study of microfinance as a financial services 
reconstruction tool in post-conflict communities fits the social and economic domain of 
post-conflict reconstruction because the restoration of financial services that work for 
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the majority of the population in post-conflict is essential to layout the basis for a viable 
modern economy. Pischke (1999) observes that:  
Finance matters in economic development (Fry, 1995), without which 
human development is retarded in the long run (UNDP, 1996; World Bank, 
1990)… Financial services supplied broadly and efficiently accelerate 
economic growth, increase the efficiency of resource allocation, and 
improve the distribution of wealth…Schumpeter (1911) claimed that 
financial intermediaries mobilizing savings, evaluating projects, 
diversifying risk, monitoring managers of indebted firms, and facilitating 
transactions are essential for technology innovation and economic 
growth.” (Pischke, 1999, p. 7).   
 
At the end of major armed conflicts, microfinance had played a crucial role of filling the 
vacuum left by formal finance and a growing informal sector (Pearce, 2003 cited by 
Marino, 2005). This study approaches modern microfinance as a combination of 
development and finance theories and practices. Muhamed Yunus developed a model 
that mixed finance ideas (loan, saving, interest rate, risk mitigation) with development 
issues (access, housing, nutrition, production, health, education) to create and promote 
the modern microfinance industry. The impact and utility of microfinance in post-conflict 
communities has not been fully addressed, particularly its significance in reconstructing 
sustainable financial services and its reconstruction role as a financial provider. This 
study aims to fill this gap by undertaking an assessment of the role that microfinance 
has played in the reconstruction of financial services. This assessment rests on three 
groups of variables related to outreach, financial performance, and reconstruction. This 
study seeks to analyze the role of microfinance in reconstructing financial services in 
the post-conflict DRC. This study also rests on the assumption that in a post-conflict 
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situation, characterized by mass poverty, weak capacity of financial services and 
diminished trust in the traditional financial services system, microfinance can work as a 
better tool in reconstructing financial services in the earlier stage of post-conflict period. 
Figure 3.1 bellow summarizes the conceptual framework of this study. 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Framework 
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The role of Microfinance in post-conflict reconstruction of financial services is 
investigated in this study using the DRC case, where three sectors have been identified 
as forming the financial services industry: the traditional financial services sector (TFS), 
the microfinance sector (MF), and the Informal financial sector (IFS). The traditional 
financial sector (TFS) encompasses providers of financial services using commercial 
lending methodology. They are not proactive and have rigid underwriting policies which 
always require collateral. They are recognized by the Central bank of Congo as legal 
providers of financial services and include commercial, development, and agricultural 
banks. The microfinance sector (MF) encompasses providers of financial services using 
micro lending methodology such as village banking, solidarity group, and individual 
lending. They are proactive and have flexible underwriting policies which often do not 
require collateral. They are recognized by the Central bank of Congo as legal providers 
of financial services and include non-profit organizations, credit unions, and banks. The 
informal financial sector (IFS) encompasses all financial transactions occurring -and 
institutions operating - outside the regulatory framework of the Central Bank of Congo. 
They operate within a framework of trust and have no guiding policies. They include a 
myriad of socio-cultural practices and associations (Likelemba, Moziki, Tontine, susu, 
social insurance, and ROSCAS), not-for-profit organizations, and private lenders.  
 
The informal financial sector emerged as the dominant financial sector when conflict 
ended in 2003, followed by the traditional financial sector and finally the microfinance 
sector. This study’s assumption is that the informal financial sector will grow during an 
armed conflict period; however, throughout the post-conflict period, it will show a 
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decrease in market share, which become mostly part of the microfinance sector. The 
argument is consistent with that of Barr (2005, p. 287) who argues that “in financially 
underdeveloped countries, microcredit can serve to reduce prevailing high interest rates 
in the informal sector through bringing increased levels of competition”. The Traditional 
financial sector will more or less maintain the same level during the early stage of post-
conflict. This is graphically represented in exhibit 3.2 below. 
Figure 3.2: Post-Conflict Hypothetical Predication 
 
Pre-Conflict Conflict  Post-Conflict Short-term 
MF<IFS<TFS MF<TFS<IFS TFS<IFS<MF  
 
 
Typically, it is expected that in the pre-conflict period TFS will surpass MF in market 
share. During conflict, both TFS and MF will experience a decline. At the end of the 
conflict period and the beginning of the post-conflict era, IFS will emerge as the larger 
sector among the three, followed by TFS and last MF. Due to its agility, it is expected 
that MF will grow faster in the earlier stage of post-conflict and eventually surpass TFS. 
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In the long term however, TFS will regain its position as the major component of the 
financial services industry, follow by MF. IFS will continue its decline as the country 
continues to return to normality.  
 
While the Informal Financial Sector (IFS) is undoubtedly a player, there are no objective 
means to reliably measure its relevance pre and post conflict as no reliable records 
exist. As a result, quantitative analyses in this research will only look at Microfinance 
(MF) and Traditional Financial Services (TFS). The role of IFS in this equation pre/post 
conflict will be explored through secondary data from previous studies and integrated 
whenever possible into the analyses of MF and TFS in post conflict reconstruction. 
 
3.2. Research Questions and Hypotheses  
 
 Question 1: Is microfinance an effective tool in post-conflict reconstruction?  
Sub-Question 1.1: Does MF show an increase in outreach as measured 
by employment, clientele, lending, and deposits during the post-conflict 
period?  
Sub-Question 1.2: Does MF show an increase in financial performance as 
measured by assets, profitability, efficiency, and risk mitigation during the 
post-conflict period? 
 Question 2: Is microfinance a more effective tool than traditional financial 
services in the earlier stage of a post-conflict construction? 
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Sub-Question 3.1: Does MF perform better than TFS in a post-conflict 
period when it comes to outreach as measured by employment, clientele, 
lending, and deposits?  
Sub-Question 3.2: Does MF perform better than TFS in a post-conflict 
period when it comes to financial performance as measured by assets, 
profitability, efficiency, and risk mitigation? 
Sub-Question 3.3: Does MF show a faster reconstruction than TFS in 
post-conflict communities in terms of client’s business development, 
education, assets, and standard of living? 
 Question 3: Are financial services provided by microfinance institutions 
translated into post-conflict reconstruction in terms of client’s business 
development, education, assets, and standard of living?  
 Exploratory Question 4: Is microfinance an alternative to informal financial 
sector in post-conflict period so that IFS loses more of its market share than TFS 
in favor of microfinance in post-conflict?  
Assessing the role of Microfinance (RQs 1 and 2) will identify whether it is active or not 
and the extent of its activity in this national case study (DRC). The question of its 
effectiveness and its relevance in relation to TFS will be addressed by RQ3, which 
compares MF to TFS before and after conflict. The core expectation of this research is 
that MF is more agile at the earlier stages of reconstruction, which will be reflected in 
the relevant rates of activity and expansion between these financial service modalities. 
RQ4 is explorative and will use secondary data from previous studies. Figure 3.3 
summarizes the research framework.  
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Figure 3.3: Research Framework Summary 
 
 
 
This study is a comparative study with two groups: financial services providers using a 
microfinance approach and those using a commercial or traditional approach. Each 
approach provides the study with an independent variable: traditional financial services 
(TFS) for providers using a commercial approach; and microfinance (MF) for providers 
that use a microfinance approach. Three constructs are used as dependent variables: 
outreach, financial performance, and reconstruction. Outreach is measured by the level 
of employment of the financial institution, the number of clients it serves, the volume of 
loans to clients and the volume of deposits or savings clients bring to the financial 
institution. Financial performance is measured by the volume of assets of the financial 
institution, its profitability, its efficiency and risk. While outreach and financial 
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performance are measured at the institutional level, the reconstruction variable is 
measured at the client and the household levels. Reconstruction is measured by the 
level of clients’ business development, and the access to education by family members 
of the client, household’s assets acquisition, and household’s expenditures. This study 
recognizes that there exist intervening variables that have effect on the dependent 
variables, mainly gender, informal sector, government policy and aid policy. This study 
will assume that intervening variables are constant.         
 
Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1.1: Outreach as measured by employment, clientele, lending, and deposits 
of MF (OMF) will display consecutive yearly increases from their 2003 levels through 
year 2008 or: 
  
      OMF2003 < OMF2004 < OMF2005 < OMF2006 < OMF2007 < OMF2008 
Hypothesis 1.2: Financial Performance as measured by assets, profitability, efficiency, 
and risk mitigation of MF (FPMF) will display consecutive yearly increases from their 
2003 level through year 2008 or:      
 
FPMF2003 < FPMF2004 < FPMF2005 < FPMF2006 < FPMF2007 < FPMF2008 
Hypothesis 2.1: Outreach as measured by employment, clientele, lending, and deposits 
of MF (OMF) will display higher yearly increases between 2004 and 2008 when 
compared to the outreach of TFS (OTFS) or: 
 
OMF2003 < OTFS2003; OMF2004 > OTFS2004; OMF2005 > OTFS2005; OMF2006 > OTFS2006; 
OMF2007 > OTFS2007; OMF2008 > OTFS2008 
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Hypothesis 2.2: Financial Performance as measured by assets, profitability, efficiency, 
and risk mitigation of MF will display higher yearly increases between 2004 and 2008 
when compared to the financial performance of TFS. 
 
FPMF2003 < FPTFS2003; FPMF2004 > FPTFS2004; FPMF2005 > FPTFS2005; FPMF2006 > 
FPTFS2006; FPMF2007 > FPTFS2007; FPMF2008 > FPTFS2008 
 
 
Hypothesis 2.3.: Reconstruction’s level of MF clients (RMF) as measured by their 
business development, assets, and standard of living will be faster than reconstruction’s 
level of TFS clients (RTFS ) or: 
 
      RMF > RTFS 
 
Hypothesis 3: Reconstruction’s level of MF clients as measured by their business 
development, assets, and standard of living before and after they become MF clients 
will display a significant difference between their Pre-MF membership levels (RPRE-MF) 
and their Post-MF membership levels (RPOST-MF) or: 
      RPRE-MF < RPOST-MF 
 
Explorative hypothesis 4: Microfinance is an alternative to the informal financial sector in 
post-conflict period and IFS loses most of its market share in favor of microfinance and 
less in favor of Traditional financial services in post-conflict period.  
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4. Methodology 
4.1. Research Design 
To assess outreach and financial performance of MF, the dissertation proposal planned 
to use Time Series analysis of data related to post-conflict level of outreach 
(employment, clientele, lending, savings/deposits) and of data related to post-conflict 
level of financial performance (assets, profitability, efficiency, risk) of microfinance 
institutions. To assess reconstruction level of MF clients, the dissertation proposal 
planned to use data from a survey of clients and non-clients of MF. To comparing 
outreach, financial performance, and reconstruction of MF and TFS, the dissertation 
proposal planned to use Time Series analysis and data from a survey of MF and TFS 
clients. To explore IFS behavior in comparison to MF and TFS, reliance on secondary 
data from previous studies on the subject and data from the Central Bank of Congo was 
proposed.   
 
Data collection was very challenging in the DRC. Data availability emerged as one 
among the challenges. As a result, only six microfinance institutions were used to 
answer the question of whether microfinance is an effective tool in post-conflict 
reconstruction. While the original intention was to collect data from 2003 to 2008; there 
was no complete data set for this timeframe. Instead, almost complete data set were 
found for four institutions for the period of 2005-2009. A fifth institution had complete 
data for 2004-2007, while a sixth had data for 2002-2006. The last two sets of data have 
been used flexibly and integrated in some analyses while excluded in others. The most 
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important purpose here was to see the trend of the data and see how close they are to 
the predicted patterns.    
 
Two commercial banks and two microfinance institutions were selected to answer the 
question of whether microfinance is a more effective tool than traditional financial 
services in the early stage of post-conflict reconstruction. Here too, while the original 
intention was to compare data from 2003 to 2008, unfortunately, the two providers 
applying a microfinance approach had no complete data set for this timeframe and 
therefore the period of 2005-2009 was used for the sake of comparison between MF 
and TFS.   
 
In the implementation of the survey, financial institutions were not very cooperative and 
did not provide the sample frame (lists of their clients), except for one microfinance 
bank. The main reasons evoked have been bank secrecy customs to protect clients’ 
identity, security of clients, and confidentiality. In some cases, financial institutions’ 
managers said they were too busy to deal with this request. This attitude resulted in 
delays in collecting data and prolonged the data collection period (six months instead of 
three months as planned) and required two overseas trips to get additional funding to do 
research in Congo. Faced with these challenges, an alternative method of collecting 
data was applied: 5 random clusters of market places were selected and vendors were 
randomly selected to identify their category (MF, Non Client, or TFS). After consent, 
interviews were conducted. Ninety-five structured interviews were conducted between 
6/2/2010 and 11/11/2010, using the “MFI Clients Post-Conflict Reconstruction Survey” 
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attached in Appendix 2. Forty-six interviews were conducted among clients of MF; forty-
seven interviews were conducted among non- clients of either microfinance institutions 
or commercial banks (Non Client); and only two clients of commercial banks (TFS) were 
found and interviewed. Obviously, only the MF vs. Non Client comparison was feasible 
and not the MF vs. TFS comparison, due to insufficient data collected in this category 
(TFS). The two interviews with clients of commercial banks (TFS) were considered as 
outliers and were excluded from the data set that serves for analyses. These 
circumstances resulted in some modifications of the dissertation proposal’s research 
design. The research design used in this dissertation is displayed below as Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1: Dissertation’s Research Design Annotation 
 
Time Series Analysis 
N     O2005   XMF O2006 XMF O2007 XMF O2008 XMF O2009  
N  O2005 XTFS O2006  XTFS O2007 XTFS O2008 XTFS O2009  
 
Survey  
N     OPRE         XMF  OPOST 
N     OPRE          OPOST 
    
 
Legend 
N  : Non Equivalent 
XMF : Microfinance approach in the provision of financial services 
XTFS : Traditional approach in the provision of financial services  
O : Observation 
 
The time series part of this study is designed as a retrospective longitudinal 
“Nonequivalent-Groups Design” (NEGD). It’s a NEGD because of nonrandom 
assignment of groups which cannot be considered as similar. It is also a “Repeated 
Measures Design” (Trochim, 2007, p. 6) with less than 20 waves of measurement over 
time. Time series analysis is an ordered sequence of values of variables that are 
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recorded at equal periods of time and can be used to “obtain an understanding of the 
underlying forces and structure that produced the observed data; and to fit a model and 
proceed to forecasting, monitoring or even feedback and feedforward control” (Prins, 
2009, p.1). Time series in this study shall help to determine whether MF has been active 
(yearly scale up) and agile (faster than TFS) during the post-conflict period. Using time 
series to look at outreach and financial performance variables of financial institutions 
(MF and TFS) on a yearly basis will determine whether variables changed over time and 
whether these changes were significant. This study’s survey is a cross-sectional inquiry 
because it takes place in a single point in time. It is designed as a Proxy Pretest Design 
(Trochim, 2007, p. 228) because the pre-test is collected after the program has already 
been implemented.  
 
4.2. Procedure, Sampling and Instrumentation 
Exhibit 4.2 below uses a chart presenting different variables (independent, dependent); 
a detailed operationalization of each group of variables; specific data gathering 
techniques for each group of variables and the sources from where the data will be 
collected. This study uses secondary data from various sources (The Microfinance 
Information Exchange Markets “MIX Markets”, DRC Central Bank, microfinance 
institutions, commercial banks, the World Bank, and the United Nations) to answer the 
first and part of the third research questions, while primary data from a survey will be 
used to answer the second research question and part of the third research question.  
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Table 4.1: Procedural Chart 
 
Variable Type Operationalization Data 
Gathering 
Technique 
 
Data Source 
Dependent  
 
1. Outreach 
Employment 
 
 
Clientele 
 
 
 
Loans 
 
 
 
 
Deposits/Savings 
 
 
 
 
Number of people employed by 
the financial institution.  
 
 
 
 
Secondary 
data review 
 
 
 
The MIX Markets; 
DRC Central Bank; 
MFIs; TFSIs 
 Number of clients 
 Woman Borrowers (%) 
 
Secondary 
data review 
 
The MIX Markets; 
DRC Central Bank; 
MFIs; TFSIs 
 
 Gross Loan Portfolio 
(US$) 
 Number of Borrowers 
 Average loan balance 
per Borrower (US$) 
 
Secondary 
data review 
 
The MIX Markets; 
DRC Central Bank; 
MFIs; TFSIs  
 
 Amount Deposits 
 Number of 
Savers/Depositors 
 Average 
savings/deposits 
balance per client (US$) 
Secondary 
data review 
 
The MIX Markets; 
DRC Central Bank; 
MFIs; TFSIs  
 
2. Financial 
Performance 
 
Assets 
 
 
 
 
 
Profitability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efficiency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total Assets (in US$) 
 Total Equity (in US$) 
 Total Debt (in US$) 
 
 
 
Secondary 
data review 
 
The MIX Markets; 
DRC Central Bank; 
MFIs; TFSIs 
 Capital/Asset ratio 
 Debt/Equity ratio 
 Return on equity (%) 
 Operational self-
sufficiency (%) 
 Profit Margin (%) 
 Total expense ratio (%) 
 Operating expense ratio 
(%) 
 
Secondary 
data review 
 
The MIX Markets; 
DRC Central Bank; 
MFIs; TFSIs 
 Operating expense/Loan 
portfolio (%) 
 Cost per borrower 
Borrowers / staff 
member 
 Savers per staff member 
 Borrower per staff  
 
Secondary 
data review 
 
The MIX Markets; 
DRC Central Bank; 
MFIs; TFSIs 
 Portfolio at risk > 30 
days ratio (%). 
 
Secondary 
  
The MIX Markets; 
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Risk 
 
 
 
 
 Portfolio at risk > 90 
days ratio (%). 
 Loan loss reserve ratio 
(%). 
 Risk coverage ratio (%) 
 Write off ratio (%) 
data review DRC Central Bank; 
MFIs; TFSIs 
3. Reconstruction 
 
 
 
Business Activities 
 
 
 
 
Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard of living  
 Number of businesses 
 Loan amount (in US$) 
 Loan term (in weeks) 
 Annual Interest rate (%) 
  Loan purpose  
 Main business 
 Duration of business 
 Job creation 
 Profitability of business 
Primary Data 
from Survey 
& Focus 
Group 
Survey; Focus Group; 
Secondary data 
 Children at school age 
 Attendance of children 
 Financing education 
 Household members 
literacy.  
Primary Data 
from Survey 
& Focus 
Group 
Survey; Focus Group; 
Secondary data 
 Agricultural land 
ownership 
 Agricultural items 
 Livestock 
 Communication 
 Means of transportation 
 Electronics 
 Kitchen Items 
 Furniture 
 Savings  
 Home ownership 
 Others 
  
 Home (rent/mortgage) 
 Furniture/Appliances 
 Utilities 
 Cooking fuel cost 
 Food purchase expense 
 Household production of 
food 
 Household/Personal 
products expense 
 Clothing & shoes 
 Total School/education 
expenditures 
 Transport expense 
 Total health expense 
 Charitable giving 
expenditures 
 Money to family/friends 
expenditures 
 Taxes/bribes 
expenditures 
Primary Data 
from Survey 
& Focus 
Group 
Survey; Focus Group; 
Secondary data 
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 Special events 
expenditures 
 Leisure expense 
 Other expenses 
Independent 
 
Microfinance (MF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Traditional 
Financial Services 
(TFS) 
Any provider of financial 
services using micro lending 
methodology through village 
banking, solidarity group, and 
individual lending, including:  
 Non-Profit (NGO) 
 Non-Bank financial 
institution 
 Cooperative/Credit 
Union 
 Bank   
 The MIX Markets; 
DRC Central Bank; 
MFIs; TFSIs 
Any provider of financial 
services using commercial 
lending methodology, including: 
 Commercial banks 
 Agricultural banks 
 The MIX Markets; 
DRC Central Bank; 
MFIs; TFSIs 
 
4.3. Data 
Three sources of data were planned for this study: first, financial data from financial 
services providers of both types: MF and TFS; second, data from the survey; and third, 
secondary and archival data from various sources (Mix Markets, Central Bank of 
Congo, International Monetary Funds, UNDCF, World Bank, DRC commercial banks) 
related to both MF and TFS. Only financial institutions with reliable data could be 
included in the time series analyses, recognizing that this could create a source of bias. 
As depicted in exhibit 4.2, data related to employment, clientele, loans and deposits 
were used to measure the effect of the independent variables on Outreach; data related 
to assets, profitability, efficiency, and risk were used to measure the effect of the 
independent variables on Financial Performance; finally, data related to business 
development, education, assets, and standard of living were used to measure the effect 
of the independent variables on Reconstruction.   
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4.4. Analysis 
Time Series Analysis of Outreach and Financial Performance 
Time Series Analysis pursues two main goals: (1) Identify the nature of a phenomenon 
the data represented; and (2) forecast or predict a pattern based on observed data 
(Prins, 2009). This study is concerned with the first goal only and intends to measure 
and identify the nature of MF and TFS behaviors in post-conflict situations. There are 
several types of data analysis for Time Series. Each is related to the specific purpose 
pursued by the study. This study principally used a systemic pattern identification and 
trend analysis. As suggested in the Post-Conflict Hypothetical Prediction, this study 
hypothesizes a “monotonous or consistently increasing trend” from the Time Series 
Analysis. 
 
To analyze research question 1.1 (Does MF show an increase in outreach as measured 
by employment, clientele, lending, and deposits during the post-conflict period?), time 
series analysis was designed to look at the four measures of the construct outreach as 
described in exhibit 4.2 by looking at consecutive yearly increases from their 2005 
levels through year 2009. Percentage change from each year would illustrate the trend 
using measures of central tendency (mean, median, and mode) and measures of 
dispersion (standard deviation, and variance).  
  
To analyze research question 1.2 (Does MF show an increase in financial performance 
as measured by assets, profitability, efficiency, and risk mitigation during the post-
conflict period?), time series analysis would look at the four measures of the construct 
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financial performance as described in exhibit 4.2 by looking at consecutive yearly 
performance of each measure from their 2005 levels through year 2009. Yearly totals or 
percentage change from each year would illustrate the trend, using measures of central 
tendency (mean, median, and mode) and measures of dispersion (standard deviation, 
and variance).  
 
To analyze research question 3.1 (Does MF show a better performance in comparison 
with TFS in a post-conflict period when it comes to outreach as measured by 
employment, clientele, lending, and deposits?), a comparison between MF and TFS 
was proposed, using time series analysis of each independent variable by looking at the 
four measures of the construct financial performance as described in exhibit 4.2. Time 
series would compare yearly outcome from 2005 levels through year 2009. Yearly totals 
or percentage change of each measure would illustrate the trend using graphs.  
 
To analyze research question 3.2 (does MF show a better performance in comparison 
with TFS in a post-conflict period when it comes to financial performance as measured 
by assets, profitability, efficiency, and risk mitigation?), a comparison between MF and 
TFS was proposed, using time series analysis of each independent variable by looking 
at the four measures of the construct financial performance as described in exhibit 4.2. 
Time series would compare yearly outcome from 2005 levels through year 2009. Yearly 
totals or percentage change of each type of providers would illustrate the trend using 
graphs.  
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Analysis of Reconstruction Level of MF Clients 
Checking for differences between the three groups (MFI clients, TFS clients, and non- 
clients) is a starting point for understanding how they are different. Henry et al. of the 
CGAP (2003) suggested that t-tests of differences between means and the chi-square 
test for cross tabulations are appropriate tests for determining such differences. Cross 
tabulations were used as a means of identifying relationships. Some of data were 
parametric and therefore parametric correlation coefficients were used to measure the 
strength of the relationships between variables.  Some variables produced non-
parametric data and therefore non parametric correlation coefficients were used. 
Significance tests used generally accepted social science standard.  
 
As depicted in exhibit 4.2, data related to business development, education, assets 
acquisition, and standard of living were used to measure the effect of the independent 
variables on reconstruction. To test the business development hypothesis, three 
variables were tested statistically: number of businesses, profit, and number of 
employees. To test the education hypothesis, two variables were submitted to inferential 
analysis: number of children currently sent to school and number of children sent to 
school before microfinance. To test the asset acquisition hypothesis, one score 
summarizing assets acquisition was submitted to statistical analysis. That variable was 
the Total value of all of goods acquired. To test the standard of living hypothesis, two 
variables were submitted to statistical analysis: individual income of interviewees and 
their households’ expense. Savings emerged as another key measure of reconstruction 
during data collection. To test the savings hypothesis, one variable was submitted to 
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statistical analysis: amount saved. Prior to executing statistical tests, some descriptive 
information was provided for each of these variables.  
 
Following Field’s (2005) recommendation, the first step of the analysis of each variable 
was testing for normality (Kolgomorov-Smirnov “K-S” and Shapiro-Wilk “S-W” tests). 
After testing normality, a test of homogeneity of variance (Levene statistic) was 
conducted. The two tests intended to provide the study with a decision whether to use 
parametric or nonparametric tests. The second step applied the correct (parametric or 
nonparametric) test to check if there was any correlation between the independent and 
the dependent variables (Pearson, Spearman and Kendall tau, Biserial, or Point-
Biserial). When correlation was found, then the independent t-test (parametric) and the 
Mann-Whitney U Test (nonparametric) were applied to the data. The conclusion has 
been to reject or retain the null hypothesis. However, again following Field (2005), a 
decision has been made to apply both parametric and nonparametric tests to the data to 
make sure that all tests resulted to the same outcome (correlation and significance). 
The rationale for this double-testing can be justified by Field argument that “tests of 
normality (Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk) have their own limitations because 
with large sample sizes, it is very easy to get significant results from small deviations 
from normality, and so a significant test doesn’t necessarily tell us whether the 
deviations from normality is enough to bias any statistical procedures that we apply to 
the data. I guess the take-home message is: by all means use these tests, but plot your 
data as well as try to make an informed decision about the extent of non-normality” 
(Field, 2005, 93).   
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This study also computed the DPCE (Daily Per Capita Expenditure) Score. The DPCE 
is a score used by FINCA Client Assessment Tool (FCAT) to determine the poverty 
level of an MFI client (FINCA, 2007). The methodology is based on widely accepted 
indicators of poverty scaled (FINCA, 2007) as following: 
  
a. Less than $1/day of total household consumption indicates “Severe Poverty”. 
b. $1-$2/day of total household consumption indicates “Moderate Poverty”. 
c. Above $2/day of total household consumption indicates “Vulnerable or Non-
Poor”. 
 
Using collected data from the variable “Expenditures” of the survey resulted in 
computing a DPCE for each category of clients. Using the DPCE score to determine 
their consumption level should provide a good indication of the reconstruction effect on 
clients. FINCA utilizes comprehensive annual household expenditure data to compute 
the total household expenditures which is then divided by the total number of household 
members. In this study, a comprehensive monthly household expenditure data was 
used instead. Indeed, when using the FCAT in 2007, it appeared very challenging to 
clients to remember their expenses an annual basis. A monthly approach appeared to 
be a more practical one.        
 
4.5. Validiy, Reliability and Limitations 
Quasi-experiments are vulnerable to internal validity threats primarily because of non-
randomization. Proxy Pretest Design is susceptible to threats to internal validity 
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because it is based on either recollection or archives. This study is aware of these 
threats and every effort will be made to minimize the threats through data collection and 
analysis. Multiple sources (financial institutions, World Bank, MIXMarkets, DRC Central 
Bank) will be used to reduce errors from archival sources. Recollection errors will be 
reduced by repeating the same questions in diverse forms during the interviews.  
 
 Another limitation is the reliability of data from DRC, a country that just emerged from a 
regional civil war seven years ago. The study will try to avoid and correct such problems 
whenever possible. Fortunately, however, institutions such as CGAP, the World Bank, 
International MFIs and the MIXMarkets provide data that can be approached with some 
level of trust.    
 
4.6. Significance 
 
This study expected to find that microfinance, as a mode of financial services provision, 
is more agile and is a better tool than traditional financial services in a post-conflict 
reconstruction, at least in the early interim phases of reconstruction. MF takes less time 
for to set-up after conflict than TFS; it reaches more people faster through its proactive 
methodology, which induces MF to employ more people than do TFS. MF also reaches 
out to a portion of the population that has been excluded from TFS even in peace time. 
MF may therefore act as an entry level for this portion of the population, and for the 
general population, to access financial services after a significant conflict. Moreover, MF 
can work as a bridge between the informal sector and the commercial banking sector. 
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The policy implication, thereby the significance of this research, is that if MF is more 
agile than TFS, it should then be emphasized as intervention in the early stages of 
reconstruction. If proved that microfinance is more agile and positions itself as a bridge 
between the informal financial sector and the commercial financial sector, then a 
potential solution to the exclusion of some segments of the population in accessing 
mainstream financial services encountered in many developing countries may be 
addressed. The divide between the poor majority and the rich in accessing financial 
services can be addressed and reduced. While inequality in accessing financial services 
may always exist, it can be reduced by using a hybrid model of financial services 
provision following a conflict.  
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5. Results 
 
This chapter presents the results of data collected at two levels: the institutional level 
and the individual (client) level. Data collected at the institutional level aim to test 
research questions one and two, while data collected at the individual level aim to test 
research question three.  
 
First, a sample of six microfinance institutions was used to answer the question of 
whether microfinance is an effective tool in post-conflict reconstruction. Operationally, 
the data collected indicate whether microfinance institutions show an increase in 
outreach as measured by employment, clientele, lending, and deposits during the post-
conflict period; and whether they show an increase in financial performance as 
measured by their assets, profitability, efficiency, and risk mitigation during the post-
conflict period. The original intention was to collect data from 2003 to 2008; however, 
there was no complete data set for this timeframe.  Instead, almost complete data was 
found for four institutions for the period 2005-2009.  A fifth institution had complete data 
for 2004-2007, while a sixth had data for 2002-2006. The last two sets of data will be 
used flexibly and are integrated in some analyses while excluded in others. The most 
important purpose here is to see the trend of the data and see how close they are to the 
predicted patterns.    
 
Second, a total of 111 interviews (95 structured and 16 unstructured) were conducted 
among micro-entrepreneurs, microfinance institution personnel and bankers operating 
in Kinshasa, the capital city of the DRC. Sixteen unstructured interviews were 
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conducted among bankers and microfinance institutions’ personnel.  Ninety-five 
structured interviews were conducted between 6/2/2010 and 11/11/2010, using the “MFI 
Clients Post-Conflict Reconstruction Survey” attached in Appendix 1. These interviews 
provided a set of primary quantitative data and a set of primary qualitative data obtained 
by probing and asking unstructured questions when collecting quantitative data.  Forty-
five interviews were conducted among clients of microfinance institutions; fifty among 
non-clients of microfinance institutions. These data aim to check whether or not financial 
services provided by microfinance institutions are translated into post-conflict 
reconstruction in terms of clients’ business development, education, assets, and 
standard of living.  
 
Third, two commercial banks and two microfinance institutions were selected to answer 
the question of whether microfinance is a more effective tool than traditional financial 
services in the early stage of post-conflict reconstruction. Operationally, a comparison of 
data collected from the two categories of financial services providers is used to 
determine whether microfinance institutions show higher increases than commercial 
banks in outreach as measured by employment, clientele, lending, and deposits during 
the post-conflict period; and whether microfinance shows better financial performance 
than commercial banks as measured by their assets, profitability, efficiency, and risk 
mitigation during the post-conflict period. The original intention was to survey data from 
2003 to 2008, however the two providers applying a microfinance approach had no 
complete data set for this timeframe and therefore the period of 2005-2009 was used.   
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This study did not collect enough data to determine whether the microfinance approach 
leads to faster reconstruction than the commercial approach; nor can it answer the 
question of whether microfinance is an alternative to the informal financial sector in the 
post-conflict period. The two questions will be addressed in further research.  
 
5.1. Financial Institutions Surveyed 
 
This chapter focuses on the results of outreach, financial performance, and 
reconstruction by microfinance institutions. Eight financial institutions (six institutions 
applying a microfinance approach and two institutions applying a commercial approach 
to financial services provision) were selected to provide data to assess outreach and 
financial performance, while interviews provided data to assess reconstruction. A profile 
of the eight institutions included in the sample should provide a context for the 
subsequent data analysis. The eight financial  institutions are: PAIDEK, HEKIMA, 
FINCA DRC, PROCREDIT BANK CONGO, HOPE DRC, BOSANGANI, BCDC, and 
RAWBANK.  
 
5.1.1. PAIDEK 
PAIDEK stands for “Programme d’Appui aux Initiatives de Développement 
Economiques du Kivu” (“Program to Support Economic Development Initiatives of 
Kivu”). PAIDEK was established in 1996 under the name “Programme Credit Zaire” or 
PCZ (“Zaire Credit Program”). The project was a result of a request by the Congolese 
National Association of NGO to foreign Non Profit Organizations (NGO) to help the 
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country to establish microfinance institutions in Zaire. The new microfinance program 
would be a response to the failure of the Zairian cooperative system that occurred at the 
end of the Eighties and the early Nineties.  
 
SOS Faim, a European NGO, helped with the initial funding and initially co-managed 
the program with local teams. At the end of 1997, the PCZ failed and was restructured 
and renamed PAIDEK, operating under the direct supervision of SOS Faim. On May 19, 
2005 PAIDEK became an NGO and obtained later its legal status as a Congolese NGO 
(Authorization No. 0066/CAB/MIN/J/2006 of March 23, 2006). PAIDEK is recognized by 
the Central Bank of Congo (BCC) as a microfinance institution under the new DRC 
microfinance law as provided in Instruction No.1 to Microfinance Institutions of 
December 18, 2005 published July 5, 2006 in the Official journal of the DRC. By 
December 2006, PAIDEK had provided 14,023 total loans to its target population (SOS 
Faim, 2011).  
 
As of December 2009, PAIDEK had a Gross Loan Portfolio of US$ 1.8 million; 10,835 
active borrowers; an average of US$ 169 per borrower; US$ 0 deposit; 38 employees, 9 
offices; and total assets of US$ 2.4 million (MixMarkets, 2010). PAIDEK operates 
essentially in the Eastern part of the DRC, specifically in the Kivu provinces, where the 
DRC had experienced most conflicts during the last twenty years.  
 
PAIDEK was established when the first civil war started in the Kivu provinces in 1996. 
The region experienced another major civil war in 1998. Even though major conflicts 
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have ended, still PAIDEK operates in an unstable region where militia from DRC and 
Rwanda operate and terrorize rural populations with rapes and lootings. PAIDEK is a 
credit-led microfinance organization providing mostly loans to urban populations of the 
Kivu provinces.  
 
5.1.2. HEKIMA 
HEKIMA is a microfinance institution established in April 2004 by World Relief, a well-
known international NGO. According to World Relief (2011) “HEKIMA was established 
to provide affordable financial services to underserved communities and help strengthen 
the entire microfinance sector in Congo.” (http://worldrelief.org/Page.aspx?pid=1697, 
p.1). Upon creation, HEKIMA started operating in the city of Goma, capital of the Nord-
Kivu Province in Eastern DRC and later in 2006 expanded to Bukavu, the capital city of 
the neighbor Sud-Kivu province.  
 
HEKIMA has barely begun to meet the vast needs for financial services 
that exist in Congo’s eastern communities. The success seen to date, 
however, promises great change in the financial landscape. As HEKIMA 
expands, it will continue to provide hope to entrepreneurs in Goma and 
other communities in Eastern Congo. As in Burundi, World Relief and 
USAID have supported the development of a sector association capable 
of improving financial service delivery across the microfinance sector of 
Eastern Congo (World Relief, 2011, 1).  
 
HEKIMA is recognized by the Central Bank of Congo (CBC) as a microfinance 
institution under the new DRC microfinance law. HEKIMA engages in credit-led 
microfinance providing loans and collecting deposits from its clients.  As of December 
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2009, HEKIMA had a Gross Loan Portfolio of US$ 740,366; 9,229 active borrowers; an 
average of US$ 80 per borrower; US$ 598,123 deposits; 41 employees; 3 offices; and 
total assets of US$ 1.7 million (MixMarkets, 2010). HEKIMA operates essentially in the 
Eastern part of the DRC, specifically in the Kivu provinces, where the DRC had 
experienced most conflicts during the last twenty years. HEKIMA was established when 
major armed conflicts ended and the DRC entered the post-conflict era. KIVA (2010) 
describes the environment in which HEKIMA operates as follows:  
 
   
HEKIMA operates in an area that has been marked by over a decade of 
wars as well as social, economic and institutional collapse. A complex 
legal and regulatory environment is further complicated by widespread 
corruption and market flooded with poor quality of microfinance suppliers. 
In the city of Goma, where HEKIMA is based, many people are still 
recovering from 2002 eruption of the Nyragongo volcano which destroyed 
much of the city, and left over 100,000 people homeless. (KIVA, 2011, 
p.1). 
 
 
5.1.3. FINCA DRC 
 
FINCA DRC is one among 21 national microfinance programs forming the FINCA 
International network. FINCA International is one of the largest microfinance programs 
in the world, founded by John Hatch.  
 
In 1984, while working in a USAID project with farmers in Bolivia, John 
Hatch conceived a small loan program for low-income farmers that put 
them in charge. The program allowed them to obtain loans without 
collateral at interest rates they could afford. It brought groups of neighbors 
together giving them the power to collectively disburse, invest and collect 
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loan capital as they saw fit. His program became known as village banking 
(FINCA, 2011, 1).  
 
FINCA International is based in Washington, DC. Worldwide, FINCA reaches over 
700,000 clients, has provided US$ 320 million in outstanding loans, and is on pace to 
disburse US$ 800 million in loans by year end (FINCA, 2011). 
 
In 1992 FINCA entered Africa to see whether it could duplicate success in 
Latin America on the continent where poverty was [more] severe. FINCA 
Uganda opened in 1992 and later programs in Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, 
and the DRC were established. FINCA’s programs in Africa have proven 
among the most successful in the region… In 2009, FINCA partnered with 
Deutsche Bank to secure capital commitments of US$ 212 million to 
provide FINCA affiliates, including the DRC, the financial flexibility to lend 
an estimated US$ 100 million in additional loan capital, as well as make 
investments in staff, branches and other infrastructures to support its 
expanding microfinance lending and deposit-taking programs (FINCA, 
2011, 1).   
 
FINCA DRC was established in May 2003 thanks to a grant from USAID in order to 
provide financial services to DRC poor families so that they can create their own jobs, 
enhance their existing businesses or create new businesses, increase their household 
incomes and improve their standard of living. FINCA DRC entered the DRC’s financial 
services market when major armed conflicts ended and the DRC entered the post-
conflict era. FINCA DRC “is a regulated and deposit-taking microfinance institution, 
which permits it to better support the economic and human development of Congolese 
families trapped in poverty” (FINCA, 2011, p.1). FINCA is recognized by the Central 
Bank of Congo (CBC) as a microfinance institution under the DRC microfinance law. 
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 As of December 2009, FINCA DRC had a Gross Loan Portfolio of US$ 10.4 million; 
44,532 active borrowers; an average of US$ 232 per borrower; US$ 4.2 million 
deposits; 342 employees; 5 branches; and total assets of US$ 16.5 million (MixMarkets, 
2010). FINCA DRC operates essentially in the Western part of the DRC, with most of its 
activities based in Kinshasa, the capital city of DRC. FINCA DRC started its expansion 
outside Kinshasa in 2007 with its first office opening doors in the province of Bas-
Congo, specifically in Matadi, the capital city of Bas-Congo. In six years of operations 
(2004-2009), FINCA DRC has emerged as the DRC’s largest provider of loans and had 
44,532 outstanding loans as of December 2009 versus 13,577 for MECRECO and 
10,273 for PROCREDIT for the same period (Mecreco, 2010; MixMarkets, 2010; 
Procredit, 2010). As of 2009, FINCA DRC was the second largest non bank financial 
institution in terms of total clients (44,532) behind MECRECO (49,675). However, as of 
December 2010, FINCA reported servicing 59,005 clients which makes it also the 
largest microfinance institution in terms of total clients. PROCREDIT had however the 
largest portfolio of deposit accounts (109,183 as of December 2009). In 2005, 100% of 
FINCA DRC clients were women, while in 2009 women were still the majority group but 
represented only 76% of borrowers (MixMarket, 2010). In addition, though FINCA 
DRC’s early focus was on Village Banking (VB), it has quickly embraced the Individual 
Loan (IL) methodology and already by 2007, 52% of its loan portfolio was IL and only 
48% VB (Matabisi and al., 2007). VB clients have access to small loans while IL clients 
have access to larger loans. As a result FINCA DRC’s individual loan size varies from 
an average of US$ 50 to above US$ 5,000.  
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5.1.4. PROCREDIT BANK CONGO 
ProCredit Bank Congo is one of 21 banks operated by the ProCredit Group, led by the 
ProCredit Holding AG, a holding company based in Europe, specifically in Germany.  
 
 
The ProCredit group consists of 21 growing banks operating in transition 
economies and developing countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America 
and Africa. Procredit Holding, the majority shareholder in the group, 
defines its purpose as to provide strategic guidance and management for 
these banks, which are growing rapidly (Procredit, 2011, 1).  
 
 
ProCredit Group is emerging as one of the strongest financial institutions applying a 
microfinance approach to financial services provision. ProCredit can be considered as 
an adapted model of Grameen Bank or, better, a hybrid financial institution mixing 
microfinance and some classical banking methods that result in a faster development of 
both the financial institution and its client base.  
 
 
The group is committed to both social and commercial objectives. All 21 
institutions are locally registered and most are regulated by the local 
banking supervisory agency. These features distinguish the ProCredit 
group from microfinance NGOs (non-governmental organizations). 
Lacking commercial criteria, such institutions tend not to be profitable and 
therefore not sustainable except through continued grants and donations. 
Their capacity for growth is typically limited, as is their outreach. As a 
result, they usually remain quite small and localized… ProCredit banks 
focus on providing financing for small business… the reason for this 
emphasis is that small enterprises and family-run businesses are the most 
effective means of combating marginalization and poverty in the difficult 
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economic environments in which they operate. It is widely recognized that 
such enterprises are the engines of economic growth and provide much of 
the formal employment and informal employment in our countries of 
operation (ProCredit, 2011, 1).  
  
 
ProCredit Bank launched its operations in the DRC in August 2005 with the goal of 
providing financial services to medium and small businesses as well as to micro-
entrepreneurs operating in the DRC. ProCredit Congo is a regulated financial institution, 
bearing the status of a local bank subject to the supervisory activities of the Central 
Bank of Congo. ProCredit Congo entered the DRC’s financial services market when 
major armed conflicts ended and the DRC entered the post-conflict era. As of 
December 2009, ProCredit Congo had a Gross Loan Portfolio of US$ 33.7 million; 
10,273 active borrowers; an average of US$ 3,283 per borrower; US$ 108.5 million in 
deposits; 109,183 depositors; 455 employees; 11 branches; and total assets of US$ 
122 million (MixMarkets, 2010). In six years of operations (2004-2009), when compared 
to its peers applying a microfinance approach to financial services provision, ProCredit 
has emerged as the largest provider of loans in term of volume (US$), has the largest 
portfolio of deposit accounts; the largest total amount of deposits, is the number one 
employer, and has the highest volume in total assets. ProCredit Congo operates 
essentially in the Western part of the DRC, with most of its activities based in Kinshasa, 
the capital city of DRC.  
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5.1.5. HOPE DRC 
HOPE DRC is one among 14 national microfinance programs forming the HOPE 
International microfinance network with programs in Afghanistan, Burundi, China, DRC, 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, India, Moldova, Philippines, Republic of Congo, Romania, 
Russia, Rwanda and Ukraine.  
 
 
Hope was founded in 1997 by Jeff Rutt, a Lancaster, Pennsylvania [USA] 
based homebuilder. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Mr. Rutt 
traveled to Ukraine…transporting containers of food, clothing, and medical 
supplies. After several visits, a local pastor pulled Jeff aside and told him 
honestly that the shipments were not helping… though people were 
accessing needed supplies they had become dependent on American 
charity… Mr. Rutt returned from the trip with strong drive to find a solution. 
He plunged into research and eventually discovered the concept of 
microfinance. He applied this tool with great success in Ukraine…As Mr. 
Rutt and Hope’s staff realized the enormous impact they could have on 
the poor through microfinance, they expanded to other countries (HOPE 
International, 2011, 1).    
 
 
HOPE International’s microfinance programs seem to differ from other programs in its 
emphasis on religious faith and values added to business efficiency and effectiveness 
goals. 
The mission of HOPE International microfinance program is to provide 
sustainable financial services and training which have a positive impact on 
the physical and spiritual health of the poor in a way that strengthens the 
church and brings honor and glory to Jesus Christ (Mixmarkets, 2010, 1).  
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HOPE DRC was established in 2004 and started disbursing loans in Kinshasa, the 
capital city of DRC. While most microfinance institutions concentrate their activities in 
one area and then expand later, HOPE DRC chose from start to establish its activities in 
the three main cities of DRC (Kinshasa, Kisangani and Lubumbashi) separated by 
thousands of miles within a country emerging from decades of political and armed 
conflicts without basic infrastructures. “The main challenges include creating efficiencies 
in an environment with underdeveloped infrastructures and managing multiple branches 
separated by large geographic distances” (Mixmarkets, 2010, p.1). HOPE DRC entered 
the DRC’s financial services market when major armed conflicts ended and the DRC 
entered the post-conflict era. HOPE is a regulated microfinance institution recognized 
by the Central Bank of Congo (BCC) as a microfinance institution under the new DRC 
microfinance law. As of December 2007, HOPE DRC had a Gross Loan Portfolio of 
US$ 868,225; 11,160 active borrowers; an average of US$ 78 per borrower; US$ 0 
deposit; 100 employees; and total assets of US$ 1,506,001(MixMarkets, 2010).  
 
5.1.6. BOSANGANI 
BOSANGANI is a mutual saving and credit institution (Mutelle d’Epargne et de Credit) 
established in 2002 with the mission of providing its members with financial services 
that increase their coping mechanism against poverty. BOSANGANI started its activities 
one year before Congo entered the post-conflict era when major political and armed 
conflicts were still occurring in the Eastern part of the country. BOSANGANI is a 
regulated microfinance institution recognized by the Central Bank of Congo (BCC) as a 
microfinance institution under the new DRC microfinance law as provided in Instruction 
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No.1 to Microfinance Institutions of December 18, 2005 published July 5, 2006 in the 
Official journal of the DRC. As of December 2006, BOSANGANI had a Gross Loan 
Portfolio of US$ 46,876; 258 active borrowers; an average of US$ 182 per borrower; 
1,230 depositors; US$ 47,974 in deposit; 7 employees; and total assets of US$ 86,368 
(MixMarkets, 2010).  
 
5.1.7. BCDC 
BCDC stands for “Banque Commerciale Du Congo” (“Commercial Bank Of Congo”). 
BCDC is the oldest commercial bank of the DRC. BCDC started its activities on January 
11, 1909 under the denomination of “Banque du Congo Belge”. This happened one year 
after the former Independent State of Congo, personal property of King Leopold II, 
became a colony of Belgium. Branches were opened in Matadi (1909), Kinshasa (1910) 
and Lubumbashi (1910). For over 40 years, BCDC fulfilled some prerogatives of the 
Central Bank of Congo, including the emission of the country’s currency. The status of 
the bank changed in July 1, 1952 upon the creation of the “Banque Centrale du Congo 
Belge”, the old version of the current Central Bank of Congo. A new incorporation was 
therefore needed.   
 
BCDC was incorporated by the deed of 16 September 1952 in the form of 
a joint stock company with limited liability. It is established according to the 
banking legislation of DRC as stipulated by Order in Council No. 72/004 of 
14 January 1972 relating to the protection of savings and the control of 
financial intermediaries as modified by law No. 003/2002 of 2 February 
2002 relating to the activity and the control of financial institutions. 
According to its articles of association, BCDC’s corporate object is to carry 
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out any banking, stock market, exchange, finance, cash, commission… 
(BCDC, 2006, 5).  
 
 
BCDC has gone through the highs and lows of the Belgian Congo (1908-1960), the new 
independent Congo (1960-1965), the Mobutu era and the State of Zaire (1965-1997) 
during which major financial world crises occurred, three civil wars, and the looting of 
financial institutions in 1991 and 1993; the armed conflicts of the DRC under the Kabilas 
(1997-2003); and now the post-conflict DRC since 2003. As of 2009, BCDC had US$ 
300.3 million in total assets; US$ 30.2 million as own funds; USD 192 million in 
deposits; US$ 101.1 in loans; 183.1 million financial income; US$ 50.9 million in net 
income on banking operations; and 461 employees (BCDC Annual Report 2009, p. 7). 
At its highest, BCD had 2,952 employees (1987) and in its lowest it had only 279 
employees (2002). Throughout its existence, BCDC’s focus has been on corporate 
banking with its clients being essentially large private and state companies. This 
category of clients is still the lion’s share of BCDC activities. “BCDC commercial 
activities are oriented in priority to large companies, international organizations and 
institutions, performing Small and Medium Businesses, salaried employees of large 
private and public companies” (BCDC, 2010, 32). However, the post-conflict DRC has 
brought new opportunities and a new environment in the provision of financial services 
by BCDC. As a result, BCDC has established since 2003 three divisions: corporate 
banking; financial institutions and banks; and retail and personal banking. This strategy 
represented a shift in the BCDC’s strategy and approach to financial services provision 
in a DRC entering the post-conflict period. As stated in their 2009 annual report, BCDC 
claims that with the new commercial organization designed in 2003 and oriented 
64 
 
towards “clients”, BCDC has shown again leadership and innovation in providing 
financial services in the DRC (BCDC, 2010). BCDC has the largest geographical 
coverage of DRC with branches in all but three of the country’s Bandundu, Equateur, 
and Maniema provinces. 
 
5.1.8. RAWBANK 
RAWBANK S.A.R.L. was established in May 2001and authorized to conduct 
commercial banking activities following the Presidential decree No. 040/2001 of August 
2001. As of December 31, 2009, the bank’s capital was leveled at US$ 11.13 million 
shared between RAWHOLDING S.A. and six members of the Rawji family (RAWBANK, 
2010). RAWBANK is an initiative of the Rawji family, doing business in the DRC since 
1922. The bank was established according to the banking legislation of DRC as 
stipulated by Order in Council No. 72/004 of 14 January 1972 and the control of 
financial intermediaries as modified by law No. 003/2002 of 2 February 2002 relating to 
the activity and the control of financial institutions. 
 
RAWBANK defines itself as a world-class, global, innovative bank that 
creates and distributes highly effective and profitable banking, financial 
and electronic banking systems for all its Congolese and international 
customers, private and public enterprises, international organizations, 
embassies, NGOs and private customers (RAWBANK, 2007, 4). 
  
RAWBANK started its activities two years before Congo entered the post-conflict era 
when major political and armed conflicts were still occurring in the Eastern part of the 
country. However, the bank came to life when a climate of business renewal started to 
take roots in Congo with ongoing negations between rebel factions and the new political 
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leadership in Kinshasa led by Joseph Kabila.  Kabila replaced his father, who was 
assassinated in January of 2001.    
 
Since it was established, RAWBANK has been primarily a corporate bank, 
but we are now developing a retail customer base of individual employees 
and well-established businesspeople. This commercial development is in 
anticipation of changes in Congolese society which, with the return of 
political normalization and economic recovery is gradually seeing the 
rebirth of middle-class who are both savers and consumers. We will 
continue to introduce new savings and loans products to the market for 
the benefit of these demanding customers (RAWBANK, 2007, 5).    
 
 
The shift in its strategy, from a primarily corporate bank to a diversified bank with an 
important retail division, has brought tremendous growth of the new established 
commercial bank positioning it as a fierce competitor of the oldest and centennial 
commercial bank, the BCDC. As a result, RAWBANK went from under 5,000 bank 
accounts in 2007 to over 20,000 in 2008, a five times increase in one year. As of 2009, 
RAWBANK had around US$ 308.1 million in total assets (compared to US$ 300.3 
million for BCDC); US$ 32 million in own funds (compared to US$ 30.2 million for 
BCDC); US$ 238.2 million in deposits (compared to US$ 192 million for BCDC); US$ 
99.2 in loans (compared to US$ 101.1 million for BCDC); US$ 22.8 million financial 
income (compared to US$ 183.1 million for BCDC); US$ 3.1 million in net income on 
banking operations (compared to US$ 50.9 million for BCDC) ; and 433 (compared to 
461 for BCDC) employees (BCDC Annual Report 2009; RAWBANK Annual Report 
2009). At inception, RAWBANK concentrated its operations in the capital city of 
Kinshasa but started expanding geographically within the vast territory of the DRC.  
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5.2. Outreach by Microfinance Institutions 
 
5.2.1. Employment 
 
Four microfinance institutions in our sample had complete data on the number of 
employees their specific institution employed from 2005 to 2009. Table 5.1 summarizes 
employment by MF from 2005 to 2009. 
  
Table 5.1: Employment by Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
Institutions 
Name 2005 2006 
Hired 
2006 2007 
Hired 
2007 2008 
Hired 
2008 2009 
Hired 
2009 
% 
Chg 
05-
09 
Paidek 31 34 3 37 3 36 -1 38 2 23% 
Finca 59 140 81 219 79 295 76 342 47 480% 
Hekima 17 34 17 36 2 39 3 41 2 141% 
Procredit 49 105 56 188 83 319 131 455 136 829% 
Total  156 313 157 480 167 689 209 876 187 462% 
Source: Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit, 2008.  
 
 
As of 2009, Procredit had the highest number of employees, followed by Finca, Hekima 
and finally Paidek. Procredit and Finca had also the highest employment rate from 2005 
to 2009 while Hekima and Paidek had a slow increase in the number of people hired 
during the same period. Figure 5.1 provides the time series trend of employment by 
each microfinance institution.  
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Figure 5.1: Employment by Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
Overall and as an industry, the sample shows steady yearly increases in the number of 
people hired from 2005 to 2009 which is over 500% increase for the five year period. 
Figure 5.2 provides the time series trend of employment by all microfinance institutions.  
 
Figure 5.2: Employment by All Four MF Institutions in the Sample (2005-2009) 
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As hypothesized, outreach, as measured by the level of employment by microfinance 
institutions, displays consecutive yearly increases from 2005 through year 2009. The 
increases occurred at the institutional level and at the industry level. Clearly, two 
institutions have greatly impacted the trend line, Procredit and Finca. Nevertheless, 
Hekima and Paidek have also shown increases (except for Paidek in 2008) even though 
far below the level shown by Procredit and Finca.   
  
5.2.2. Clientele 
 
The number of loans recipients was used as an indicator of clientele for Paidek, Finca, 
and Hekima while the number of depositors was used for Procredit. Up until recently, 
the former three institutions were essentially loan providers. In the case of Finca, what 
was considered a deposit was the compulsory saving of a borrower. Recently, Finca 
has officially launched its deposit/saving program. Paidek has no depositors reported 
while Hekima reported the same number except for year 2009. Procredit instead has 
been providing loans and collecting deposits since it began operations. Table 5.2 
summarizes the outreach of microfinance institutions in terms of clientele.  
 
Table 5.2: Number of Clients of Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
Institution
s Name 2005 2006 
New 
Clients 
06 
2007 
New 
Clients 
07 
2008 
New 
Clients 
08 
2009 
New 
Clients 
09 
Paidek 8,872 9,936 1,064 11,298 1,362 12,351 1,053 10,835 -1,516 
Finca 11,292 19,454 8,162 28,802 9,348 36,414 7,612 44,532 8,118 
Hekima 2,390 3,913 1,523 6,163 2,250 8,413 2,250 9,229 816 
Procredit 3,679 16,512 12,833 44,584 28,072 84,227 39,643 109,183 24,956 
Total MF 26,233 49,815 23,582 90,847 41,032 141,405 50,558 173,779 32,374 
Source: Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit, 2008. 
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As of 2009, Procredit had the highest number of depositors (109,183), followed by Finca 
(44,532), Paidek (10,835), and then Hekima (9,229). It should be mentioned that 
Hekima reported 11,013 in 2009, which if considered should place it ahead of Paidek.  
As with the number of employees, Procredit and Finca have the greatest shares of 
clients. The two microfinance institutions have been very attractive to micro and small 
entrepreneurs in the city of Kinshasa. When looking at the data, except for Paidek, all 
microfinance institutions have shown an increase in the number of clients for the five 
consecutive years (2005-2009), as depicted on figure 5.3.  
 
Figure 5.3: Number of Clients of Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
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Procredit and Finca. Nevertheless, Hekima and Paidek have also shown some 
increases (except for Paidek in 2009) even though far below the level shown by 
Procredit and Finca.  Figure 5.4 below depicts the time series trend of all microfinance 
included in this study. 
 
Figure 5.4: Number of Clients of All MFI in the Sample (2005-2009) 
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micro-credit is generally the starting point of a lending-led microfinance institution. 
Exhibit 12 provides details of loans disbursed by the institutions of the sample during 
five years (2005-2009).  
 
Table 5.3: Loan Portfolio of MF in Thousands of US Dollars (2005-2009) 
Institutions 
Name 2005 2006 
% Chg 
 05-06 2007 
%  Chg  
06-07 2008 
% Chg  
07-08 2009 
% Chg  
08-09 
Paidek 1,152 1,369 19% 1,584 16% 1,895 20% 1,837 -3% 
Finca 1,006 3,595 257% 6,032 68% 8,735 45% 10,352 19% 
Hekima 110 183 66% 183 0% 631 245% 740 17% 
Procredit 2,197 7,392 236% 12,021 63% 21,772 81% 33,733 55% 
Total MF 4,465 12,539 181% 19,820 58% 33,033 67% 46,662 41% 
Source: Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit, 2008. 
 
Procredit has tripled its loan volume from 2005 to 2006, and doubled it in 2007 and 
2008. Finca has shown the same trend by tripling its loan’s volume in 2006 and 
doubling it in 2007. As a whole, the four institutions have increased their loan portfolios 
consecutively (except for Paidek in 2009). Figure 5.5 depicts the time series of loan 
portfolios of microfinance institutions from 2005 to 2009.  
 
Figure 5.5: Loan Portfolio of Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
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As hypothesized, outreach, as measured by the volume (dollar amount) of loans 
disbursed by microfinance institutions, displays consecutive yearly increases from 2005 
through year 2009. The increases occurred at the institutional level (figure 5.5), 
although dominated by Procredit and Finca; and at the industry level (figure 5.6). As 
with the number of employees hired and the number of clients served during the five 
years period, two institutions have greatly impacted the trend line: Procredit and Finca. 
Nevertheless, Hekima and Paidek have also shown increases (except for Paidek in 
2009) in their portfolios’ volume.  
 
Figure 5.6: Loan Portfolio of Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
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Table 5.4: Deposits of MF in Thousands of US Dollars (2005-2009) 
Institutions 
Name 2005 2006 
% 
Chg 
05-06 
2007 
%  
Chg 
06-07 
2008 % Chg 
07-08 2009 
% Chg 
08-09 
Finca 670 1,340 100% 2,059 54% 3,018 47% 4,197 39% 
Hekima 21 35 64% 108 205% 369 239% 598 62% 
Procredit 3,306 14,841 349% 49,800 236% 47,394 -5% 108,529 129% 
Total MF 3,997 16,216 306% 51,967 220% 50,781 -2% 113,324 123% 
Source: Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit, 2008. 
 
 
For the three institutions combined, total deposits shot up by over 2800% between 2005 
and 2009.  The slowest-growing institution, Finca, grew by 626% from 2005 to 2009.  
The fastest-growing, Procredit, grew by over 3000% during the same period.  Year-to-
year changes for individual institutions were positive in all but one instance (Procredit 
from 2007 to 2008), and frequently exceeded 100%. Figure 5.7 depicts the time series 
of the dollar amount collected by microfinance institutions from 2005 to 2009.  
 
Figure 5.7: Deposits of Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
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Outreach, as measured by the dollar amount of deposits of clients, displays consecutive 
yearly increases from 2005 to 2007, a slight decrease between 2007 and 2008, and 
again a shape increase through year 2009. Figure 5.8 depicts the time series of all MF 
institutions. Procredit was the institution with the highest dollar amount in deposits 
among the three institutions considered here, its 2007-2008 result has impacted the 
entire sample which shows a break in the upward trend between 2007 and 2008. 
Overall, however, the hypothesized trend occurred at the institutional level and at the 
industry level.  
 
Figure 5.8: Combined Deposits of All MF Institutions in the Sample (2005-2009) 
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post-conflict situation. Four variables were proposed for that purpose: employment, 
clientele, lending, and savings/deposits by providers of financial services. Time series 
analysis was suggested to look at the trend displayed by the four variables. Originally, 
this study intended to plot percentage change from each year to illustrate the trend. It 
was also suggested that measures of central tendency (mean, median, and mode); 
measures of dispersion (standard deviation, and variance); and some significance tests 
be applied. Unfortunately, data collected were very limited and could not support many 
of the proposed analyses. Fortunately, however, this study was able to plot the data for 
each of the four institutions and their total outcome, which provided this study with an 
analysis tool to understand the phenomenon under study. Figure 5.9 below summarizes 
the findings related to outreach by microfinance institutions.  
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Figure 5.9: Outreach Hypothesized Pattern vs. Study’s Outcome  
 
 
 
     Study’s Outcome 
 
                                                      
 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1990 2003 2008 2013
M
ar
ke
t S
ha
re
s
Yearly 
Change Outcome
Post Conflict Hypothetical Prediction
TFS
IFS
MF
0
200
400
600
800
1000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009N
um
be
r o
f E
m
pl
oy
ee
s
Year
Total Number of Employees of All 
MF Institutions in the Sample 
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
N
um
be
r o
f C
lie
nt
s
Year
Total Number of Clients of MF 
Institutions in the Sample
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Lo
an
 P
or
tf
ol
io
 in
 U
S$
 (1
00
0s
)
Year
Total Loan Porfolio of All MF in the 
Sample
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
D
ep
os
it
s 
in
 U
S$
 (1
00
0s
)
Year
Combined Deposits of All MF 
institutions in the Sample 
77 
 
The first three measures of outreach by microfinance institutions—employment, number 
of clients, and loan volume, each display the expected pattern of OMF2005 < OMF2006 < 
OMF2007 < OMF2008 < OMF2009, as hypothesized.  This is true at the institutional level as 
well as the industry level. The fourth measure of outreach by microfinance institutions – 
dollar amount of deposits of clients, displays consecutive yearly increases from 2005 to 
2007, but slightly decreases between 2007 and 2008, but regains its increase 
throughout year 2009. The overall trend fits the hypothesized pattern of OMF2005 < 
OMF2006 < OMF2007 < OMF2008 < OMF2009.  
 
As noted above, two institutions, Procredit and Finca, have greatly impacted the time 
series trend lines of the four variables (employment, clientele, loans, savings /deposits). 
Nevertheless, Hekima and Paidek have also shown increases in the number of people 
hired during the five consecutive years (except for Paidek in 2008) and therefore fit the 
trend as individual cases of the sample. In term of people brought in the industry as 
clients, Procredit, Finca and Hekima have increased their number for the entire period 
while Paidek experienced a slight decrease in 2009. The same feature has been 
displayed with the last two variables (loans and deposits) with a clear dominance by 
Procredit, followed by Finca and lastly by Hekima. Paidek was not included in the last 
analysis (deposits) because it was not collecting deposits and/or savings as of 
December 2009.  
 
 
 
78 
 
5.3. Financial Performance by Microfinance Institutions 
 
5.3.1. Assets 
Table 5.5 summarizes total assets of microfinance institutions from 2005 to 2009. 
 
Table 5.5: Total Assets of Microfinance Institutions in ’000 US Dollars (2005-2009) 
Institutions 
Name 2005 2006 
% 
Chg 
05-06 
2007 
%  
Chg 
06-
07 
2008 
% 
Chg 
07-
08 
2009 
% 
Chg 
08-
09 
% Chg 
05-09 
Paidek 1,251 1,412 13% 1,750 24% 2,016 15% 2,430 21% 94% 
Finca 2,336 5,987 156% 10,383 73% 13,556 31% 16,542 22% 608% 
Hekima 252 252 0% 370 47% 999 170% 1,665 67% 561% 
Procredit 6,077 19,980 229% 58,149 191% 105,382 81% 122,012 16% 1908% 
Total MF 9,918 27,633 179% 70,653 156% 121,955 73% 142,651 17% 1338% 
Source: Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit, 2008. 
 
 
As with the outreach variables, Paidek, Finca, Hekima, and Procredit had complete data 
on financial performance variables (assets, efficiency, profitability, and risk) while Hope 
and Bosangani had data that did not fit the time series analysis. When looking at table 5 
above, Paidek had a million and a quarter US dollars in 2005 and had slow but steady 
increases until 2009. Paidek doubled its assets during the five-year period (1.2 US$ 
million in 2005 and 2.4 US$ million in 2009). Finca’s total assets in 2009 (16.5 US$ 
million) happened to be seven times what they were in 2005 (2.3 US$ million). Hekima 
had almost the same trend as Finca and saw its total assets increase almost seven 
times from 2005 (0.25 US$ million) to 2009 (1.6 US$ million). Procredit is the institution 
that showed the highest and tremendous growth in total assets during the five years 
period, going from US$ 6 million in 2005 to US$ 122 million in 2009, a twenty times 
increase. Overall and as an industry, the sample shows also steady yearly increases in 
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total assets, representing a fourteen times increase from 2005 (US$ 9.9 million) to 2009 
(US$ 142.6). Figure 5.10 provides the time series trend of total assets of microfinance 
institutions in the sample.  
 
Figure 5.10: Total Assets of Microfinance Institutions in Thousands of US Dollars 
(2005-2009) 
 
 
 
As hypothesized, financial performance, as measured by the increase in total assets of 
microfinance institutions, displays consecutive yearly increases from 2005 through year 
2009. All the institutions in the sample experienced increases going from twice to 
sixteen times during the five-year period. When taken together, their total assets 
increased fourteen times. The increases happened at the institutional level (Figure 5.10) 
and at the industry level (Figure 5.11). Procredit and to some extent Finca have greatly 
impacted the trend line. Hekima and Paidek have also shown steady growth in assets. 
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Figure 5.11: Total Assets of All MF Institutions in US Dollars (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
5.3.2. Efficiency 
 
In finance, efficiency can be conceptualized in different ways: efficient frontier, efficient 
markets, efficient portfolio, or efficient set (Smart, Megginson, and Gitman, 2004). 
Efficient frontier is used in the case of portfolios maximizing expected returns in any 
given level of volatility. The efficient markets hypothesis is related to financial asset 
prices and available information. An efficient portfolio is one that maximizes returns for 
any given level of volatility; and efficient set generally refers to a group of efficient 
portfolios (Smart, Megginson, and Gitman, 2004). In business administration, efficiency 
and effectiveness are two related concepts but differ in that effectiveness is related to 
goals’ achievement, while efficiency is more related to the costs (money, time, energy) 
in implementing a program or plan to reach planned goals. The self-sufficiency rate of 
microfinance emerged as a good indicator of efficiency compared to other measures 
such as nominal or real yield on portfolio. Indeed, microfinance institutions are often 
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therefore that self-sufficiency (use of proper funds to operate) is the preferred measure 
of efficiency of microfinance as a tool for financial services reconstruction. Table 5.6 
provides the self-sufficiency rates of each microfinance institution from year 2005 to 
year 2009. 
 
Table 5.6: Self-Sufficiency Rate of Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
Institutions Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Paidek 78.93 87.86 76.72 132.71 56.34 
Finca 133.83 109.99 110.17 102.39 111.91 
Hekima 17.78 32.05 47.62 63.19 79.34 
Procredit 104.75 118.27 126.09 133.91 87.29 
All MF 83.82 87.04 90.15 108.05 83.72 
Source: Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit, 2008. 
 
 
From exhibit 22 above, it can be depicted that Finca has maintained full self-sufficiency 
(above 100%) for the five consecutive years (2005-2009). Procredit has maintained full 
self-sufficiency for four years (2005-2008) but fell to 87% self-sufficiency in 2009. 
Paidek reached full self-sufficiency in 2008 (133%) but decreased sharply at 56% in 
2009. Hekima had never yet reached full self-sufficiency as of 2009 but has shown 
steady progress, going from only 18% in 2005 to almost 80% self-sufficiency in 2009. 
Figure 5.12 depicts the time series of microfinance institutions. 
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Figure 5.12: Self-Sufficiency Rate of Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
  
 
 
This study hypothesized that financial performance, as measured by efficiency of 
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OMF2009 as expressed on Figure 5.13. The overall trend matches the hypothesis but 
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instance, Procredit will recover from its fall of 2009 and regain its full self-sufficiency. 
The same attention should be also directed to Paidek which went from 133% self-
sufficiency in 2008 to 56% in 2009. 
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Figure 5.13: Self-Sufficiency Rate of All Microfinance in the Sample (2005-2009) 
 
 
5.3.3. Profitability 
 
Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) are two measures of profitability 
of a portfolio or business. Smart et al. (2004) defines ROA as “a measurement of the 
overall effectiveness of management in generating returns to common stockholders with 
its available assets” (p. G-16) and ROE as “a measure that captures the return earned 
on the common stockholders’ investment in a firm” (p. G-16). When looking at the data 
collected, ROE and ROA presented the same trend and it was decided that only one will 
be subject to analysis, and in this case it is the return on total assets (ROA). Table 5.7 
below presents the ROA rates of each microfinance institution of the sample and the 
sample average.  
Table 5.7: Return on Assets (ROA) of Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
Institutions Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Paidek -5.15 -3.26 -8 6.91 -21.09 
Finca 11.56 7.95 4.34 0.86 5.33 
Hekima -61.14 -61.14 -41.47 -21.8 -7.75 
Procredit 4.09 4.09 8.18 8.18 -1.82 
Industry Average -12.66 -13.09 -9.24 -1.46 -6.33 
Source: Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit, 2008. 
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In table 5.7, there is a clear divide between, on one side Finca and Procredit, and on the 
other side Paidek and Hekima. Finca and Procredit operations are profitable while 
Paidek and Hekima struggle and are not profitable, as indicated by their ROA. Finca is 
the only institution to maintain a positive ROA during the entire five-year period. 
Procredit maintained positive returns on assets during four years (2005-2008) but 
experienced a negative ROA in 2009 (-1.82). Paidek had a positive ROA in only one 
year (2008) but has been in the negative for the other four years. Hekima has shown 
some improvement, going from (-61.14) in 2005 to (-7.75) in 2009, but overall its ROA 
had been negative for the entire study period (2005-2009). Overall, the averages from 
2005 to 2009 for the four institutions in the sample have been negative.  
 
Figure 5.14: Return on Assets (ROA) of MF Institutions (2005-2009) 
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figure 5.14, different institutions present different patterns but as an industry the pattern 
did not occur as hypothesized but deviates from the hypothesis. The outcome is 
therefore OMF2005 > OMF2006 > OMF2007 > OMF2008 >OMF2009. The overall trend has not 
matched the hypothesis pattern as depicted by the time series lines on Figure 5.15.   
 
Figure 5.15: Return on Assets (ROA) of Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
 
Providing loans to poor and vulnerable micro and small entrepreneurs is the 
cornerstone of microfinance. In this study, gross loan portfolio has been selected as one 
of the variables measuring outreach. For the sake of sustainability of microfinance 
institutions in general and in particular in a post-conflict reconstruction context, it is 
essential for financial institutions to have healthy portfolios and make money when 
providing loans in order to maintain revolving funds that will continue to help the poor 
and vulnerable to create or maintain their micro and small enterprises. For this reason, 
an additional indicator of profitability has been analyzed, the “yield on gross portfolio” to 
check if microfinance institutions are making money from the loans disbursed. Exhibit 
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28 presents data from 2005 to 2009 showing the yields different institutions had on 
outcome from their portfolios.  
 
Table 5.8: Yield on Gross Portfolio of Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
Institutions Name 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Paidek 25% 25% 28% 30% 31% 
Finca 85% 82% 79% 80% 78% 
Hekima 50% 50% 56% 63% 58% 
Procredit 72% 72% 56% 41% 41% 
All MF Average 58% 57% 55% 53% 52% 
Source: Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit, 2008. 
 
 
On Table 5.8, all microfinance institutions in the sample display positive yields on their 
gross portfolio, ranging from a low of 25% to a high of 85%. Finca emerged as the 
institution with the most stable YGP during the five-year period (2005-2009), displaying 
an average of 80% YGP with values ranging from 78% to 85%. Procredit shows a 
descending pattern with higher YGP in 2005 and 2006 (72%) but lower YGP (41%) in 
2008/2009. Hekima and Paidek overall displayed an ascending pattern with lower YGP 
in 2005 but a higher one in 2008/2009. Figure 5.16 depicts the time series trends of 
each microfinance institution.  
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Figure 5.16: Yield on Gross Portfolio of Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
Overall, when looking at the entire sample, YGP shows a descending but stable pattern 
with an average of 55% YGP with extreme values ranging from 58% (2005) to 52% 
(2009). This study hypothesized that, financial performance, as measured by profitability 
of microfinance institutions will display consecutive yearly increases from 2005 through 
year 2009 (that is OMF2005 < OMF2006 < OMF2007 < OMF2008 < OMF2009). When looking at 
Figure 5.17 below, different institutions present different patterns, but as an industry the 
pattern did not occur as hypothesized but deviates from the hypothesis. The outcome is 
indeed OMF2005 > OMF2006 > OMF2007 > OMF2008 >OMF2009. The overall trend has not 
matched the hypothesis pattern as depicted by the time series lines on Figure 5.17.   
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Figure 5.17: Yield on Gross Portfolio of Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
5.3.4. Risk 
 
Post-conflict microfinance institutions operate in a risky environment due to the flexibility 
of their methodology (non-rigorous lending conditions) compounded by the legacy of 
conflict. As said earlier, for the sake of sustainability of microfinance institutions in 
general and in particular in a post-conflict reconstruction context, it is essential for 
financial institutions to have healthy portfolios, which means that they have to minimize 
risk. Portfolio at Risk (PAR) is generally considered a good indicator of the level of a 
financial institution’s portfolio risk. Table 5.9 presents a thirty days PAR of microfinance 
institutions in this study’s sample.  
 
Table 5.9: Portfolio at Risk (PAR) 30 Days (%) of Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
Institution Name  2005   2006     2007    2008 2009 
Paidek 17.77 31.17 22.4 21.56 13.03 
Finca 2.77 0.74 3.94 2.90 1.50 
Hekima 2.85 2.85 1.95 1.04 1.64 
Procredit 0 1.83 3.7 2.11 3.64 
Average Industry 5.85 9.15 8.00 6.90 4.95 
Source: Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit, 2008. 
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From Table 5.9 above, it can be depicted that Hekima has maintained the most efficient 
risk management of its portfolio during the five consecutive years (2005-2009), going 
from its highest of 2.85% in 2005 to its lowest of 1.04% in 2008, before climbing a bit in 
2009 with a 1.64% PAR. Finca and Procredit have also demonstrated good risk 
management of their portfolio. Finca’s highest PAR occurred in 2007 (3.94%) but the 
trend has been a descending pattern during the last two years. Procredit has 
experienced ups and downs but has also maintained a strong portfolio with a maximum 
PAR of 3.64% in 2009. Paidek has deviated from the pattern displayed by the other 
three microfinance institutions of the sample (all below 4% PAR). Indeed, Paidek’s 
highest PAR reached 31% in 2006 but it has improved in 2007 (22%), 2008 (22%) and 
2009 (13%). Figure 5.18 below depicts the time series trends of each case.  
 
Figure 5.18: Portfolio at Risk (PAR) Rate of Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
 
 
This study hypothesized that, financial performance, as measured by the risk level of 
microfinance institutions will display consecutive yearly improvement (decreases in this 
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OMF2009). When looking at figure 5.18 above, different institutions present different 
patterns but as an industry the pattern generally occurred as hypothesized from 2006 to 
2006 but deviated from the hypothesis in 2006. The outcome is indeed OMF2005 > 
OMF2006 < OMF2007 < OMF2008 < OMF2009. Exhibit 33 depicts the time series trend. The 
overall trend has matched the hypothesis pattern but it should be mentioned that the 
time series trend has been largely impacted by Paidek. While this study could consider 
Paidek as an outlier in this section, it has been included in the analysis to reflect the 
divide between microfinance institutions with some being well managed in term of risk 
while others keep losing money and continue to depend on grants and donations.  
 
Figure 5.19: Portfolio at Risk Rate of All Microfinance Institutions (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
 
5.3.5. Financial performance Hypothesized vs. Study’s Outcome  
 
This study proposed that microfinance serves as a tool for rebuilding the financial 
services sector in post-conflict communities, and one way of determining whether or not 
the phenomenon occurs in the DRC case was to examine whether that microfinance 
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institutions show improvements in their financial performance during consecutive years 
in post-conflict situation. Four variables were proposed for that purpose: assets, 
efficiency, profitability, and risk. Time series analysis was suggested to look at the trend 
displayed by the four variables. As with the outreach hypothesis, this study intended 
originally to plot percentage change from each year to illustrate the trend and expected 
to be able to run statistical analyses such as significance. Unfortunately, data collected 
were very limited and could not fit many of the proposed analyses. Fortunately, 
however, this study was able to plot the data for each of the four institutions and their 
total outcome, which provided this study with an analytical tool to depict the trend of the 
phenomenon under study. Figure 5.20 below summarizes the findings related to 
financial performance of microfinance institutions.  
 
First, as hypothesized, financial performance, as measured by total assets of 
microfinance institutions, displays consecutive yearly increases from 2005 through year 
2009 and fits the formula OMF2005 < OMF2006 < OMF2007 < OMF2008 < OMF2009 as 
hypothesized. The increases happened at the institutional level and at the industry level. 
The time series depicted in figure 20 demonstrates the predicted trend. Second, as 
hypothesized, financial performance, as measured by efficiency (self-sufficiency) of 
microfinance institutions, displays consecutive yearly increases from 2005 through year 
2008 but deviated from the hypothesis in 2009, displaying the following  outcome 
OMF2005 < OMF2006 < OMF2007 < OMF2008 > OMF2009. The overall trend has matched the 
hypothesized pattern. Third, financial performance, as measured by profitability of 
microfinance institutions, did not occur as hypothesized but deviates from the 
hypothesis and resulted as OMF2005 > OMF2006 > OMF2007 > OMF2008 >OMF2009. The overall 
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trend has not matched the hypothesis pattern as depicted by the time series on figure 
5.20 below. The same result was found with another indicator of profitability, the Yield 
on Gross portfolio, which result was OMF2005 > OMF2006 > OMF2007 > OMF2008 >OMF2009. 
While all microfinance institutions in the sample display positive yields of their gross 
portfolio, ranging from a lowest of 25% to a highest of 85%, their time series trend still 
deviated from the hypothesized pattern.  Fourth, as hypothesized, financial 
performance, as measured by risk (PAR) of microfinance institutions, displays 
consecutive yearly improvement from 2006 through year 2009 but deviated from the 
hypothesis in 2005, displaying the following  outcome OMF2005 > OMF2006 < OMF2007 < 
OMF2008 < OMF2009. The overall trend has matched the hypothesized pattern. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
Figure 5.20: Outreach Hypothesized Pattern vs. Study’s Outcome 
 
 
 
5.4. Comparing Outreach of Traditional Financial Services (TFS) to Outreach of 
Microfinance Institutions (MF). 
 
 
5.4.1. Employment 
Additional insight can be gained by comparing the performance of microfinance 
institutions (MF) to that of traditional financial institutions (TFS).  To that end, two 
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(Rawbank and BCDC) and two financial institutions applying a microfinance approach to 
financial services provision (Finca and Procredit) were subjected to comparative 
analysis relative to the number of workers in each institution and each category (TFS 
vs. MF) from 2005 to 2009. The study looks at both the total number of employees 
during the five-year period as well as the number of employees hired during consecutive 
years. Table 5.10 summarizes employment by TFS vs. MF from 2005 to 2009. 
 
Table 5.10: Employment by TFS vs. MF (2005-2009) 
Institutions 
Name 2005 2006 
Hired 
2006 2007 
Hired 
2007 2008 
Hired 
2008 2009 
Hired 
2009 
Rawbank 117 173 56 218 45 300 82 433 133 
BCDC 348 392 44 428 36 468 40 461 -7 
Total TFS 465 565 100 646 81 768 122 894 126 
Finca 59 140 81 219 79 295 76 342 47 
Procredit 49 105 56 188 83 319 131 455 136 
Total MF 108 245 137 407 162 614 207 797 183 
Source: BCDC Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2008 & 2009; Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit Annual 
Reports 2008 & 2009; Rawbank Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 & 2009.   
    
 
All four institutions increased their total number of workers from 2005 to 2009, except 
for BCDC that experienced a slight drop (-7) in 2009. As of 2009, BCDC had the highest 
number of total employees (461), followed by Procredit (455), Rawbank (433), and 
Finca (342). The largest employer in the sample, BCDC experienced the lowest hiring 
curve for the five consecutive years when compared to the other three financial 
institutions. Figure 5.21presents the time series trend of the four financial institutions 
under study.  
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Figure 5.21: Employment by TFS vs. MF (2005-2009)  
 
 
 
While the total number of employees provides us with valuable information, it is the 
number of people hired by each institution and each category (TFS vs. MF) that should 
determine the effectiveness of each institution and each category when comparing 
them. When looking at table 10, all four institutions have hired new employees from 
2005 to 2009, except for BCDC in 2009. However, MF has dominated TFS in hiring 
during the entire study period. In 2007 and 2008, Procredit employed more than 
Rawbank and BCDC together (83 vs. 81; 131 vs. 122). When considering the two 
categories (TFS vs. MF), MF scored higher than TFS consecutively from 2005 to 2009 
(137 vs. 100; 162 vs. 81; 207 vs. 122; 183 vs. 126). Figure 5.22 depicts the time series 
trend of extra employees hired by each category from 2005 to 2009.    
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Figure 5.22: Employees Hired by TFS vs. MF (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
This study’s hypothesis was that outreach of financial services institutions applying a 
microfinance approach (MF), as measured by employment, will display higher yearly 
increases between 2005 and 2009 when compared to the outreach of TFS (OTFS). As 
hypothesized, MF employed more than TFS and when comparing the two categories, 
the pattern bellow has indeed occurred as hypothesized:  
OMF2005<OTFS2005; OMF2006>OTFS2006; OMF2007>OTFS2007; OMF2008>OTFS2008; OMF2009>OTFS2009;  
The increases happened at the institutional level and at the industry level as depicted by 
Figures 5.21and 5.22.   
 
5.4.2. Clientele 
 
Only three financial institutions (Rawbank, Finca and Procredit) had reliable data related 
to clientele; BCDC’s clientele data was not available. Table 5.11 summarizes clientele 
TFS vs. MF from 2005 to 2009. 
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Table 5.11: Clientele by Financial Institutions (2005-2009) 
Institutions 
Name 2005 2006 
New 
Clients 
06 
2007 
New 
Clients 
07 
2008 
New 
Clients 
08 
2009 
New 
Clients 
09 
Rawbank 1,978 3,726 1,748 6,212 2,486 23,743 17,531 30,570 6,827 
Finca 11,292 19,454 8,162 28,802 9,348 36,414 7,612 44,532 8,118 
Procredit 3,679 16,512 12,833 44,584 28,072 84,227 39,643 109,183 24,956 
Source: Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit Annual Reports 2008 & 2009; Rawbank Annual Reports 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 & 2009.   
 
All three institutions increased their clientele, expressed as the number of bank 
accounts held. As of 2009, Procredit experienced fast increases as well as Finca for the 
entire five-year period. Rawbank had a slower curve during the first three years but 
sharply increased in 2008 (almost quadrupled) and 2009 (around six thousand new 
accounts). Figure 5.23 depicts the time series trends of the three financial institutions 
with reliable data.  
 
Figure 5.23: Clientele by Financial Institutions (2005-2009)
 
 
This study’s hypothesis was that outreach of financial services institutions applying a 
microfinance approach (MF), as measured by their clientele, will display higher yearly 
increases between 2005 and 2009 when compared to the outreach of financial 
institutions applying a traditional approach to services delivery (TFS). As hypothesized, 
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MF attracted more clients (as expressed by the number of accounts) than TFS and 
when comparing the two categories, the pattern below has indeed occurred as 
hypothesized: OMF2005<OTFS2005; OMF2006>OTFS2006; OMF2007>OTFS2007; OMF2008>OTFS2008; 
OMF2009>OTFS2009. The increases happened at the institutional level and at the industry 
level as depicted in Figures 5.23 and 5.24.   
 
 
Figure 5.24: Total Clientele by TFS vs. MF (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
5.4.3. Lending 
 
Rawbank, BCDC, Finca, and Procredit had all their loan portfolios data for the study’s 
period. This study was able to analyze their individual numbers as well as the category’s 
trend from 2005 to 2009. The study looks at the total size of respective loan portfolios 
during the five-year period, but especially at the increase rates of the portfolios, which is 
a better way to detect the size of the effect of MF and TFS as interventions. Table 5.12 
summarizes the evolution of financial institutions portfolios.  
 
 
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
N
um
be
r o
f A
cc
ou
nt
s
year
Total Clientele of TFS vs. MF in the Sample
TFS
MF
99 
 
Table 5.12: Loan Portfolio of TFS vs. MF in Thousands of US Dollars (2005-2009) 
Institutions 
Name 2005 2006 
% Chg 
05-06 2007 
%  Chg 
06-07 2008 
% Chg 
07-08 2009 
% Chg 
08-09 
Rawbank 27,728 37,363 35% 59,385 59% 80,163 35% 99,276 24% 
BCDC 51,500 54,600 6% 68,000 25% 97,000 43% 101,100 4% 
Total TFS 79,228 91,963 16% 127,385 39% 177,163 39% 200,376 13% 
Finca 1,006 3,595 257% 6,032 68% 8,735 45% 10,352 19% 
Procredit 2,197 7,392 236% 12,021 63% 21,772 81% 33,733 55% 
Total MF 3,204 10,987 243% 18,053 64% 30,508 69% 44,086 45% 
Source: BCDC Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2008 & 2009; Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit Annual 
Reports 2008 & 2009; Rawbank Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 & 2009.   
 
 
Figure 5.25 demonstrates that all four institutions have increased their loan portfolios 
from 2005 to 2009. As of 2009, BCDC had the largest loan portfolio (US$ 101 million), 
followed by Rawbank (US$ 99 million), Procredit (US$ 33 million), and Finca (US$ 10 
million). Figure 5.25 captures the time series of each institution’s trend in terms of loan 
portfolios from 2005 to 2009. While having the largest loan portfolio, BCDC lends higher 
amounts to state and big private companies; Rawbank had the same target as BCDC 
until recently when it opened up its portfolio to small and medium enterprises. Procredit 
and Finca have more individual clients accessing loans through their portfolio, and 
many of them are micro and small entrepreneurs.  
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Figure 5.25: Loan Portfolio of TFS vs. MF in US Dollars (2005-2009) 
  
 
 
 
While the total portfolio amount provides us with valuable information, it is the rate of 
increase of each institution and each category (TFS vs. MF) that should determine the 
effectiveness of each institution and each category to reconstruct the financial services 
in a post-conflict context. When looking at table 12 above, all four institutions in one 
side, and both TFS and MF on the other side, have positive increase rates, ranging from 
4% to over 200%. However, Procredit and Finca show a faster reconstruction in this 
area at both the institutional and the individual levels. Figure 5.26 depicts the time 
series trend of TFS vs. MF loan portfolio from 2005 to 2009.   
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Figure 5.26: Increase Rates of Loan Portfolio of TFS vs. MF (2005-2009) 
  
 
This study’s hypothesis was that outreach of financial services institutions applying a 
microfinance approach (MF), as measured by their loan portfolio, will display faster 
growth between 2005 and 2009 when compared to the outreach of TFS (OTFS). As 
hypothesized, MF loan portfolios experienced higher rates of increase than TFS and 
when comparing the two categories, the pattern bellow has indeed occurred as 
hypothesized OMF2005<OTFS2005; OMF2006>OTFS2006; OMF2007>OTFS2007; OMF2008>OTFS2008; 
OMF2009>OTFS2009. The increases happened at the institutional level and at the industry 
level as depicted by Figures 5.25 and 5.26.   
 
5.4.4. Deposits  
As in the case of loan portfolios, Rawbank, BCDC, Finca, and Procredit had all their 
deposit data collected and this study was able to proceed to the analysis of their 
individual numbers as well as the category’s trend from 2005 to 2009. The study looks 
at both the total amount of respective deposits during the five years period but also the 
increase rates of deposits. Table 5.13 summarizes the volume of deposits clients 
brought to their respective financial institutions.  
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Table 5.13: Total Deposits of TFS vs. MF in thousands of US Dollars (2005-2009) 
Institutions 
Name 2005 2006 
% Chg 
05-06 2007 
% Chg 
06-07 2008 
% Chg 
07-08 2009 
% Chg 
08-09 
Rawbank 67,986 110,223 62% 135,665 23% 163,069 20% 238,232 46% 
BCDC 126,600 133,800 6% 154,000 15% 207,000 34% 192,000 -7% 
Total TFS 194,586 244,023 25% 289,665 19% 370,069 28% 430,232 16% 
Finca 670 1,340 100% 2,059 54% 3,018 47% 4,197 39% 
Procredit 3,306 14,841 349% 49,800 236% 47,394 -5% 108,529 129% 
Total MF 3,976 16,181 307% 51,859 220% 50,413 -3% 112,726 124% 
Source: BCDC Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2008 & 2009; Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit Annual 
Reports 2008 & 2009; Rawbank Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 & 2009.   
 
 
Rawbank and Finca had consecutive positive increase rates from 2005 to 2009, while 
Procredit experienced a negative increase rate (-3%) in 2008 and BCDC experienced it 
in 2009 (-7%). As of 2009, Rawbank had the largest deposits (US$ 238 million), 
followed by BCDC (US$ 192 million), Procredit (US$ 108 million), and Finca (US$ 4 
million). Figure 5.27 captures the time series of each institution’s trend in term of 
deposits from 2005 to 2009. As with the loans BCDC deposits come largely from state 
and big private companies; Rawbank had the same sources of deposits in its beginning 
but has shift recently to individuals, and to small and medium enterprises. As for loans, 
Procredit and Finca’s deposits originate mostly from individual clients many of whom 
are poor or vulnerable.  
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Figure 5.27: Total Deposits of TFS vs. MF in US Dollars (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
This study’s hypothesis was that outreach of financial services institutions applying a 
microfinance approach (MF), as measured by the volume of deposits of their clients, will 
display faster growth rates between 2005 and 2009 when compared to the outreach of 
TFS (OTFS). This hypothesis should therefore display the following pattern:         
OMF2005>OTFS2005; OMF2006>OTFS2006; OMF2007>OTFS2007; OMF2008>OTFS2008; OMF2009>OTFS2009. 
This study displayed the following outcome:                                             
OMF2005>OTFS2005; OMF2006>OTFS2006; OMF2007>OTFS2007; OMF2008<OTFS2008; OMF2009>OTFS2009. 
Although the pattern shows a slight deviation in 2008, as depicted in figure 5.28 below, 
when smoothing the trend line, the hypothesized pattern clearly occurred.  
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Figure 5.28: Total Deposits of TFS vs. MF (Yearly Rate Change) 
 
 
 
5.4.5. Outreach Hypothesized vs. Study’s Outcome  
This study postulated that MF is a valuable financial service reconstruction tool in post-
conflict communities because it displays more rapid and profound increases in outreach 
and financial performance during consecutive years in post-conflict situation, and its 
services translate into reconstruction. It also hypothesized MF is a better tool than TFS 
particularly at the earlier stages of post-conflict reconstruction because MF displays 
more rapid increases in outreach. Four variables were proposed for that purpose: 
employment, clientele, lending, and deposits/Savings. Time series analysis was 
proposed to look at the trend displayed by the four variables by plotting raw numbers 
and/or percentage change from each year to illustrate the trends. Figure 5.29 below 
summarizes the findings related to the comparison of outreach of TFS and MF. This 
study has found that, when comparing outreach of financial services institutions 
applying a microfinance approach (MF) to those applying a traditional financial 
approach (TFS), using employment, clientele, loan portfolio, and deposits as 
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measurements, this study displayed the hypothesized pattern of OMF2005<OTFS2005; 
OMF2006>OTFS2006; OMF2007>OTFS2007; OMF2008>OTFS2008; OMF2009>OTFS2009.  MF hired more 
employees than TFS; MF attracted more clients (as expressed by the number of 
accounts) than TFS; MF loan portfolios experienced higher rates of increase than TFS; 
and overall, MF displayed faster consecutive yearly increase rates than TFS. The 
hypothesized pattern occurred at the institutional level as well as at the industry level.    
Figure 5.29 depicts the time series trends summary of the above findings. 
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Figure 5.29: TFS vs. MF Outreach Hypothesized Pattern vs. Study’s Outcome 
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5.5. Comparing Financial Performance of Traditional Financial Services (TFS) to 
Financial Performance of Microfinance Institutions (MF)  
 
5.5.1. Assets 
 
Rawbank, BCDC, Finca, and Procredit total assets were analyzed at the individual 
financial institution level as well at their category level to depict the trend from 2005 to 
2009. The study looks at both the total assets of each financial institution during the 
five-year period but also the increase rates of their total assets throughout the five-year 
period (2005-2009). Table 5.14 summarizes the data.  
 
Table 5.14: Total Assets in Thousands US Dollars of TFS vs. MF (2005-2009) 
Institutions 
Name 2005 2006 
% Chg 
05-06 2007 
% Chg 
06-07 2008 
% Chg 
07-08 2009 
% Chg 
08-09 
Rawbank 75,851 124,084 64% 184,530 49% 226,317 23% 308,135 36% 
BCDC 185,400 181,900 -2% 256,500 41% 301,500 18% 300,300 -0.4% 
Total TFS 261,251 305,984 17% 441,030 44% 527,817 20% 608,435 15% 
Finca 2,336 5,987 156% 103,83 73% 13,556 31% 16,542 22% 
Procredit 6,077 19,980 229% 58,149 191% 105,382 81% 122,012 16% 
Total MF 8,414 25,967 209% 68,532 164% 118,939 74% 138,555 16% 
Source: BCDC Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2008 & 2009; Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit Annual 
Reports 2008 & 2009;Rawbank Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 & 2009.   
 
 
BCDC has been the financial institution with the highest total assets from 2005 to 2008, 
but was surpassed by Rawbank in 2009. As of December 2009, Rawbank has also 
posted the highest increase rate of its assets (36%) among the four financial institutions. 
In contrast, BCDC, the financial institution with the slowest growth of its assets, posted 
negative rates (-2%) in 2006 and in 2009 (-0.4%). Procredit has dominated all its peers 
from 2005 to 2008, posting the highest increase rates of its total assets among all, 
before decreasing to a 16% increase rate in 2009. Finca has been positive all the way 
from 2005 to 2009 but has shown a decreasing pattern with lower and lower increase 
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rates through the five years (2005-2009). When looking at the two categories (TFS vs. 
MF), the latter has experienced faster increase rates during the entire period (2005-
2009).  Figure 5.30 depicts the time series trends of each financial institution involved in 
this study.  
 
Figure 5.30: Total Assets of TFS vs. MF (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
The dollar value of total assets yields valuable information on the volume of assets 
financial institutions have to provide financial services. Clearly, the higher the dollar 
amount a financial institution has at its disposal the better. However, as an indicator of 
financial performance, the dollar amount does not tell the whole story. It is instead the 
increase rate through the years that captures the effect of reconstruction of financial 
services, which is central to this study. The rate of increases of each institution and 
each category (TFS vs. MF) should determine the effectiveness of each institution and 
each category to reconstruct financial services in a post-conflict context. This effect is 
depicted in Figure 5.31 below. 
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Figure 5.31: Total Assets Increase Rate of TFS vs. MF (2005-2009) 
 
 
This study’s hypothesis was that financial performance of financial services institutions 
applying a microfinance approach (MF), as measured by their total assets, will display 
faster growth rates between 2005 and 2009 when compared to the financial 
performance of TFS. The findings in this study have displayed the pattern FPMF2005 > 
FPTFS2005; FPMF2006 > FPTFS2006; FPMF2007 > FPTFS2007; FPMF2008 > FPTFS2008; FPMF2009 > 
FPTFS2009, which is indeed identical with the hypothesized pattern, as it has been 
depicted in Figure 5.31 above.   
5.5.2. Profitability 
As mentioned above, Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) are two 
measures that indicate profitability of a portfolio or a business - ROA measures returns 
generated from total assets while ROE measures returns generated from total equity. 
When looking at the data collected, ROE and ROA presented the same trend and it was 
decided that only one will be subject to analysis, and in this case it is the return on total 
assets (ROA). Exhibit 51below presents the ROA rates of each financial institution 
included in this analysis.   
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Table 5.15: Return On Assets (ROA) of TFS vs. MF (2005-2009) 
Institutions Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Rawbank 1.78 1.85 1.21 0.96 1.02 
BCDC 1.2 2.6 2.1 1.4 1.4 
TFS Average 1.49 2.23 1.66 1.18 1.21 
Finca 11.56 7.95 4.34 0.86 5.33 
Procredit 4.09 4.09 8.18 8.18 -1.82 
MF Average 7.83 6.02 6.26 4.52 1.76 
Source: BCDC Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2008 & 2009; Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit Annual 
Reports 2008 & 2009;Rawbank Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 & 2009.   
 
When looking at exhibit 51, all four financial institutions posted positive ROA during the 
five consecutive years (2005-2009), except for Procredit which posted a negative ROA 
(-1.82) in 2009. Finca has emerged as the financial institution with the highest ROA (6% 
average) ahead of Procredit (4.5% average), BCDC (1.74% average), and Rawbank 
(1.36% average). Exhibit 52 depicts the time series trends of all four financial institutions 
from 2005 to 2009.  
 
Figure 5.32: Return on Assets (ROA) of Financial Institutions (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
When looking at the two categories (TFS vs. MF), microfinance institutions have 
averaged better ROAs for the entire period (2005-2009), as depicted on Figure 5.33 
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below. This study’s hypothesis was that financial performance of financial services 
institutions applying a microfinance approach (MF), as measured by their return on total 
assets (ROA), will display higher ROAs between 2005 and 2009 when compared to the 
financial performance of TFS. The findings in this study have displayed the pattern 
FPMF2005 > FPTFS2005; FPMF2006 > FPTFS2006; FPMF2007 > FPTFS2007; FPMF2008 > FPTFS2008; 
FPMF2009 > FPTFS2009, which is indeed identical with the hypothesized pattern.  
 
Figure 5.33: Return on Assets (ROA) of TFS vs. MF (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
 
5.5.3. Efficiency 
 
When analyzing microfinance institutions’ efficiency, the self-sufficiency rate of 
microfinance emerged as the right measure compared to others such as nominal or real 
yield on portfolio. It was argued indeed that microfinance institutions are often criticized 
for dependence on grants and donations and that self-sufficiency (use of proper funds 
to operate) should provide this study with a better measure of microfinance as a tool for 
financial services reconstruction. In this section where a comparison is conducted 
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between financial institutions applying a microfinance approach and those using 
traditional approach, a different variable is used: the network expansion pace of each 
category. While not being a proper measure of financial performance, it is a good 
indicator of efficiency. Table 5.16 presents data related to the network expansion of 
each institution and each category.  
 
Table 5.16: Network Expansion of TFS vs. MF (2005-2009) 
Institutions 
name 2005 2006 
Chg 
05-06 2007 
Chg  
06-07 2008 
Chg 
 07-08 2009 
Chg  
08-09 
Rawbank 2 3 1 3 0 10 7 18 8 
BCDC 11 11 0 13 2 16 3 16 0 
Total TFS 13 14 1 16 2 26 10 34 8 
Finca 1 2 1 4 2 4 0 5 1 
Procredit 1 2 1 3 1 7 4 11 4 
Total MF 2 4 2 7 3 11 4 16 5 
Source: BCDC Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2008 & 2009; Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit Annual 
Reports 2008 & 2009;Rawbank Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 & 2009.   
 
 
Exhibit Table 54 indicates that, as of December 2009, Rawbank operated the largest 
number of branches (18), ahead of BCDC (16), Procredit (11), and  Finca (5). Procredit 
has emerged as the fastest financial institution in expanding its network of branches, 
going from one branch in 2005 to eleven branches in 2009. Rawbank has shown almost 
the same pattern, growing from only two branches in 2005 to 18 branches, a nine times 
increase in five years. Finca is grown five times in five years, while BCDC has been the 
slowest, adding only five branches in five years. When looking at the average of each 
category, microfinance institutions have grown faster from 2005 to 2007 but the 
commercial banks have reversed the trend to become faster than microfinance 
institutions during the last two years (2008 and 2009). Exhibit 55 below depicts the time 
series trend of the financial institutions’ network expansion from 2005 to 2009.   
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Figure 5.34: Network Expansion of TFS vs. MF (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
This study’s hypothesis was that financial performance of financial services institutions 
applying a microfinance approach (MF), as measured by their network expansion, will 
display faster growth between 2005 and 2009 when compared to the financial 
performance of TFS. The hypothesis was formulated as FPMF2005 > FPTFS2005; FPMF2006 > 
FPTFS2006; FPMF2007 > FPTFS2007; FPMF2008 > FPTFS2008; FPMF2009 > FPTFS2009. When looking 
at figure 5.35, the outcome in this study deviates from the hypothesis in 2008 and 2009. 
The outcome is indeed FPMF2005 > FPTFS2005; FPMF2006 > FPTFS2006; FPMF2007 > FPTFS2007; 
FPMF2008<FPTFS2008; FPMF2009<FPTFS2009. The overall trend has not matched the 
hypothesis pattern, as it can be seen in figure 5.35 providing the time series trends of 
TFS and MF.  
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Figure 5.35: Network Expansion of TFS vs. MF (2005-2009) 
 
 
5.5.4. Risk 
 
 
It was said earlier in this chapter that post-conflict microfinance institutions operate in a 
risky environment due to the flexibility of its methodology (non-rigorous lending 
conditions) compounded by the legacy of conflict. This is true with any type of financial 
institutions, including commercial banks resuming their activities (like BCDC in Congo) 
or new post-conflict commercial banks (like Rawbank). Credit risk, market risk, liquidity 
risk, and operational risk are compounded by the turmoil of post-conflict reconstruction, 
mostly an unstable macroeconomic environment. As with the previous analysis, portfolio 
at Risk (PAR) is used here because it is generally considered as a good indicator of the 
level of a financial institution’s portfolio risk. This study was unable to get BCDC data 
related to its PAR. Only three financial institutions are included in the analysis. Exhibit 
57 presents PAR of financial institutions studied.  
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Table 5.17: Portfolio at Risk (PAR) of TFS vs. MF (2005-2009) 
Institutions Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Rawbank 1.78 1.85 1.21 0.96 1.02 
Total TFS/Average 1.78 1.85 1.21 0.96 1.02 
Finca 2.77 0.74 3.94 2.9 1.5 
Procredit 0 1.83 3.7 2.11 3.64 
Total MF 2.77 2.57 7.64 5.01 5.14 
MF Average 1.39 1.29 3.82 2.51 2.57 
Source: BCDC Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2008 & 2009; Mixmarkets, 2010; Procredit Annual 
Reports 2008 & 2009; Rawbank Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 & 2009.   
 
 
Rawbank has maintained the most efficient risk management of its portfolio during the 
five consecutive years (2005-2009), remaining under 2% PAR for entire period, while 
Finca and Procredit have exceeded 3.5% in some years. This outcome is not 
unexpected considering the specific approaches used in lending by financial institutions 
applying a microfinance methodology and those applying a pure commercial approach 
to lending. Nevertheless, Finca and Procredit have also demonstrated good risk 
management of their portfolio. Finca’s highest PAR occurred in 2007 (3.94%) but the 
trend has been a descending pattern during the last two years. Procredit has 
experienced ups and downs but has also maintained a strong portfolio with a maximum 
PAR of 3.64% in 2009. Exhibit 58 depicts the time series trends of financial institutions 
included in the analysis.  
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Figure 5.36: Portfolio at Rear (PAR) of Financial Institutions (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
This study’s hypothesis was that financial performance of financial services institutions 
applying a microfinance approach (MF), as measured by their portfolio at risk (PAR) 
rate, will display better rate (lower) between 2005 and 2009 when compared to the 
financial performance of TFS. The hypothesis was formulated as FPMF2005 > FPTFS2005; 
FPMF2006 > FPTFS2006; FPMF2007 > FPTFS2007; FPMF2008 > FPTFS2008; FPMF2009 > FPTFS2009. 
When looking at exhibit 59 below, the outcome in this study deviates from the 
hypothesis from 2006 to 2009 and fits the hypothesized pattern only in 2005. The 
outcome is indeed FPMF2005 > FPTFS2005; FPMF2006 < FPTFS2006; FPMF2007 < FPTFS2007; 
FPMF2008<FPTFS2008; FPMF2009<FPTFS2009. The overall trend has not matched the 
hypothesis pattern, as can be seen in Figure 5.37.  
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Figure 5.37: Portfolio at Risk (PAR) of TFS vs. MF (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
 
5.5.5. Comparing Financial Performance Hypothesized vs. Study’s Outcome  
This study postulated that MF is a valuable financial service reconstruction tool in post-
conflict communities because it displays more rapid and profound increases in outreach 
and financial performance during consecutive years in post-conflict situations, and its 
services translate into reconstruction. It also hypothesized that MF is a better tool than 
TFS particularly at the earlier stages of post-conflict reconstruction because MF 
displays more rapid increases in outreach and financial performance. Four variables 
were proposed for that purpose: assets, efficiency, profitability, and risk. Time series 
analysis was suggested to look at the trend displayed by the four variables by plotting 
raw numbers and/or percentage change from each year to illustrate the trends. Exhibit 
60 below summarizes the findings related to the comparison of financial performance of 
TFS and MF. This study can conclude that: First, this study’s hypothesis that financial 
performance of financial services institutions applying a microfinance approach (MF), as 
measured by their total assets, will display faster growth rates between 2005 and 2009 
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when compared to the financial performance of TFS, stood and this study’s outcome 
displayed the hypothesized pattern and found indeed FPMF2005 > FPTFS2005; FPMF2006 > 
FPTFS2006; FPMF2007 > FPTFS2007; FPMF2008 > FPTFS2008; FPMF2009 > FPTFS2009.  Second, this 
study’s hypothesis that financial performance of financial services institutions applying a 
microfinance approach (MF), as measured by their return on total assets (ROA), will 
display higher ROAs between 2005 and 2009 when compared to the financial 
performance of TFS, stood and this study’s outcome displayed the hypothesized pattern 
and found indeed FPMF2005 > FPTFS2005; FPMF2006 > FPTFS2006; FPMF2007 > FPTFS2007; 
FPMF2008 > FPTFS2008; FPMF2009 > FPTFS2009.  Third, this study’s hypothesis that financial 
performance of financial services institutions applying a microfinance approach (MF), as 
measured by their network expansion, will display faster growth between 2005 and 
2009 when compared to the financial performance of TFS, partially stood and this 
study’s outcome displayed the hypothesized pattern and found indeed FPMF2005 > 
FPTFS2005; FPMF2006 > FPTFS2006; FPMF2007 > FPTFS2007; FPMF2008<FPTFS2008; 
FPMF2009<FPTFS2009. The overall trend has not matched the hypothesized pattern. Fourth, 
this study’s hypothesis that financial performance of financial services institutions 
applying a microfinance approach (MF), as measured by their portfolio at rear (PAR) 
rate, will display better rate (lower) between 2005 and 2009 when compared to the 
financial performance of TFS, did not stand and this study’s outcome displayed the 
hypothesized pattern and instead found FPMF2005 > FPTFS2005; FPMF2006 < FPTFS2006; 
FPMF2007 < FPTFS2007; FPMF2008<FPTFS2008; FPMF2009<FPTFS2009. The overall trend has not 
matched the hypothesized pattern.  
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Figure 5.38: Financial Performance Hypothesized Pattern vs. Study’s Outcome 
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5.6. Reconstruction by Microfinance  
 
 
While outreach and financial performance are measured at the institutional level, the 
reconstruction variable is measured at the client and the household levels. 
Reconstruction is measured by the level of clients’ business development, and the 
access to education by family members of clients, the household’s assets acquisition, 
and household’s standard of living.  
 
Data used in the following analysis originated from ninety-three structured interviews 
conducted between 6/2/2010 and 11/11/2010 in the DRC, using the “MFI Clients Post-
Conflict Reconstruction Survey” attached in Appendix 2. Forty-six interviews were 
conducted among clients of microfinance institutions (MF) and forty-seven interviews 
were conducted among non- clients of either microfinance institutions or commercial 
banks (Non Client). These ninety-three interviews provided a set of primary quantitative 
data summarized in the following sections.  
 
To test the business development hypothesis, three variables were tested statistically: 
number of businesses, profit, and number of employees. To test the education 
hypothesis, two variables were submitted to inferential analysis: number of children 
currently sent to school and number of children sent to school before microfinance. To 
test the asset acquisition hypothesis, one score summarizing assets acquisition was 
submitted to statistical analysis. That variable was the Total value of all of goods 
acquired. To test the standard of living hypothesis, two variables were submitted to 
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statistical analysis: individual income of interviewees and their households’ expense. 
Savings emerged as another key measure of reconstruction during data collection. To 
test the savings hypothesis, one variable was submitted to statistical analysis: amount 
saved. This study also computed the DPCE (Daily Per Capita Expenditure) Score. The 
DPCE is a score used by FINCA Client Assessment Tool (FCAT) to determine the 
poverty level of an MFI client (FINCA, 2007). The methodology is based on indicators of 
poverty scaled (World Bank, 2009) as following: (a) Less than $1/day of total household 
consumption indicates “Severe Poverty”; (b) $1-$2/day of total household consumption 
indicates “Moderate Poverty”; and above $2/day of total household consumption 
indicates “Vulnerable or Non-Poor”. Using collected data from the variable 
“Expenditures” of the survey resulted in computing a DPCE for each category of clients. 
Using the DPCE score to determine their consumption level should provide a good 
indication of the reconstruction effect on clients.     
 
Prior to executing statistical tests, some descriptive information was provided for each 
of these variables. Selected SPSS output (Tables and Figures) are displayed in 
Appendix 3. In the narrative, tables and figures in Appendix 3 will be numbered as A3 
plus the number.    
 
5.6.1. Surveyed Participants 
 
  
5.6.1.1. Gender 
 
Women represented 76% of the sample while men represented 24% (Table A3.1). The 
sample reflects the composition of clients operating in the DRC’s microfinance and the 
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informal sectors. Indeed, when looking at FINCA DRC, the larger provider of 
outstanding loans in DRC, 76% of its clients as of December 2009 were women 
(MixMarket, 2010). Also, Todaro & Smith (2006) argues that “women often represent 
the bulk of the informal sector labor supply, working for low wages at unstable jobs with 
no employee or benefits” (p. 333). This gender distribution characteristic was almost 
equally represented in the two comparison groups, as depicted on table 10 below: 20% 
among clients of microfinance institutions were male and 80% were female; 28% among 
non-clients of microfinance institutions were male and 72% were female.  
 
When looking at the distribution among the types of microfinance clients (village 
banking, solidarity group, and individual client), it appears that women are concentrated 
in the village banking type (which provides lower amount of loans: average of $US 446 
monthly found in this study) while men are concentrated in the individual client type 
(which provides higher amount of loans: average of US$ 1,475 monthly found in this 
study). Nine-two percent of village banking clients were female and only 8% (Table 
A3.2) were male. On the other, one-third (around 32%) of men were individual clients or 
members of a solidarity group.     
 
 5.6.1.2. Marital Status 
 
Fifty-nine percent in of respondents were married; 25% singles; 10% widows; and 6% 
were separated or divorced (Table A3.3). Singles and widows represented together one 
third of the sample (35%) which means that most of these households depend on only 
one source of income, the one earned by the single or the widow. This distribution 
corroborates Todaro & Smith’s (2006) argument that “the increase in the number of 
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single female migrants has also contributed to the rising proportion of urban households 
headed by women, which tend to be poorer, experience tighter resource constraints, 
and retain relatively high fertility rates” (p. 333).  
 
 5.6.1.3. Age 
 
The mean age of respondents was 39.24 and their median was 40 (Table A3.4). The 
sample has multiple modes with the smallest being 35 years old. The sample had a 
standard deviation of 10 years (9.881) and a range of 46 years with the oldest 
interviewee being 64 years old and the youngest 18 years old. In Figure 5.39, the 
sample age’s distribution appears closely normal (Field, 2005). The histogram reveals 
also that the majority of clients fall between the ages of 25 and 50 years old, which 
represent the active population of DRC who are the main source of income for their 
households. This section of the population is the target of microfinance institutions 
applying a poverty alleviation approach, claiming that the overall goals of microfinance 
should be poverty reduction and empowerment (Hishigsuren, 2004). Whether these 
households fall into the severe poverty rank ($1 or less per day), the moderate poverty 
rank ($1.01-$2 per day), or the vulnerable category (2.01-$3 per day), they are 
generally low-income households deprived access to mainstream financial institutions 
services (Daley-Harris & Awimbo, 2006). As noticed by Todaro & Smith (2006) “the lack 
of capital is a major constraint on activities of the informal sectors and the provision of 
credit would therefore permits these enterprises to expand, produce more profit, and 
hence generate more income and employment” (p.333). 
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Figure 5.39: Respondents Age Distribution 
  
 
 5.6.1.4. Experience with Financial Institutions 
 
Out of the 93 interviews, forty-six interviews were conducted among clients of 
microfinance institutions (MF); and forty-seven interviews were conducted among non- 
clients of either microfinance institutions or commercial banks (Non Client). The two 
groups are the comparison groups used for various analyses related to the 
reconstruction hypothesis. Table 5.18 presents the distribution of the sample in terms of 
their experience with formal financial services providers.  
 
Table 5.18: Experience with Financial institutions 
Experience with Financial Institutions  Number of 
Interviewees 
Percentage 
Client of Microfinance Institution         46     49.5% 
Not a Client of either Type of Financial Institution        47     50.5% 
Total         93   100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5.6.1.5. Types of Clients of Microfinance Institutions 
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The microfinance industry usually categorizes clients into group lending (solidarity group 
loans, expanded solidarity group loans, village banking) and individual lending (working 
capital loans, fixed asset loans, small business loans, agricultural loans, home 
improvement loans, lines of credit, consumer loans, emergency loans, pawn loans, 
parallel loans). The two approaches have resulted in three main types of clients: village 
banking, solidarity group, and individual client. The ‘group methodology’ has been the 
cornerstone of microfinance since its inception; however, John Hatch is generally 
recognized as the founder of the village banking model that brings together 25 to 40 
people to form a group called a ‘village bank’. The microfinance institution provides 
financial services to the group as a unit, mostly in the areas of loans and financial 
education. In a village bank, the group constitutes their collateral and is therefore 
collectively responsible for the full amount borrowed; if one member defaults, the entire 
group bears the responsibility to pay back the loan defaulted and in some cases get 
their credit score affected. The solidarity group is smaller in size (up to 10 members but 
generally around 5) but operates exactly as does the village bank in terms of lending 
policy and financial education. The individual client deals with the microfinance 
institution alone. This typology of clients has been largely influenced by the 
microfinance credit methodology which lies at the heart of microfinance and its quality. It 
is believed to be one of the most determinant factors for the efficiency, impact and 
profitability of a microfinance institution. Among microfinance clients, the sample had 
the following composition: 52.2% were village banking clients, 21.7% were members of 
solidarity groups, and 26.1% were individual clients (Table A3.5).  
 5.6.1.6. Clients Main Occupations 
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Except for one case, all interviewees own some type of business. Small business 
ownership reveals therefore to be the main occupation of clients of financial institutions 
and non-clients. Overall, 82% of the sample considered themselves primarily micro and 
small business owners; 8% considered themselves primarily public servants conducting 
small business in addition to their main job as public servant; 5% were primarily owners 
of not for profit organizations or of a medium size business; and 5% were students 
conducting small businesses while studying at local universities (Table A3.6). Figure 
5.40 below displays the dominance of small business ownership as the main occupation 
of interviewees from both comparison groups: microfinance institutions’ clients and non-
clients of either type of financial services providers. It was important that this study’s 
sample reflects this distribution because, as said above, post-conflict microfinance can 
help reconstruct small enterprises destroyed by armed conflict by providing the 
necessary capital to consolidate existing business or create new business. Indeed, 
Santos (2003) suggested that in the post-conflict DRC, microfinance should seize the 
opportunity to finance small, medium and micro enterprises. This section of this study, 
comparing microfinance institutions clients and non-clients, can be considered an 
impact evaluation of the role of major microfinance institutions (Procredit, Finca, Hope, 
Paidek, Hekima, and Mecreco, to name just a few) since they started disbursing loans 
to micro and small entrepreneurs in the city of Kinshasa.  
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Figure 5.40: Respondents Main Occupation 
 
 
 
 5.6.1.7. Clients Categories of Businesses 
 
Small businesses conducted by interviewees were categorized into three sectors: 
commerce or trade (including retail), manufacturing, and service. As depicted in Figure 
5.40, the bulk of interviewees split into the commerce/ trade/ retail and service sectors 
and represented together 97% of activities. Less than 3% were operating in the 
manufacturing sector. As mentioned above, one interviewee had no operating business 
at the time of interview.  This distribution corroborates previous research in Kinshasa 
(DRC) which found that the majority of household businesses fall under “Commerce” 
and “Services” with 58.2 % and 29.5% respectively (Matabisi, Beyene, and Kiremidjan, 
2007). However, though the 3% appear insignificant in term of percentage, it is 
important that the manufacturing domain be part of the poor’s portfolio in term of 
business and receives funding from financial institutions because manufacturing has the 
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highest potential to create jobs and wealth. The current trend in the microfinance 
industry is to finance trade and retail activities and less of manufacturing and 
agricultural activities because they usually don’t fit the repayment schedule (bi-weekly 
and monthly). As a matter of risk mitigation, most financial institutions providing loans 
require a maximum of a monthly timeframe to repay loans, which doesn’t fit 
manufacture and agricultural activities.  
 
Twelve types of businesses were recoded among clients and non-clients of financial 
institutions: food distribution, mini-convenient store or “ligablo” in Lingala, beverage 
kiosk or “Terrace” in Congolese French, pharmacy, used clothes sale or “fripperie” in 
Congolese French, agricultural products, local restaurant or “Malewa” in Lingala, taxi, 
phone kiosk or “Cabine” in Congolese French, grain mill or “Moulin” in French, wood 
products sale or “Mabaya” in Lingala, and electronics. Table A3.8 presents detailed 
data for each type of business. 
 
As illustrated by Figure 5.41, food distribution scored highest with 31% of interviewees 
involved in this type of business. Food distribution included all type of food sold at the 
market (grains, vegetables, beans, rice, meet, fish, and so on). Ligablo or mini-
convenient stores represented around 12% of main businesses; Terraces and 
Fripperies were respectively at 18% and 17% among clients. Malewa represented 
around 7% of business of interviewees, while Mabaya sellers represented around 5%. 
All the other types scored 2% or less.   
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Figure 5.41: Respondents Type of Main Business 
 
 
 
 5.6.1.8. Clients Sales Performance 
 
As shown on Table A3.9 and figure 5.42, only 27% of respondents reported that sales 
had increased since one year earlier. Approximately the same percentage said that 
sales were stable.  The rest reported decreasing sales. This finding revealed that the 
post-conflict macroeconomic environment in the DRC is still unstable. While this 
underperformance of the Congolese economy has an impact on client’s sales and profit, 
it should not affect the results of this study because it is assumed that both comparison 
groups are affected the same way. Figure 5.42 below displays the distribution of clients 
in term of their sales performance.  
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Figure 5.42: Respondents Sales Performance 
 
 
 5.6.1.9. Loan Recipients 
 
In the sample of clients of financial services institutions, eighty percent received a 
loan to boost their activities (Table A3.10). Financial services referred generally 
to the range of activities of the finance industry, which include lending, savings, 
insurance, investments, pension/retirement, payment services, mortgage, and 
money transfer. In the DRC, “the banking sector remains underdeveloped, and 
the level of financial intermediation is extremely low. In 2008, the level of 
aggregate credit to economy to GDP was only 6.4%, and the level of customer 
deposits to GDP was 9.5%” (IMF World Economic Outlook Database, cited by 
Procredit 2010). Deposits, loans, and money transfer through Western Union and 
MoneyGram are the main financial products most financial institutions offer. 
Recently, debit cards have been introduced and an emphasis is more and more 
put on savings accounts. In the DRC microfinance industry, loans remain the 
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main financial product offered to which are attached compulsory deposits or 
savings. For those clients with loans, three timeframes of repayment had been 
identified within the sample: weekly, bi-weekly, and monthly. Clients of village 
banking and solidarity groups are usually required to start repaying their loans a 
week but generally two weeks after loan disbursement. Individual clients are 
usually scheduled for a monthly repayment schedule. The bi-weekly repayment 
schedule seems to be the mode and scores 58% of clients with loans, followed 
by the monthly repayment schedule (33%) (Table A3.11). The loan repayment 
cycle currently practiced by microfinance institutions has been subject to a lot of 
comments by clients and non-clients interviewed. Summaries of these qualitative 
findings are presented in a subsequent section of this chapter; however, clients 
generally complained about this repayment cycle and argued that it profits the 
financial institution but disadvantages loan recipients.      
 
 5.6.1.10. Use of Loans 
 
The logic behind small loans provided to micro and small entrepreneurs is that the full 
loan amount is invested in the current business in order to bust the business in term of 
volume of inventory and sales. The result would be higher profit generated, enabling the 
loan recipient to pay back its loan on schedule while having enough money to provide 
for the household well-being. However, the sample revealed that not all loans recipients 
invest all loan amounts into their business; a cumulative 28% invested less than all of 
loan received (Table A3.12). This finding is plausible in an economy where business 
and household expenses are mingled. This behavior appears to be a risk mitigation 
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strategy by some recipients who prefer to keep some portion of their loan to cope with 
social shocks (sickness, death, social emergency, bankruptcy, and so on…).    
 
 5.6.1.11. Clients Affiliations 
 
Microfinance institutions expect their clients to belong to only one institution. This is not 
actually an expectation but more a requirement. The logic is simple: loans from more 
than one institution will overburden the loan recipient who will be unable to pay back the 
money borrowed on time. In a country like the DRC where there is no credit bureau and 
where financial providers are more than just competitors and do not share information, 
the chance for a client to get loans from more than one financial institution is high. 
However, microfinance institutions usually succeed in educating and using social 
pressure to convince their clients to avoid cross-loans. Nevertheless, this study’s 
sample revealed that around 15% of clients do belong to another financial institution 
and take loans from that financial institution (Table A3.13).  
 
5.6.1.12. Sales Performance of MF Clients 
 
Microfinance as an intervention to either access to financial services or to poverty 
alleviation rests on business development of the microfinance client. So far, emphasis 
has been on micro-credits but more and more saving-led microfinance is growing and 
considered an equal or even better tool as intervention (Ashe, 2009). Earlier, we found 
that 82% of all interviewees considered small business ownership their main 
occupation. All clients interviewed, but one, had a running business. As said above, the 
logic behind small loans provided to micro and small entrepreneurs is that this loan is 
invested in the current business in order to boost business in terms of volume of 
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inventory and sales. The result is higher profit generated from the business. To test this 
assumption, this study inquired about the level of sales performance pre and post 
microfinance. Only 38% of microfinance clients experienced the same or lower 
performance but the majority (62%) experienced some sort of increase in their sales 
performance (Table A3.16). This is an indication that microfinance as an intervention 
helps clients to boost their business. Figure 5.43 illustrates the sales performance of 
microfinance clients. 
  
Figure 5.43: Post-MF Sales Performance 
 
 
 5.6.1.13. Income  
 
With 82% of the sample depending only on their business profit as income, one of the 
key areas of comparison between the two comparison groups (MF vs. Non Client) is 
obviously the difference in their individual income level. While the independent t-test or 
its nonparametric equivalent will determine if there is a significant difference between 
MF and Non Clients, an indication comes from the pre and post level of income of 
microfinance clients. Table A3.16 presents the answers of forty-six interviewees 
Post-MF Sales Performance 
compared to Pre-MF
Sales increased a little or 
a lot
Sales decreased or stayed 
the same 
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exposed to microfinance intervention to know whether their current income experiences 
any change compared to their pre-microfinance level.  The question was measured at 
the ordinal level and it revealed that only a cumulative percentage of 33% of 
interviewees said that their income level stayed the same or were lower than their pre-
microfinance level. The majority of respondents (67%) said that their incomes were little 
higher or a lot higher. Figure 5.44 displays the outcome.   
 
Figure 5.44: Respondents Pre and Post Microfinance Income
 
 
  
5.6.1.14. Savings  
Saving is a major component of the microfinance equation. It takes many forms, 
depending on the approach and the methodology applied by the microfinance 
institution. In most cases, microfinance institutions require a deposit (up to 20% of 
requested loan) before loan consideration and disbursement.  
 
Major microfinance institutions, like FINCA DRC, require compulsory saving by the 
client at the time of loan reimbursement. For instance, interviewee No. 87, a client of 
FINCA DRC, belonging to the village bank called “Ndanu” in Limete, presented us her 
Post-MF Income compared to Pre-MF
Income increased a little or 
a lot
Income decreased or 
stayed the same 
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loan’s register or card detailing her cycle number, loan amount (principal), the interest, 
and the total amount (principal + interest). Another row detailed the payment amount, 
the savings, and the amount actually paid. The full name of the member was 
mentioned, the name of her village bank, and her membership number. This is an 
illustration of how important saving/deposit is for the microfinance industry. As of 
December 2009, the total amount saved by FINCA DRC clients was US$ 4.2 million.  
 
Although it was not emphasized in the proposal, saving has emerged as a key variable 
in measuring the impact of microfinance as an intervention. Using a “yes-no” format, the 
sample revealed that around 56% of the entire sample had savings of some sort, as 
depicted on Table A3.17.  
 
Obviously, some non-clients had savings. Seventy-seven percent among clients of 
financial institutions currently with savings had no savings before joining their current 
financial institution; only around twenty-three percent had savings before joining their 
current financial institution. This is an indication of a potential impact of the intervention 
by financial services providers, acting as a trigger to save. Table A3.18 presents the 
data.  Figure 5.45 below provides a visual illustration that shows the impact of 
microfinance, as an intervention, in promoting savings among its clients.    
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Figure 5.45: Respondents with Savings before joining MF  
 
 
Finally, when comparing the amount or level of savings pre and post microfinance 
institution, only 14% said that their savings were the same or less than their pre-
microfinance membership; the vast majority (86%) said that their savings were a little or 
a lot higher during their post-microfinance membership when compared to their pre-
microfinance membership. Table A3.19 presents the data and Figure 5.46 below 
displays the impact of microfinance, as an intervention, in promoting savings.   
 
Figure 5.46: Pre vs. Post MF Savings 
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Testing Reconstruction Hypotheses  
When planning this study, it was said that checking for differences between the two 
groups (MFI clients and Non clients) will improve our understanding of how they are 
different. The section above (population’s sample characteristics) has provided this 
study with some indications of differences between the two comparison groups. For 
instance, only 38% of microfinance clients experienced the same or lower sales 
performance. The majority (62%) experienced some sort of increase in their sales 
performance since they joined the current microfinance institution. In addition, using a 
“yes-no” format, the sample revealed that around 56% of the entire sample had savings 
of some sort; and seventy-seven percent among clients of financial institutions currently 
with savings had no savings before joining their current financial institution. This might 
be an indication of a potential impact of the intervention by financial services providers, 
acting as a trigger to save. When comparing the amount or level of savings pre and post 
microfinance institution, only 14% said that their savings were the same or less than 
their pre-microfinance membership; however, the majority (86%) said that their savings 
Comparing Pre to Post MF Savings
Decrease or Stayed the 
same
Increase a little or a lot
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were a little or a lot higher during their post-microfinance membership when compared 
to their pre-microfinance membership. Finally, only 33% of interviewees said that their 
income level stayed the same or was lower than their pre-microfinance level; the 
majority of respondents (67%) said that their incomes were a little higher or a lot higher. 
These indications of differences between the MF and Non Clients groups needed to be 
tested to see whether they are statistically significant.    
 
T-tests of differences between means are appropriate tests for determining such 
differences. It was anticipated during the planning stage that some data would be 
parametric while others will be nonparametric data to make sure that the study uses the 
right statistic for the data collected. It was said that Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
would be used to measure the strength of the relationships between variables when 
data are parametric, while nonparametric data would be submitted to Spearman’s and 
Kendall’s correlation coefficients. The study’s planning also anticipated that partial 
correlations might be used to control for other variables. Significance was set at the 
generally accepted social science standard of 95% confidence level (p<.05). To test the 
business development hypothesis, three variables were tested statistically: number of 
businesses, profit, and number of employees. To test the education hypothesis, two 
variables were submitted to inferential analysis: number of children currently sent to 
school and number of children sent to school before microfinance. To test the asset 
acquisition hypothesis, one score summarizing assets acquisition was submitted to 
statistical analysis. That variable was the total value of all of goods acquired. To test the 
standard of living hypothesis, two variables were submitted to statistical analysis: 
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individual income of interviewees and their households’ expense. To test the saving 
hypothesis, one variable was submitted to statistical analysis: amount saved. Prior to 
executing statistical tests, some descriptive information is provided for each of these 
variables.  
 
To begin, each variable was tested for normality (Kolgomorov-Smirnov “K-S” and 
Shapiro-Wilk “S-W” tests) and homogeneity of variance (Levene statistic) to guide the 
decision on whether to use parametric or nonparametric tests. The second step applied 
the correct (parametric or nonparametric) test to check significant correlation between 
the independent and the dependent variables (Pearson, Spearman and Kendall tau, 
Biserial, or Point-Biserial). When correlation was found, then the independent t-test 
(parametric) and the Mann-Whitney U Test (nonparametric) were applied to the data. 
Following Field (2005), a decision was made to apply both parametric and 
nonparametric tests to the data to make sure that all tests resulted to the same outcome 
(correlation and significance). The rationale for this double-testing can be justified by 
Field’s argument that “tests of normality (Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk) have 
their own limitations because with large sample sizes, it is very easy to get significant 
results from small deviations from normality, and so a significant test doesn’t 
necessarily tell us whether the deviations from normality is enough to bias any statistical 
procedures that we apply to the data. I guess the take-home message is: by all means 
use these tests, but plot your data as well as try to make an informed decision about the 
extent of non-normality” (Field, 2005, 93).   
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5.6.2. Business Development Hypothesis 
 
As said above, three variables are used to test business development hypothesis: 
number of businesses, profit, and number of employees. Table 5.19 provides key 
descriptive statistics of the three variables. Ninety-three cases are examined for each of 
the three variables. Respondents had up to six businesses with an average of 1.82 
businesses for the entire sample and a standard deviation of .999; they earned an 
average of US$113.80 profit weekly with a wide standard deviation of US$171 and a 
maximum of US$919; and respondents employed an average of 0.75 workers with a 
standard deviation of 1.07 and a maximum of 6 workers. It should be noticed that one 
respondent had no business when this survey was conducted, resulting to a minimum 
value of zero for the three variables. When looking at the two comparison groups 
(microfinance clients vs. non-clients of any financial institution), boxplots provide 
indications of the distribution of respondents for each variable. Figure 5.47 presents the 
boxplots of the distribution for the number of businesses respondents from different 
groups have, their weekly income, and the number of workers they employ.  
 
Table 5.19: Business Development Key Statistics 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
Number of Business 93 6 0 6 1.82 .100 .966 
Weekly Gross Profit 93 919 0 919 113.80 17.737 171.046 
Total Number of Employees 93 6 0 6 .75 .111 1.070 
Valid N (listwise) 93       
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Figure 5.47: Boxplots for Business Development 
                                                
 
 
The boxplots provide a first flavor of the data distribution among respondents for the three variables. 
The three whisker diagrams show the lowest score and the highest scores. As explained by Field 
(2005), “the distance between the lowest horizontal line and the lowest edge of the tinted box is the 
range between which the lowest 25% of scores fall (call the bottom quartile)” (p. 75).  
When looking at the boxes, the median numbers of businesses and employees are higher for MF 
clients vs. non-MF clients. There is very little difference in median weekly gross profits.   
For all three variables, however, means are higher for the MF clients. These results suggest a 
difference between the two groups.  Table 5.20 presents the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk outcomes for business development.  
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When looking at Table 5.20 below, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk 
output significant results (p>.05) for the three variables (number of business, weekly 
gross profit, and total employees), which indicate deviations from normality. The 
distributions are therefore not normal. (See Figure A2.3 for corroborating Normal Q-Q 
and Detrended Normal Q-Q Plots).  
 
Table 5.21 below displays the results of the Test of Homogeneity of Variance (Levene 
Statistic) for variables number of business, profit, and number of employees. Test 
results support the assumption of homogeneity of variance for the numbers of 
businesses (p=.302) and employees (p=.259), but not for profit (p=.000). This reflects 
the much greater variation in profit for MF clients versus non-MF clients. 
 
Table 20: Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) Outcomes for Business 
Development. 
 
  
Experience with Formal 
Financial Services 
 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Significance 
 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Significance 
 
Number of Businesss 
 
Client of MF 
Not a Client of MF 
 
.000 
.000 
 
.000 
.000 
 
 
Weekly Gross Profit 
 
Client of MF 
Not a Client of MF 
 
.000 
.004 
 
.000 
.000 
 
 
Total Number of 
Employees 
 
Client of MF 
Not a Client of MF 
 
.000 
.000 
 
.000 
.000 
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Field (2005) suggests the use of Point-Biserial correlation coefficient (rpb) test when 
one of the two variables is dichotomous and discrete. This is the case here: the 
independent variable “Experience with formal financial services” is a categorical 
variable (Client of MF or Non Client of MF). A Point-Biserial correlation “is simply a 
Pearson correlation when the dichotomous variable is coded with 0 for one category 
and 1 for the other (actually you can use any values and SPSS will change the lower 
one to 0 and the higher one to 1 when it does the calculations)” (Field, 2005, 132). 
Table 5.22 presents the Point-Biserial correlations for number of businesses, profit, 
and the number of employees.      
 
 
Table 5.21: Test of Homogeneity of Variance for Number of Business, Profit, and Number of 
Employees 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Number of Business Based on Mean 1.077 1 91 .302 
Based on Median 1.365 1 91 .246 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.365 1 90.991 .246 
Based on trimmed mean .804 1 91 .372 
Weekly Gross Profit Based on Mean 26.561 1 91 .000 
Based on Median 11.481 1 91 .001 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
11.481 1 46.688 .001 
Based on trimmed mean 19.133 1 91 .000 
Total Number of Employees Based on Mean 1.292 1 91 .259 
Based on Median 2.277 1 91 .135 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
2.277 1 90.568 .135 
Based on trimmed mean 1.816 1 91 .181 
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Table 5.22: Point-Biserial Correlations for Number of Businesses, Profit, and Number of Employees 
 
Experience with 
Formal 
Financial 
Services (a) 
Number of 
Business 
Weekly Gross 
Profit 
Total Number of 
Employees 
Experience with Formal 
Financial Services 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.255** -.337** -.169 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .007 .000 .052 
N 93 93 93 93 
Number of Business Pearson Correlation -.255** 1 .314** .166 
Sig. (1-tailed) .007  .001 .056 
N 93 93 93 93 
Weekly Gross Profit Pearson Correlation -.337** .314** 1 .494** 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .001  .000 
N 93 93 93 93 
Total Number of Employees Pearson Correlation -.169 .166 .494** 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .052 .056 .000  
N 93 93 93 93 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
(a): MF clients were coded 0 and Non-MF clients were coded 1.  
 
 
From table 5.22 above, the Point-Biserial coefficient’s output provides a matrix of the 
correlation coefficient for variables Number of Businesses (rbp=.255), Weekly Gross 
Profit (rbp= .337), and Total Number of Employees (rbp= .169). Two variables are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 levels (Number of Business and Weekly Gross Profit). 
One variable was not statistically significant (Number of Employees).  
 
As said above, a decision was made to apply both parametric and nonparametric tests. 
When looking at the output as summarized on table 5.23 below, the nonparametric tests 
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(Spearman’s rho and Kendall tau) display statistical significant results  for the three 
variables while the Point-Biserial test displays statistically significance for only two 
variables (Number of business and profit) while one is not significant (Number of 
employees). When looking at table 5.23, clearly the scores are closely similar. 
Therefore, a decision was made to proceed with the independent tests (T-test and 
Mann Whitney U tests) for the three variables.    
 
Table 5.23: Comparing Parametric to Non Parametric Tests for Number of Businesses, Profit and 
Number of Employees  
Variables Pt-Biserial Spearman rho Kendall tau 
Score Sig. Score Sig. Score Sig. 
Experience and # of Businesses .255 .007 .261 .006 .244 .006 
Experience and Profit .337 .000 .315 .001 .260 .001 
Experience and # of Employees .169 .052 .174 .048 .164 .048 
 
“Correlation coefficients say nothing about which variable causes the other to change” 
(Field, 2005, 128). However, when squared, the correlation coefficient called the 
coefficient of determination can indicate the amount of variability in one variable 
explained by the other variable. Using the Point-Biserial scores of the three variables to 
compute R Squared, number of businesses scored 6.5%; profit scored 11.3%; and 
employees scored 2.86%. After establishing correlations, significance was tested. Table 
5.24 below summarizes the nonparametric hypothesis test between the independent 
variable (experience with formal financial services) and the three dependent variables 
that measure business development: number of businesses, profit, and number of 
employees. The tests confirm that differences in the number of businesses and amount 
of profit are statistically significant; the difference in the number of employees is not.  
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Table 5.24: Non Parametric Hypothesis Test Summary for Number of Business, Profit, and 
Number of Employees 
 
The output of the parametric test (T-Test) reveals the same trend of results. The tests 
confirm that differences in the number of businesses (p=.007) and amount of profit 
(p=.000) are statistically significant; the difference in the number of employees is not 
(p=.053).  
 
From the above analysis, this study can conclude that there is indeed a correlation 
between the experience with formal financial institution of a micro or small business 
entrepreneur, operating in Kinshasa, the capital city of the DRC and the number of her 
or his business lines, the weekly profit she or he makes, and to some extent the number 
of people she or he employs. Moreover, this study established that two variables 
(number of business and profit) out of the three correlations are statistically significantly 
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while the third one barely missed the significance level (p=.053). This study’s 
experimental hypothesis, stating that micro and small entrepreneurs who are clients of 
microfinance experience more effective and efficient business development than micro 
and small entrepreneurs who are not clients of microfinance, has been confirmed. This 
study has therefore established that microfinance, as an intervention, improves 
business development in terms of the number of businesses, profit, and to some extent, 
in terms of the number of people they employed while exercising their micro and/or 
small enterprise activities. 
 
5.6.3. Education Hypothesis 
 
To test education hypothesis, two variables have been used: “number of children sent to 
school” and “number of children sent to school before joining current financial 
institution”. Table 5.25 provides key statistics of the three variables.  
 
Table 5.25: Education Key Statistics 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
Number of Children sent to 
School 
93 12 0 12 2.66 .212 2.046 
Number of Children sent to 
School before joining 
Financial Institution 
93 11 0 11 2.65 .208 2.004 
Valid N (listwise) 93       
 
Ninety-three cases are examined for each of the two variables. Respondents sent up to 
12 children to school when this survey was conducted; and up to eleven children were 
sent to school among current clients of microfinance institutions before becoming actual 
members. On average, 2.66 kids were currently sent to school and 2.65 were sent to 
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school Pre-MF. The entire sample had a standard deviation of 2.046 while Pre-MF had 
a standard deviation of 2.004. A few respondents had no children sent to school now or 
Pre-MF, therefore both variables had a minimum value of zero. When looking at the two 
comparison groups (microfinance clients vs. non-clients of any financial institution), the 
boxplots below display the distribution of respondents for each variable. Figure 5.48 
presents the boxplots of the distribution for the two education’s variables. 
 
 
Figure 5.48: Boxplots for Children sent to School Now (left) and Pre-MF (right) 
    
 
The whisker diagrams show the lowest scores, the highest scores, and the range 
between which the lowest 25% of scores fall. The two whisker boxplots look the same 
for children sent to school currently and those sent to school Pre-MF. The similarities 
between the two boxes for each variable suggest non-significance between the two 
comparison groups in terms of education as defined in this study. Table 5.26 below 
presents the results of the test of normality for two variables used to test the education 
hypothesis. 
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Table 26: Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) Outcomes for Education 
 
 
  
Experience with Formal 
Financial Services 
 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Significance 
 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Significance 
 
Number of Children sent to 
School 
 
Client of MF 
Not a Client of MF 
 
.004 
.012 
 
.000 
.001 
 
 
Number of Children sent to 
School before joining 
Financial Institution  
 
Client of MF 
Not a Client of MF 
 
.002 
.028 
 
.000 
.002 
 
 
Results from both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and the Shapiro-Wilk indicate 
deviations from normality. Table 5.27 below presents the results of the test of 
homogeneity of variance for education. 
 
Table 5.27: Test of Homogeneity of Variance for Number of Children sent to School 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Number of Children sent to 
School 
Based on Mean .271 1 91 .604 
Based on Median .298 1 91 .586 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.298 1 84.247 .587 
Based on trimmed mean .273 1 91 .602 
Number of Children sent to 
School before joining 
Financial Institution 
Based on Mean .465 1 91 .497 
Based on Median .448 1 91 .505 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.448 1 83.709 .505 
Based on trimmed mean .466 1 91 .496 
 
 
Test results support the assumption of homogeneity of variance for both the number of 
children sent to school and the number of children sent to school before joining financial 
institution (p=.497). As depicted on Table 5.28, the Point-Biserial correlation coefficient 
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(rpb) tests show significance for number of children sent to school but non-significance 
for number of children sent to school before joining current financial institution.  
 
Table 5.28: Point-Biserial Correlations for Experience with Financial Institution and 
Education 
 
Experience with 
Formal 
Financial 
Services 
Number of 
Children sent to 
School 
Number of 
Children sent to 
School before 
joining Financial 
Institution 
Experience with Formal 
Financial Services 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.188* -.144 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .035 .085 
N 93 93 93 
Number of Children sent to 
School 
Pearson Correlation -.188* 1 .937** 
Sig. (1-tailed) .035  .000 
N 93 93 93 
Number of Children sent to 
School before joining 
Financial Institution 
Pearson Correlation -.144 .937** 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .085 .000  
N 93 93 93 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
The output of nonparametric tests (Spearman’s rho and Kendall tau) summarized in 
Table 5.29 below displays the same trend in terms of scores and significance.    
 
Table 5.29: Comparing Parametric to Non Parametric Tests for Children sent to School  
Variables Pt-Biserial Spearman rho Kendall tau 
Score Sig. Score Sig. Score Sig. 
Experience and # of Children sent to 
School 
.188 .035 .176 .046 .154 .046 
Experience and of Children sent to 
School Pre MF 
.144 .085 .123 .120 .108 .119 
 
 
Using the Point-Biserial scores of the two variables to compute R Squared, both 
variables scored less than 1%. Nonparametric hypothesis tests confirm that differences 
in both variables were not significant. Table 5.30 below displays the results. The output 
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of parametric tests (T-Test) reveals the same trend of results. The tests confirm that 
there were no significant differences in the two variables. 
 
Table 5.30: Non Parametric Hypothesis Test Summary for Number of Children sent to School Now 
and Pre-MF. 
 
From the above analysis, this study has concluded that there is not a strong 
correlation or, most importantly, a significant difference in the number of children sent 
to school by micro and small entrepreneurs who are clients of microfinance institutions 
compared to those who are not client of any formal financial services institution, 
operating in Kinshasa, the capital city of the DRC. This study has not found that 
microfinance, as an intervention, makes a difference in children’s education.                 
 
 
 
 
 
5.6.4. Assets Acquisition Hypothesis 
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To test the Assets Hypothesis, variable “Total Assets Acquisition” is tested. Prior to 
statistical tests, Table 5.31 provides key statistics of total assets variable.  
 
Table 5.31: Assets Acquisition Key Statistics 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
Total Assets 93 86465 30 86495 13184.52 2135.046 20589.633 
Valid N (listwise) 93       
 
 
Ninety-three cases are examined for variable total assets. Respondents’ total assets’ 
value ranges from US$ 30 to US$ 86,495 with an average of US$ 13,184 and a 
standard error of US$ 235.046. The standard deviation is US$ 20,589.633. Figure 5.49 
displays the Boxplot for Assets.  
 
 
Figure 5.49: Boxplot for Total Assets Acquisition of Respondents. 
 
 
 
When looking at the boxplots, the median number is slightly higher for MF clients vs. 
non-MF clients; however, the mean is higher for MF clients. These results suggest that 
there seems to be a difference between the two groups.   
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Table 5.32 presents the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk outcomes 
for assets acquisition.  
 
Table 5.32: Tests of Normality for Total Assets 
 Experience with Formal 
Financial Services 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic Df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
Total Assets Client of Microfinance 
Institution 
.280 46 .000 .772 46 .000 
Not a Client of either type of 
Financial Institution 
.305 47 .000 .552 47 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
When looking at Table 5.32, the results indicate deviations from normality. Normal Q-Q 
and Detrended Normal Q-Q Plots of variable total assets (see Figure A3.5) corroborate 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk outcomes.  From Table 5.33 below, the 
results of the test of homogeneity of variance for total assets acquisition indicate that 
the assumption of homogeneity was violated. 
 
Table 5.33: Test of Homogeneity of Variance 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Total Assets Based on Mean 10.255 1 91 .002 
Based on Median 4.934 1 91 .029 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
4.934 1 84.227 .029 
Based on trimmed mean 10.103 1 91 .002 
 
 
The Point-Biserial correlation coefficient (rpb) test is used to check correlations. Table 
5.34 displays the results.  
 
 
 
Table 5.34: Point-Biserial Correlations for Experience with Microfinance 
and Total Assets 
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Experience with 
Formal 
Financial 
Services Total Assets 
Experience with Formal 
Financial Services 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.237* 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .011 
N 93 93 
Total Assets Pearson Correlation -.237* 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .011  
N 93 93 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
 
According to table 5.34, the Point-Biserial for variable total assets is statistically 
significant. The nonparametric tests (Spearman’s rho and Kendall tau), summarized in 
Table 5.35 below, display the same trends in terms of scores and significance. Total 
assets’ R squared is 6%.  
 
Table 5.35: Comparing Parametric to Non Parametric Tests for Total Assets  
Variables Pt-Biserial Spearman rho Kendall tau 
Score Sig. Score Sig. Score Sig. 
Experience and Total Assets .237 .011 .267 .005 .219 .005 
 
 
The Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U test reveals a significance level of .010. 
Results are displayed on Table 5.36. The parametric test (T-Test) reveals the same 
trend of results with p=.023 (two-tailed). One-tailed significance is .011.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5.36: Non Parametric Hypothesis Testing 
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From the above analysis, this study can conclude that there is indeed a correlation 
between experience with formal financial institution of a micro or small business 
entrepreneur, operating in Kinshasa, the capital city of the DRC, and the total value of 
their assets. Moreover, this study has found that the difference in the value of total 
assets between the two groups (MF vs. Non Clients) is statistically significant and 
displays a medium effect. Therefore, this study’s experimental hypothesis has been 
confirmed.  
 
5.6.5. Standard of Living Hypothesis 
 
To test the standard of living hypothesis, two variables have been used: “individual 
monthly income” and “total household expenditures”. Table 5.37 provides key statistics 
for the two variables.  
 
Table 5.37: Standard of Living Key Statistics 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
Individual Monthly Income 93 3676 0 3676 453.48 70.274 677.699 
Total Household Expenses 93 2576 84 2660 623.24 51.869 500.208 
Valid N (listwise) 93       
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Ninety-three cases are examined for each of the two variables. Respondents earned an 
average of US$ 453 as individual monthly income while the household’s expenditures 
average US$ 623. One respondent had no income and therefore the minimum is zero 
for monthly income while it is US$ 84 for household’s monthly expenditure; their 
maxima are respectively US$ 3,676 and US$ 2,660; their standard deviations are 
respectively US$ 677.699 and US$ 500.208. Figure 5.50 displays the boxplots for 
individual income and total household expenditures.  
 
 
Figure 5.50: Boxplots for Standard of Living 
 
  
 
 
When looking at the boxes, the median numbers of total household expenditures is 
higher for MF clients vs. non-MF clients. There’s however very little difference in median 
monthly income. For both variables, however, means are higher for the MF clients. 
These results suggest that there seems to be a difference between the two groups.  
Table 5.40 presents the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk outcomes 
standard of living.   
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When looking at Table 5.38, the results of both variables indicate deviations from 
normality. Normal Q-Q and Detrended Normal Q-Q Plots of Standard of living (see 
Figure A3.7) corroborate the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk outcomes.   
 
 
Table 5.38: Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) Outcomes for Business 
Development. 
 
  
Experience with Formal 
Financial Services 
 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Significance 
 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Significance 
 
Individual Monthly 
Income  
 
Client of MF 
Not a Client of MF 
 
.000 
.004 
 
.000 
.000 
 
 
Total Household 
Income  
 
Client of MF 
Not a Client of MF 
 
.000 
.000 
 
.000 
.000 
 
 
 
Table 5.39 below displays the results for the Test of Homogeneity of Variance for both 
variables and here too the results (Levene’s statistics) are both significant indicating 
violations of the assumption of homogeneity for both variables. 
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Table 5.39: Tests of Homogeneity for Individual Income and Household Total Expenditures 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Individual Montly Income Based on Mean 22.607 1 91 .000 
Based on Median 9.818 1 91 .002 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
9.818 1 46.950 .003 
Based on trimmed mean 15.980 1 91 .000 
Total Household Income Based on Mean 23.655 1 91 .000 
Based on Median 11.046 1 91 .001 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
11.046 1 46.769 .002 
Based on trimmed mean 16.888 1 91 .000 
 
Results of the Point-Biserial correlation coefficient test are displayed on Table 5.40. 
The outcomes show high correlations for total household expenditures and monthly 
income.  
 
Table 5.40: Point-Biserial Correlations for Individual Income and Household Total 
Expenditures 
 
Experience with 
Formal 
Financial 
Services 
Individual 
Montly Income 
Total Household 
Income 
Experience with Formal 
Financial Services 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.316** -.364** 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .001 .000 
N 93 93 93 
Individual Montly Income Pearson Correlation -.316** 1 .847** 
Sig. (1-tailed) .001  .000 
N 93 93 93 
Total Household Income Pearson Correlation -.364** .847** 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .000  
N 93 93 93 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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The same trend found with the Point-Biserial is also displayed when using 
nonparametric tests (Spearman’s rho and Kendall tau). Results are summarized on 
Table 5.41. R squared is 10% for monthly income; it is 13% for total household 
expenses. Individual monthly income displayed a medium effect but close to a large 
size effect (r=.4.1). Total household expenditures displayed a large effect. 
 
Table 5.41: Comparing Parametric to Non Parametric Tests for Income and Household 
Expenditures  
Variables Pt-Biserial Spearman rho Kendall tau 
Score Sig. Score Sig. Score Sig. 
Experience and # Individual Monthly 
Income 
.316 .001 .283 .003 .233 .003 
Experience and Total Household 
Expenditures 
.364 .000 .458 .000 .377 .000 
 
Table 5.42 below summarizes the nonparametric hypothesis tests. The Independent-
Samples Mann-Whitney U tests reveal significance for both variables. The parametric 
tests (T-Test) also reveal the same trend of results with p=.000 for both variables.  
 
Table 5.42: Non Parametric Hypothesis Test Summary for Standard of Living 
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Based on the above analysis, there is indeed a correlation between the experience with 
formal financial institution of a micro or small business entrepreneur, operating in 
Kinshasa, the capital city of the DRC, and their standard of living, as measured by the 
individual monthly income and the total household expenditures. Moreover, this study 
established that the two variables are statistically significant and display large effects. 
This study’s experimental hypothesis was retained. This study concluded that 
microfinance, as an intervention, improves the standard of living of their clients in 
comparison to non-clients of financial institutions. 
 
 
5.6.6. Savings Hypothesis 
 
To test the Savings hypothesis, the variable “Amount of Savings” is tested. The amount of savings of 
respondents ranges from US$ 0 to US$ 3,750 with an average of US$ 245.90 and a standard error of 
US$ 62.589 (Table A3.20). The standard deviation is US$ 603.590. Figure 5.51 displays the boxplot 
for amount of savings.   
  
Figure 5.51: Boxplot for Amount of Savings  
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When looking at the boxes, the median savings displays little difference between MF 
clients and non-clients. The means however appear to be higher for MF clients. These 
results suggest that there might be a difference between the two groups. Table 5.43 
presents the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk outcome for savings.  
 
Table 5.43: Tests of Normality for Savings 
 Experience with Formal 
Financial Services 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic Df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
Amount of Savings Client of Microfinance 
Institution 
.315 46 .000 .499 46 .000 
Not a Client of either type of 
Financial Institution 
.358 47 .000 .524 47 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Results of the test of normality for savings show that the assumption of normality has 
been violated. Table 5.44 below presents the results of the test of homogeneity of 
variance for savings. Results of the test of homogeneity also show that the assumption 
of homogeneity of variance is violated because the Levene’s score (9.858) is significant 
(p=.002). 
 
Table 5.44: Test of Homogeneity of Variance 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Amount of Savings Based on Mean 9.858 1 91 .002 
Based on Median 4.826 1 91 .031 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
4.826 1 51.873 .033 
Based on trimmed mean 5.749 1 91 .019 
 
The Point-Biserial correlation coefficient (rpb) test is used for correlation. Table 5.45 
displays the results of the correlations. 
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Table 5.45: Point Biserial Correlation for Savings  
 
Experience with 
Formal 
Financial 
Services 
Amount of 
Savings 
Experience with Formal 
Financial Services 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.249** 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .008 
N 93 93 
Amount of Savings Pearson Correlation -.249** 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .008  
N 93 93 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
When looking at Table 5.45, the Point-Biserial coefficient outcome significant result. The 
same trend is displayed when using nonparametric tests (Spearman’s rho and Kendall 
tau). The results are summarized on table 5.46. Saving’s R Squared scored .06, 
meaning that savings accounts for 6% of the variability.  
 
Table 5.46: Comparing Parametric to Non Parametric Tests for Savings  
Variables Pt-Biserial Spearman rho Kendall tau 
Score Sig. Score Sig. Score Sig. 
Experience and Amount of Savings .249 .008 .450 .000 .395 .000 
 
The Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U test reveals a high significance level (.000). 
Table 5.47 below presents the output of the non-parametric test. The output of the 
parametric test (T-Test) also reveals the same trend of results with p=.010. 
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Table 5.47: Non Parametric Hypothesis Test for saving
 
Based on the above analysis, there is indeed a correlation between the experience with 
formal financial institution of a micro or small business entrepreneur, operating in 
Kinshasa, the capital city of the DRC, and the amount they save. Moreover, this study 
has found that the difference in the amount of savings between the two groups (MF vs. 
Non Clients) is statistically significant and displays a medium effect. Therefore, this 
study’s experimental hypothesis is retained. This study has therefore found that 
microfinance, as an intervention, allows its clients to save higher amount of money than 
those not working with any financial services institution. 
 
 
5.6.7. Daily Per-Capita Expenditure (DPCE) 
 
Data collected enabled this study to compute the DPCE (Daily Per Capita Expenditure) 
Index. The DPCE is a score used by FINCA Client Assessment Tool (FCAT) to 
determine the poverty level of an MFI client (FINCA, 2007). The methodology is based 
on indicators of poverty, scaled as following:  less than $1/day of total household 
consumption indicates “Severe Poverty”; $1-$2/day of total household consumption 
indicates “Moderate Poverty”; and $2-$3/day of total household consumption indicates 
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“Vulnerable Non-Poor” (FINCA, 2007). Using data collected for variable “Expenditures” 
of the survey resulted in computing a DPCE for both MF clients and Non Clients. As 
does FINCA, this study uses the DPCE index to determine the consumption level of 
households involved in this study. This index has been adapted to provide the study 
with an indication of the reconstruction effect when it comes to standard of living. It 
should be noticed however that, while FINCA utilizes comprehensive annual household 
expenditure data to compute the total household expenditures which is then divided by 
the total number of household members, this study uses instead a comprehensive 
monthly household expenditure data to process the DPCE Index.  
 
Indeed, when using the FCAT in 2007, the researcher found it very challenging to 
clients to remember their expenses on an annual basis. A monthly approach appears to 
be a more practical one and has been used here. In addition, this study has come up 
with an additional type of DPCE index, called the “Microfinance DPCE Index’ (MDPCEI). 
Indeed, the FINCA DPCE is based on household expenditures which comprises in 
general more than one income (MF clients + other income earners of the household). 
This study agrees that the classical DPCE, using the household expenditures approach 
as applied by the UN and its UNDP program, provides a real figure of the status of the 
household in term of $ amount used per day/household. However, this study is 
suggesting the MDPCEI as a clean and more realistic measure of the contribution of 
microfinance in the DPCE. As stated above, two paradigms champion the microfinance 
industry: financial self-sustainability and poverty alleviation. This study’s understanding 
is that each among these two approaches will be interested in determining the share of 
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microfinance outcome in the stability of a household for a self-sustainability goal of a 
household or its poverty alleviation’s goal. It is the hope of this study that the MDPCEI 
will prove useful to the microfinance community.  
 
Pooling all respondents, 7.5% of households in the sample live in severe poverty (less 
than US$ 1per day); 28% live in moderate poverty (between US$ 2 and US$1 per day); 
21.5% can be considered as vulnerable (spend between US$ 3 and US$2 per day); and 
43% can be considered non poor because they live with US$3 or higher amount per day 
(A3.21). When breaking the results between the two comparison groups (MF vs. Non 
Clients), Table 5.48 reveals that only 2.25% of MF clients in the sample live in severe 
poverty vs. 12.8% among Non-Clients; 26.1% live in moderate poverty vs. 29.8% Non-
Clients; 23.9% MF clients are vulnerable vs. 19.1% Non-Clients; and 47.8% MF clients 
are non-poor vs. 38.3% Non-Clients.   
 
 
Table 5.48: Household Poverty Level of MF Clients vs. Non Clients 
Poverty  
Level 
MF Clients Non Clients 
Frequency % Cumulative % Frequency % Cumulative % 
Severe 
Moderate 
Vulnerable 
Non poor 
      1 
    12 
    11 
    22 
  2.2 
26.1 
23.9 
47.8 
       2.2 
     28.3 
     52.2 
   100.0 
      6 
    14 
      9 
    18 
12.8 
29.8 
19.1 
38.3 
     12.8 
     42.6 
     61.7 
   100.0 
Total     46 100    100.0     47 100    100.0 
Source: Primary data from Survey conducted in Congo in 2010. 
 
When grouping the four categories into two main categories (Severe/moderate poverty 
and vulnerable/non poor), the difference between the two comparison groups become 
obvious as it can be seen from the cumulative column on the above Table 5.48: Only 
28% among MF Clients live in either severe or moderate poverty vs. 43% among Non-
Clients; inversely, 72% among MF Clients are vulnerable or Non Poor vs. 57% among 
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Non-Clients. In terms of poverty level, clients of microfinance institutions appear to be 
better off than non-clients.  
 
5.6.8. Microfinance Daily Per-Capita Expenditure (MDPCE) 
 
Table A3.22 summarizes the MDPCE (Microfinance Daily Per Capita Expenditures 
Index) outcome of MF clients and Non Clients. As a quick reminder, the DPCE uses the 
total household expenditures, which generally comprises more than one income; while 
the MDPCE is calculated based on the clients monthly income only, which permits to 
determine the net contribution of the client to the household economy. Said differently, 
MDPCEI determines what would be the household’s DPCE if living on only the income 
from the client’s microfinance activities. It can be depicted from the table that 34.4% of 
the sample’s households would live in severe poverty (US$ 1or less per day); 33.3% in 
moderate poverty (between US$ 2 and US$1 per day); 11.6% would be considered as 
vulnerable (spend between US$ 3 and US$2 per day); and 20.4% could be considered 
non poor because they would live with US$3 or higher amount per day.  
 
When looking at the results of microfinance households when other incomes are not 
considered, Table 5.49 reveals 32.6% of MF households would live in severe poverty if 
microfinance income was the only household income vs. 2.25% when the total 
household income is considered; 23.9% of MF households in moderate poverty vs. 
26.1%; 15.2% of MF households would be considered vulnerable vs. 23.9%; and finally, 
only 28.3 % of MF households (28.3%) would be non-poor vs. 47.8%.  
 
 
Table 5.49: Household Poverty Level of MF Households (MF income vs. Household income) 
Poverty  Household Income MF Income Only 
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Level Frequency % Cumulative % Frequency % Cumulative % 
Severe 
Moderate 
Vulnerable 
Non poor 
      1 
    12 
    11 
    22 
  2.2 
26.1 
23.9 
47.8 
       2.2 
     28.3 
     52.2 
   100.0 
    15 
    11 
      7 
    13 
32.6 
23.9 
15.2 
28.3 
     32.6 
     52.5 
     71.7 
   100.0 
Total     46 100    100.0     47 100    100.0 
Source: Primary data from Survey conducted in Congo in 2010. 
 
When grouping the four categories into two main categories (Severe/moderate poverty 
and vulnerable/non poor), Figure 5.52 represents the difference between the poverty 
level of households of microfinance clients when the household income is considered 
vs. when only income from microfinance activities is considered: 28% among MF 
Clients would live in either severe or moderate poverty when household income is 
considered vs. 52% when only MF income is considered; inversely, 72% among MF 
Clients would be vulnerable or Non Poor when household income is considered vs. 48% 
when only MF income is considered. This comparison illustrates the net contribution of 
MF income and indicates that while microfinance is a tool for post-conflict reconstruction 
because it improves its clients’ household standard-of-living, other members of the 
household should also bring their contribution for a higher standard of living of 
microfinance clients. Figure 5.52 displays the contrast between the DPCE and the 
MDPCE.  
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Figure 5.52: Household Poverty Level vs. Microfinance Poverty Level
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6. Discussion 
 
6.1. Post-Conflict Outreach and financial Performance by Microfinance  
 
One limitation identified when planning this study was the reliability of data from DRC, a 
country that just emerging from a long period of political and armed conflicts. 
Surprisingly, reliability was not an issue; it is the availability of data that emerged as a 
critical issue. Indeed, data used in this study came from reliable sources: published 
annual reports of financial institutions, published flyers, Central Bank of Congo’s 
published reports and documents, current information on diverse web sites, CGAP 
(Consultative Group to Assist the Poor), the World Bank, and the MIXMarkets database. 
These raw data were verified and cross-checked through various means: authentication 
of data, two trips to Congo, five visits to the Central Bank of Congo, visits at 
headquarters and branches of financial institutions operating in Kinshasa, and fifteen 
unstructured interviews with key players of the financial services industry (regulators, 
CEOs, branch managers, loan officers, tellers, and clients).  
 
It is however the availability of data that was an issue. Only two financial institutions 
applying the traditional approach and four financial institutions applying a microfinance 
approach had available and complete data sets that fit this study. Data from other 
financial institutions of both types were collected but could not be included in the 
analysis, because they were either incomplete or did not fit the study’s time frame.  
 
The reliability of data being assured, this study has worked through available data and 
came up with valuable results presented in the previous chapter.   
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This study proposed that microfinance serves as a tool for rebuilding financial services 
in post-conflict communities, and one way of determining whether or not the 
phenomenon occurred in the DRC was to determine that microfinance institutions show 
increases in outreach during consecutive years in a post-conflict situation. Four 
variables were proposed for that purpose: employment, clientele, lending, and 
savings/deposits by providers of financial services during the post-conflict period. This 
study found that outreach, measured by the level of employment by microfinance 
institutions, the number of clients joining microfinance institutions, and the volume 
(dollar amount) of loans disbursed by microfinance institutions, displayed consecutive 
yearly increases from 2005 through year 2009. Outreach, measured by the dollar 
amount of deposits of clients, displayed consecutive yearly increases from 2005 to 
2007, a slight decrease between 2007 and 2008, and again a sharp increase through 
year 2009. The increases happened at the institutional level and at the industry level. 
This study found that the overall trend fit the hypothesized pattern.  
 
Another indicator that can determine whether microfinance serves as a tool for 
rebuilding the financial services sector in post-conflict communities is whether 
microfinance institutions show improvements in their financial performance during 
consecutive years in a post-conflict situation. Four variables were examined in this 
study: assets, efficiency, profitability, and risk.  
 
This study found that financial performance, measured by total assets of microfinance 
institutions, displays consecutive yearly increases from 2005 through year 2009. The 
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study also found that financial performance, measured by efficiency (self-sufficiency) of 
microfinance institutions, displays consecutive yearly increases from 2005 through year 
2008 but deviated from the hypothesis in 2009; overall, however, the trend has matched 
the hypothesized pattern. Financial performance, measured by profitability of 
microfinance institutions and yields on portfolio, did not occur as hypothesized. 
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that all microfinance institutions in the sample 
displayed positive yields on their gross portfolio during the five-year period, ranging from 
a lowest of 25% to a high of 85% but their time series outcome shows a decreasing 
trend which deviated from the hypothesized pattern.  Finally, financial performance, 
measured by risk (Portfolio at Risk) of microfinance institutions, displays consecutive 
yearly improvement from 2006 through year 2009 but deviated from the hypothesis in 
2005. This study has concluded that the overall financial performance trend matched 
the hypothesized pattern. 
 
Data collected from other microfinance institutions but not included in the analysis 
corroborate this study’s finding that, outreach, measured by the level of employment by 
microfinance institutions, the number of clients joining microfinance institutions, the 
volume (dollar amount) of loans disbursed by microfinance institutions, and deposits by 
clients, displays consecutive yearly increases. For instance, MECRECO, a network of 
credit and saving cooperatives, displays the pattern found in this study, as 
demonstrated in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: MECRECO Key Data 
Key 
Variables 2006 2007 
% Chg 
06-07 2008 
%  
Chg 
07-
08 
2009 
% 
Chg 
08-
09 
% Chg 
06-09 
Clients 11,009 22,060 100% 36,747 67% 49,675 35% 351% 
Borrowers 3,824 9,467 148% 13,797 46% 13,577 -2% 255% 
Loan 
Portfolio 
(US$) 
2,661,886 5,722,874 115% 10,760,711 88% 14,051,641 31% 428% 
Savings 
(US$) 4,853,065 11,355,494 134% 13,565,578 19% 19,277,217 42% 297% 
Total 
Assets 
(US$) 
5,639,219 12,978,864 130% 16,834,691 30% 22,552,779 34% 300% 
Source: MECRECO 2010 Prospectus.  
 
Another example is HOPE DRC, a national microfinance program belonging to the 
HOPE International microfinance network with fourteen programs around the world that 
has also displayed an outreach performance that corroborates the findings of this study. 
Table 6.2 presents Hope-DRC’s key data.    
 
Table 6.2: HOPE-DRC Key Data 
Key Variables 2004 2005 
% Chg 
04-05 
2006 
%  Chg 
05-06 
2007 
% Chg 
06-07 
% Chg 
04-07 
Clients/Borrowers 936 3,735 299% 4,936 32% 11,160 126% 1092% 
Employees 11 38 245% 36 -5% 100 % 809% 
Loan Portfolio 
(US$) 
48,144 196,968 309% 492,367 150% 868,225 76% 1703% 
Offices 1 3 200% 3 0% 4 33% 300% 
Total Assets (US$) 73,264 446,153 509% 827,959 86% 1,506,001 82% 1956% 
Source: MixMarkets, 2009. 
 
 
Finally, the findings of outreach and financial performance by post-conflict microfinance 
corroborate data published by the Microfinance Unit of the Central Bank of Congo 
(Annual Report 2009, p.205; Internal Draft from the Microfinance Unit, Department of 
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financial providers’ supervision, Central Bank of Congo, 2010) related to the 
microfinance industry in Congo. Accordingly, as of December 2009: 
  
(a) Total deposits amounted to USD 58.7 million against USD 47.5 million as of December 
2008, an increase of 24%. The provinces of Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu have distinguished 
themselves in this area with 37% of total deposits for the former and 35% for the later. 
(b)  Loans disbursed totaled USD 45.5 million against USD 41.2 million as of December 
2008, a 10% increase. The provinces of Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu alone disbursed 64% 
of all loans while the Capital city of Kinshasa accounted for 30% of all loans. Three 
institutions provided more than half of total loans: Coopec Nyamweri (USD 7.9 million), 
FINCA DRC (USD 7.9 million), and MECRECO (USD 10.3 million). 
(c) Depositors increased to 344,207 as of September 2009 from 293,682 as of December 
2008, an increase of 17%. MECRECO’s depositors represented 15% of all depositors 
while FINCA DRC counted 11% of all depositors. 
(d) The national average deposit or saving per client was USD 117; the highest average 
was found in the province of Sud-kivu (USD 408) and the lowest in the province of 
Kasai-Occidental (USD 39) and the province of Bandundu (USD 8). 
 
Clearly, this study’s findings and additional evidence support the thesis that 
microfinance serves as a tool for rebuilding the financial services sector in post-conflict 
communities. The findings in this study bring additional evidence to the field of Post-
Conflict Microfinance (PCM) and corroborate Barr’s (2005) suggestion to approach 
microfinance as a form of financial development and understand how it can contribute to 
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financial sector development. Barr extended the original understanding of microfinance 
as a poverty alleviation tool into a broader role as a specific financial development tool 
that has to be understood in the larger context of a country’s entire financial sector.   
 
This study’s findings also provide evidence to support Kuehnast (2001); Frasier & Saad 
(2003); and Barr (2005) who argued that microfinance can play the role of financial 
services reconstruction in a post-conflict context.  
 
Two institutions, Procredit and Finca, have greatly impacted the time series trend lines 
of the outreach variables (employment, clientele, loans, savings /deposits) and financial 
performance variables (assets, efficiency, profitability, and risk). Nevertheless, Hekima 
and Paidek have also shown the same trends but usually with lower numbers or rates 
than Procredit and Finca. The findings within the sample of microfinance institutions 
have shown two behaviors or some type of divide between more aggressive and high 
performing institutions (Procredit and Finca) on one side and, on the other side, less 
aggressive and performing microfinance institutions (Hekima and Paidek). These two 
behaviors seem to corroborate what Hishigsuren (2004) cited as two competing 
paradigms guiding microfinance practice, the financial self-sustainability approach (also 
referred as profit, institutionalist or financial systems approach) and the poverty 
alleviation approach (also referred as welfarist approach). Procredit and Finca seem to 
match the former (financial self-sustainability) while Hekima and Paidek appear to 
match the latter (poverty alleviation approach).  
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While these practices can indeed reflect the two competing paradigms mentioned by 
Hishigsuren (2004), this study would instead suggest that, in a post-conflict setting of 
developing countries such as the DRC, these two behaviors shall be understood 
theoretically as two sides of the same coin, instead of two competing approaches. 
Indeed, Stiefel (1999) reminds us that the challenge of post-conflict reconstruction is 
similar to development challenges because they are related to growth, inclusiveness, 
stability, and sustainability which become more severe due to the legacy of conflict. In 
such post-conflict settings, a microfinance approach to financial services reconstruction 
needs to operate at two levels: the micro-level and the meso-level. At the micro-level, as 
do Paidek, Hekima, and Hope DRC to name just a few, microfinance reaches the urban 
and rural poorest and constitutes the entry level to the financial services industry. At the 
miso-level, as do Procredit, Finca, Advans Congo, and Mecreco to name just a few, 
microfinance addresses immediately the needs of micro and small entrepreneurs who 
are low-income but not necessary poor to access capital, deposits and savings 
capability in a post-conflict financial services environment characterized by a destruction 
of financial infrastructures. The meso-level also plays a role of “re-entry” to the financial 
services industry for many former clients of pre-conflict financial institutions who have 
lost their money but mostly their trust to the financial services industry. This “re-entry” 
move was expressed by interviewee No. 85 (see appendix 4 for full comment) who said 
“Procredit is the financial institution that has brought people back to the financial 
services industry. Procredit has projected trust and confidence by providing loans, 
securing deposit, introducing debit cards and ATM in Kinshasa”. (Interview conducted in 
Kinshasa, DRC, in October 2010). 
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The entry and re-entry role played by microfinance institutions in post-conflict DRC is an 
important finding because it confirms this study’s postulate that microfinance is more 
agile and positions itself as a bridge between the informal financial sector and the 
formal financial sector. Indeed, microfinance institutions provide a potential solution to 
the traditional exclusion of some segments of the population to access mainstream 
financial services encountered in many developing countries. Post-Conflict Microfinance 
in DRC provides therefore a way to address the divide between the poor majority and 
the rich minority to access financial services. As said earlier, while inequality in 
accessing financial services may always exist, it can be reduced by using a 
microfinance approach to financial services provision following a conflict. 
 
The outreach and financial performance by microfinance institutions’ findings and 
supporting evidence are encouraging signals in the post-conflict reconstruction of 
financial services in post-conflict DRC. However, the head of the Microfinance Unit at 
the Central Bank of Congo warns that while these results are great, “the microfinance 
sector in DRC is still weak and characterized by a lack of professionalism within the 
sector: many among them have no clear vision, do not use acceptable account 
systems, and do not have effective management systems. As a result, many 
microfinance institutions are bankrupted and have to close doors soon after they start 
operating” (Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, in August 2010).   
 
DRC post-conflict microfinance institutions are a valuable tool in reaching out to many 
Congolese to use financial services for their first time, bringing back to the financial 
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services sector former clients of bankrupt cooperatives, or even serving former clients of 
commercial banks. However, those institutions are being criticized for a myriad of 
reasons. The principal ones are: (1) High interest rates; (2) Harsh methods of loan 
recovery; (3) Social and cultural insensitivity in recovering troubled loans; (4) 
Unprofessional behavior when dealing with clients; (5) Short time between loan 
disbursement and loan repayment; (6) Caring only about loans and less about clients’ 
business development.  
 
Those criticisms are echoed by microfinance institutions’ clients. Indeed, while collecting 
quantitative data over a five-month period in Kinshasa, this study collected also some 
qualitative data by probing and asking unstructured questions, using the “MFI Clients 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction Survey” (see appendix 1). In relation to high interest 
charged by microfinance institutions, interviewee No. 90 said the following:  
 
If it’s true that MFI rates are lower when compared to street lenders, it’s 
however more and more obvious that MFI exploit us. They lend us money 
using monthly interest rate (5% more or less) but when you translate it into 
yearly rate, you find out that we pay 30%, 40% and sometimes 60%. This 
is a shame because none pays such a rate in Europe and in America. 
(Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, on November 8, 2010). 
  
When it comes to harsh methods of loan recovery, interviewee No. 67, a pastor from a 
local church said:  
 
I am not a client of a microfinance or bank but many of my followers in the 
church are clients of MF institutions. I understand that they borrow money 
as a group and when one person defaults the others pay. This is not fair 
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and I guess this is why more and more people are skeptical with MF 
institutions. Group punishment is not a fair practice. I heard a lot of bad 
stories about MF: people’s belongings are taken if they are late or do not 
pay back loans; some are hiding or moving to other neighborhoods; 
savings are retained and not given easily. (Interview conducted in 
Kinshasa, DRC, on October 21, 2010).  
 
Many clients have complained that microfinance institutions are not sensitive to social 
and cultural aspects of the environment where they operate. Interviewee No. 90 adds 
the following:  
 
In this country, social life is mingled with business. It happens often that 
on the day of repayment, a client has a funeral, a sickness or other social 
emergency. Here, MFI are not flexible at all and loan officers behave 
unprofessionally, sometimes threatening people. As I told you before, 
word-of-mouth is an effective communication tool. People talk and know 
about what others are going through and as a result people are becoming 
reluctant vis-à-vis the financial institutions. (Interview conducted in 
Kinshasa, DRC, on November 8, 2010). 
 
Clients have also complained about unprofessional behavior by microfinance institutions 
when dealing with clients. Interviewee No. 30 said the following:  
 
In general, things are well organized with FINCA. I just was not lucky and 
became ill; my sales decreased and I could not pay back my loan 
regularly. However, FINCA’s approach is good and helpful. The one think I 
do not like with FINCA is that they do not care about people’s health. Even 
if you are seriously ill you have to pay back your loan on time. I owed 
FINCA US$ 20 and received threats from loan officers. According to them 
even a dead body must pay back their loan. (Interview conducted in 
Kinshasa, DRC, on October, 9, 2010). 
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Concerning complaints about the short time between loan disbursement and loan 
repayment, interviewee No. 35 said the following:  
 
Loans help a lot. Prior to FINCA and other MF institutions, people lent 
money asking 50% interest monthly. Finca’s rate is 4 or 5% monthly. This 
is good. The fact is that it’s tough to find someone lending you money in 
this city. However, I will take a break and won’t take a new loan. If you 
want to know why, loan repayment is stressful. I need a break. Paying 
back loans every two weeks is very challenging. I am more in favor of a 
monthly repayment cycle. I will be back with Finca if they adopt a monthly 
repayment policy for groups. MF institutions are growing but clients are 
suffering and not making good progress. Sales are usually a little higher 
when you just start your loan cycle. After few repayments, sales decrease 
drastically because most of the capital is going back to MF as part of loan 
reimbursement. (Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, on October 11, 
2010).  
 
Finally, some clients to whom we talked complained about the fact that microfinance 
institutions care only about their loans and less about their clients’ business 
development. Interviewee No. 81 said:  
 
Usually, you experience serious difficulties during the last month of the 
loan cycle: your inventory is gone, the principal is gone, your own capital 
is at its lowest, and sales are very low because you do not have enough 
and diversified inventory. Loans bring you a lot of stress. I am a Christian 
and I am supposed to be happy with the standard of living God allows me 
to have, but the day before paying back your loan you feel so low that 
even prayers do not help. I feel better now that I am out of that loans-
business (Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, on October 23, 2010). 
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In conclusion, this study has found that microfinance institutions are doing a 
tremendous work in terms of outreach and financial performance but it is important that 
they address clients’ complaints through adequate policies and financial education to 
explain why they do what they do, if they think that it is the best policy or behavior for 
both the institution and the client. This study agrees with interviewee No. 90 that what 
motivated people to get involved with financial institutions in the post-conflict DRC is 
first the fact that microfinance institutions were proactive and offered loans to micro and 
small entrepreneurs in need of fresh capital in a destroyed post-conflict era. 
Microfinance institutions must recreate this business environment based on trust and 
mutual benefit. This need is echoed by interviewee No. 90:  
 
When MFI started their business in DRC, all was great and fine: they gave 
as much money as people wanted and the numbers were growing faster 
in terms of clients, loans, and deposits. Today, things have changed. MFI 
understood that they are so wanted by a population so motivated to trust 
again financial institutions that they have changed their behavior to start 
operating like commercial banks. Clients are getting frustrated with MFI. 
MFI must change their attitude. Overall, however, I do encourage what’s 
happening in the financial services industry: MFI have created jobs by 
providing the necessary funding for small businesses to remain operative 
and also for new people to enter the market with new lines of businesses 
to be part of the DRC’s business framework. We need more MFI to enter 
the country in order for competition to take place and improve the entire 
financial services provision environment.  
 
Appendix 5 labeled “Voices of MFI Clients” displays primary data collected by this 
study over a five-month period in Kinshasa, by probing and asking unstructured 
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questions when collecting quantitative data using the “MFI Clients Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction Survey”. The reader can get more insights related to clients’ concerns 
about microfinance activities by reading summaries of interviews. 
  
   6.2. Post-Conflict Outreach and Financial Performance of Microfinance   
          Institutions vs. Traditional Financial Services  
 
 
This study has found that MF is a valuable financial service reconstruction tool in post-
conflict communities because it displays rapid and profound increases in outreach and 
financial performance during consecutive years in post-conflict situation. However, this 
study postulated also that MF is a better tool than TFS particularly at the earlier stages 
of post-conflict reconstruction because MF displays more rapid increases in outreach 
and financial performance than TFS. Four variables related to outreach (employment, 
clientele, lending, and deposits/Savings) and four variables related to financial 
performance (assets, efficiency, profitability, and risk) were analyzed for each approach. 
Time series analysis was proposed to look at the trends displayed by the eight variables 
by plotting raw numbers and/or percentage change from each year.  
 
Regarding outreach, this study found that financial services institutions applying a 
microfinance approach (MF), measured by the level of employment by microfinance 
institutions, the number of clients joining microfinance institutions, the volume (dollar 
amount) of loans disbursed by microfinance institutions, and the dollar amount of 
deposits of clients, displayed higher yearly increases between 2005 and 2009 when 
compared to the outreach of TFS.  MF hired more workers than TFS; attracted more 
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clients (as expressed by the number of accounts) than TFS; their loan portfolios 
experienced higher rates of increase than TFS; and MF displayed faster consecutive 
yearly increase rates in deposits from 2005 to 2009 (deposits of MF slightly decreased 
in 2008 but regained its faster path compared to TFS through year 2009). This study 
has concluded that the overall outreach trend has matched the hypothesized pattern.  
 
Regarding financial performance, this study found that financial services institutions 
applying microfinance approach (MF), measured by their total assets displayed faster 
growth rates between 2005 and 2009 when compared to the financial performance of 
TFS. The study also found that financial performance of financial services institutions 
applying microfinance approach (MF), measured by their return on total assets (ROA), 
resulted in higher ROAs between 2005 and 2009 when compared to the financial 
performance of TFS. However, the study found that financial performance of financial 
services institutions applying microfinance approach (MF), measured by their network 
expansion, displayed faster growth between 2005 and 2007 but were surpassed by the 
financial performance of TFS in 2008 and 2009. Finally, the study found that financial 
performance of financial services institutions applying microfinance approach (MF), 
measured by their portfolio at risk (PAR) rate outcome better result than TFS only in 
2005 but has displayed a lesser performance than TFS from 2006 throughout 2009. 
This study concluded that, overall, the financial performance trend has only partially the 
hypothesized pattern.  
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Microfinance institutions and commercial banks are often considered as two different 
animals with two distinct target markets and clientele. Microfinance was originally 
initiated to “bank to the poor” (Yunus & Jolis, 2003) and mainstream financial institutions 
are known to exclude the poor and low-income people. When adhering to this divide, a 
comparative study between them can a priori appear to compare apples and oranges. 
This study did not adhere to this divide and has postulated that in a post-conflict setting 
like DRC, financial institutions applying a microfinance approach (MF) and those 
applying a traditional approach (TFS) are comparable in terms of outreach and financial 
performance for the purpose of financial services reconstruction. This approach and the 
findings from this study corroborate Barr’s (2005) suggestion to approach microfinance 
as a form of financial development that can contribute to the development of the 
financial sector. The approach and the findings also corroborate Kuehnast (2001); 
Frasier & Saad (2003); and Barr’s (2005) arguments that microfinance can play the role 
of financial services reconstruction in a post-conflict context.  
 
In 2007, The CGAP conducted a policy study on the DRC financial sector and 
concluded that the sector was still fragile, but had improved since major reforms 
suggested by the Bretton Woods institutions were implemented since 2001. According 
to the CGAP report:   
 
The government and the Central Bank of Congo (BCC) have made good 
progress in strengthening the legal framework for the financial system, 
improving monetary management, cleaning up the financial sector and 
restructuring the Central Bank. Most banks are focused on the relatively 
small government and corporate sector. In a population estimated at 62 
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million people, the Association of Congolese Banks and the BCC estimate 
only 60,000 bank accounts - that is 0.01 percent of the population has a 
bank account. The authorities are consolidating the banking sector by 
closing insolvent state and commercial banks (CGAP, 2007, pages 1-2). 
?
One illustration of the cleaning up of the financial sector has been the closure by the 
Central Bank of Congo of thirteen financial institutions. In its appraisal, the CGAP 
(2007) “12 banks still in operation after the ongoing restructuring of the banking sector 
focused primarily on the corporate and government sector, and retail banking remained 
largely underdeveloped” (p.4). As of February 2010, the Central Bank of Congo’s 
website reported that there are currently 21 banks fully operating in DRC. However, 
during data collection in Kinshasa, it was mentioned that up to 3 more should start 
operating soon. Appendix 4 presents the list of banks currently operational in DRC and 
the list of banks that were closed.   
 
As with the microfinance sector, the banking sector is still fragile. The majority of banks 
(twelve out of twenty-one) operate only in the capital city of Kinshasa and do not have 
agencies outside Kinshasa. Even in Kinshasa, most are concentrated in Gombe 
(business center) and do not reach out to other neighborhoods. One supervisor of bank 
at the Central Bank of Congo recognized the fragility of the financial sector and said:  
 
An illustration will be a recent case of ‘Banque Congolaise’, which has just 
been put under the management of the Central Bank because it is almost 
bankrupted. The Central Bank feared a systemic effect without such 
drastic measures. So, as supervisors of banks, we are watching the 
banking booming with caution. We are happy to see that finally we are out 
of trouble when the entire country had only 5 to 6 credible banks. DRC is 
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in need of more efficient and viable banks to cover the entire country. For 
a country of over 65 million people, so many people do not have access to 
financial services (Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, on October 
2010).  
 
There is indeed a “booming” climate in the financial sector in the DRC, mostly in the 
Capital Kinshasa and in major towns such as Lubumbashi, Matadi, and Goma, to name 
a few. In fact, the majority of these banks (twelve out of twenty one) started their 
operations during the last five years, creating a booming environment in the banking 
sector. In the single year of 2005, four banks opened doors. Three more opened doors 
the following year in 2006. This boom has created excitement but also a lot of 
challenges for the regulatory body as well as for the providers. The decision of so many 
banks to establish in Congo is a sign of recovery of the financial sector after a long, 
miserable period that saw banks closing en masse. The remaining question is whether 
these new and old financial institutions are strong enough to be viable and sustainable.  
 
The CGAP reported also that post-conflict DRC had a surprising number and range of 
structures claiming to provide microfinance services (CGAP, 2007). The overall picture 
depicted by the report can be summarized as following:  
 
Besides the commercial banks, only 38 COOPEC [Cooperatives 
d’Epargne et de Credit which means “Savings and Credit Cooperatives”] 
and nine MFIs are licensed as of March 2007. Companies providing 
transfers and financial messaging services are governed under separate 
laws. Most financial service providers are concentrated in Kinshasa and 
Kivu in the East, plus one bank in Lubumbashi. There are very few 
programs elsewhere in the country, and a particular dearth of services in 
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rural areas where 65 percent of the population lives. The MFI survey 
currently being carried out through PASMIF will help identify more 
precisely the geographic coverage of services nationwide. Outside the 
reach of the law, some NGOs provide financial services, especially in 
regions far from Kinshasa. In addition, the BCC estimates there are as 
many as 500 Coopecs throughout the country, although many may no 
longer be active. Informal mechanisms, such as savings schemes called 
“daddy cards” and ROSCAs are common. Since 2003, international 
organizations have entered the financial services market in DRC, 
contributing greatly to the rapid growth of numbers of new bank accounts. 
(CGAP, 2007, p. 6). 
 
The Central Bank of Congo’s Annual Report 2009 mentioned that “as of December 
2009, the Central Bank had authorized 96 savings and credit cooperatives, 17 
microfinance institutions, and 2 cooperative networks” (p. 205). However, according to 
an internal document from the Microfinance Unit of the Central Bank of Congo, an 
update of these data reports that, as of March 2010, the Central Bank of Congo 
registered 112 Saving and Credit cooperatives (including two cooperative networks: 
COOCEC MECRECO and COOCEC NORD KIVU) and 15 Micro Finance Institutions, 
totaling 127 institutions. In addition, three commercial banks offer microfinance services: 
Procredit Bank, Trust Merchant Bank, and Advans Bank (Internal Draft from the 
Microfinance Unit, Department of financial providers’ supervision, Central Bank of 
Congo, 2010). Overall, concluded the BCC Annual Report 2009, “the microfinance 
sector is expanding but its national penetration is very low at around 4% only. More than 
250 structures operate some type of microfinance activities in addition to those 
operating in the informal sector, mainly the tontines (ROSCAS), mutual help groups, 
and informal lenders” (p. 206).  
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Appendix 1 provided an updated list of all formal financial institutions of all types 
operating in the DRC as of December 2009 (Central Bank of Congo, 2010).   
 
According to the Deputy Director at the department of financial institutions’ supervision 
at the Central Bank of Congo, Mr. Valentin Ramazani, when compared to the sector’s 
situation during the conflict period, the financial sector is moving in the right direction. 
During an interview in June 2010, he said:  
 
It’s true that microfinance institutions have played a critical role in restoring 
the confidence in the banking system, he said. However, RawBank and 
Trust Merchant Bank should also be considered as major players in 
reconstructing financial services in the post-conflict era, together with 
Procredit Bank and FINCA. In fact, many banks are now using the 
microfinance approach; and at the same time, microfinance institutions are 
adopting more rigorous conditions as do commercial banks. I think that 
there is complementarity between the commercial and the microfinance 
approaches (Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, in June 2010). 
 
A manager of the credit department at Trust Merchant Bank (TMB) shared her thought 
about this complementarity and said:  
 
Procredit Bank has been the trigger in changing the game in providing 
financial services in Kinshasa and in some extent in the DRC. TMB can 
however claim to be the first Congolese bank embracing the microfinance 
methodology. Until 2009, TMB had two credit departments, one dealt with 
MF clients and another operated with classical commercial banking 
clients. Since 2009, we have merged both departments into one that uses 
a commercial approach to credit (Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, 
in September 2010). 
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One of TMB’s flyers says: “TMB is proud of being the first DRC bank to launch, at its 
creation, a microfinance initiative in order to help a portion of the Congolese population 
neglected by formal financial institutions. It is our expectation that this initiate will enable 
all strata of the Congolese people, including women, to access financial services, come 
back to the formal financial sector, and reconstruct the country”. (Trust Merchant Bank, 
DRC, 2010, p.5). 
 
Trust Merchant Bank’s case seems to be an interesting one when it comes to 
complementarity between MF and TFS in reconstructing post-conflict financial services 
provision. TMB is a Congolese bank established in 2003 but opened doors in August 
2004 (TMB Annual report 2006, p.6), at almost the same time when Procredit Bank and 
Finca DRC, two international microfinance institutions, entered the DRC market. TMB 
defines itself as a community financial institution with the goal of bringing to the formal 
financial services sector those who have been denied or excluded from the sector and 
operated in the informal financial services sector. At the same time, TMB aspired to be 
a major financial partner to the state and Congolese enterprises of all size in order to 
support and promote the reconstruction of the post-conflict DRC. For that reason, TMB 
had adopted a multi-service strategy by providing retail banking, corporate banking, and 
microfinance. According to Mr. Robert Levi, President and CEO of the bank: 
 
TMB is the sole bank that, when established in 2003, took into account 
individuals, all individuals, poor or rich as key ingredients of its 
development strategy. As a result, TMB created a department of 
microfinance as soon as it started operating in Congo. Indeed, TMB found 
it abnormal that the entire DRC with a population of 60 million people had 
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just around 100,000 bank accounts in 2003 when it launches its 
operations. That is why this annual report presents a special tribute to 
these individuals, women and men, who fight daily to put food on their 
table, send their children to school, deal with medical bills by using the 
formal financial services with dignity and courage. (TMB Annual Report 
2007, p. 5).       
 
TMD’s mixed approach has resulted in a fast increase similar to the one experienced by 
Procredit and Finca. As of December 2007, the corporate banking and retail banking 
had a total of 25,119 clients (23,144 individuals, 334 small and medium businesses, and 
1641 companies). The 2006 annual report mentions that TMB employed 230 people at 
that time while the 2007 annual report mentions a total of 366 (around 60% increase in 
hiring) employees scattered within a dozen branches located mainly in the Katanga 
Province and the capital city of Kinshasa. Key variables (assets, deposits, capital, profit, 
and loans) all experienced high increases as depicted on Table 6.3 below.   
 
Table 6.3: TMB Key Data 
Key 
Variables 
2005 2006 
% Chg 
05-06 
2007 
%  Chg 
06-07 
Total Assets 17,573,233 57,348,112 226% 128,609,171 124% 
Deposits 13,170,667 44,751,955 240% 99,331,659 122% 
Capital 3,707,112 10,613,914 186% 24,454,304 130% 
Profit 58,305 98,522 69% 149,088 51% 
Loans 5,907,961 24,684,686 318% 43,311,112 75% 
Source: Trust Merchant Bank Annual Reports 2006 & 2007. 
 
The results of TMB, a newcomer mixing the commercial approach and the microfinance 
approach can be contrasted with those of BIAC (Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique au 
Congo). It is one of the oldest financial institutions of the DRC, established 40 years ago 
and applying a traditional approach to financial services delivery. BIAC is indeed one of 
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the few survivors of the DRC economic and financial debacles. Trouble started at the 
end of the 1980s as result of the global financial crisis and became profound when 
political crises shuffled the DRC in 1991 and 1993 and saw banks’ infrastructures looted 
and destroyed. The economic crisis that followed plunged the BIAC into a survival mode 
that saw an erosion of its assets, the closure of branches, a decrease in personnel and 
financial services limited to money transfer and few big clients. Since 2003, the post-
conflict era, the Board of Directors of BIAC came up with a new business plan that 
suggested a redeployment of branches that were not operational, expansion to cover 
provinces where the bank was not present, a solid partnership abroad, and a 
diversification of its products and services.  
 
Unfortunately, BIAC financial data following the first years of the post-conflict period 
were not available and the 2008 annual reports did not provide a retrospective of key 
data. When looking at 2007 and 2008 data, BIAC has made progress but its increase 
rates appear to be far less than the results posted by TMB, a competitor that mixes TFS 
and MF approaches. Table 6.4 presents key data posted by BIAC for 2007 and 2008.  
 
Table 6.4: TMB Key Data 
Key 
Variables 
2007 2008 
% Chg 
07-08 
Total 
Assets 
112,787,590 152,302,817 35% 
Deposits 88,490,954 118,449,058 34% 
Capital 8,205,601 11,836,714 44% 
Profit 944,664 987,096 4% 
Loans 48,336,810 94,345,629 95% 
Source: BIAC Annual Report 2008.  
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When interviewing Mrs. Lebugue, former Head of the Microfinance Unit and currenly 
Director for changes at Central Bank of Congo, she said:   
 
I do believe that microfinance institutions, mainly Procredit and FINCA 
have been determinant factors in restoring the confidence of the 
Congolese people to the entire financial system, particularly in Kinshasa. 
Very few people trusted DRC commercial banks prior to the arrival of 
these two institutions. Even today many people are still reluctant with 
commercial banks and prefer using the services of Procredit, a 
microfinance institution with the status of a fully operated bank. (Interview 
conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, in September 2010). 
 
The findings from this study seem to corroborate her claim in terms of outreach because 
all four outreach variables (employment, clientele, lending, and deposits/savings) 
achieve better results for MF versus TFS.  When adding up two other measures of 
financial performance (assets and profitability) where MF showed better results than 
TFS, one way to conclude indeed is that overall MF might be a better tool than TFS at 
the earlier stage of financial services reconstruction following political and armed 
conflicts such as the one that occurred in the Democratic Republic of Congo.    
 
It is appropriate to conclude this section with a thought from a client of Advans-Congo, a 
newly established bank using a microfinance approach to financial services delivery:  
 
Ordinary people do not go to BCDC (Banque Commerciale du Congo). 
Only companies and government officials work with them. In fact, these 
commercial banks are not interested to work with small businesses like us. 
I am Advans’ first client and I feel privileged doing business with them. I 
am in my third loan and overall I have borrowed around US$ 40,000 with 
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them. Their loans have helped boosting my business and I have not 
experienced problems paying them back. When Advans Director asks why 
in a city of almost 10 million people, his bank has only a thousand clients 
after a year of operations; what I can say is that their loan’s requirements 
are not easy to fulfill. I remember that the first time when I requested to 
borrow US$ 7,600, I had to surrender my house’s ownership because 
Advans requests collateral for higher amount. In addition, Advans never 
gives you the requested amount. The first time I requested US$ 15,000 
but got half; the second time I requested US$ 25,000 and got also half. 
This third time I wanted US$ 35,000 but got just US$ 25,000. I can 
understand why Advans is careful with loans because there are really 
issues with people in this city. There are some people who just take 
money without planning how to pay it back. At the same time, there are 
good people and hard workers who cannot access loans because of 
collateral. I agree with the bank that we need to maintain the system and 
therefore banks shall make sure that they can get their money back to 
continue operating in the country. (Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, 
in November 2010).  
 
Recently, BCDC, BIAC, RAWBANK (all TFS) and many financial institutions that have 
traditionally overpassed low-income, poor, micro and small businesses have changed 
their strategy and are reaching out to the category of client who either “entered” or “re-
entered” the formal financial services through microfinance institutions. The result has 
been rapid growth in the number of their accounts as illustrated by Rawbank which went 
from 3,726 accounts in 2006 to 30,570 in 2008, a ten-time increase in four years. Year 
2007 was the one that saw Rawbank’s paradigm change to embrace clients formerly 
attracted by microfinance. Rawbank went from 6,212 accounts to 23,793 accounts in 
one year, an increase rate nearly 400%. BCDC has also done the same move by titling 
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its 2009 Annual Report as “Loans for a new century” (BCDC, 2010), a signal to reach 
out to those who entered or re-entered the formal financial sector or are ready to do so. 
FINCA DRC has also moved aggressively towards individuals and big loans to be 
competitive with those banks embracing its target market. Procredit, the champion of all 
of them understood it from the start and has emerged as the big winner of DRC post-
conflict reconstruction of financial services.   
 
    6.3. Post-Conflict Microfinance and Business Development   
 
This study has found that microfinance, as an intervention, improves business 
development of its clients in terms of the number of businesses, profit, and to some 
extent, in terms of the number of people they employed while exercising their micro 
and/or small enterprise activities. Indeed, drawing from the analysis of business 
development in the previous chapter, this study found a correlation between the 
experience with formal financial institution of a micro or small business entrepreneur; 
and both the Mann-Whitney U-Test and the Independent-Samples T-Test reveal a 
significance level of p < .05 for number of businesses and profit; the variable “number of 
employees” barely missed the significance level for the Independent-Samples T-Test 
(p=.052>.05). Overall, this study’s hypothesis, stating that micro and small 
entrepreneurs who are clients of microfinance experience better business development 
than micro and small entrepreneurs who are not clients of microfinance, has been 
confirmed.  
 
Santos (2003) suggested that in the post-conflict DRC, microfinance should seize the 
opportunity to finance small, medium and micro enterprises. Matabisi, Beyene, and 
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Kiremidjan (2007) found that almost all FINCA-DRC clients were owners of some kind 
of microenterprise; 3.6% of clients in the sample used their loan to start a new activity 
while 94.5% borrowed to continue their existing businesses. They also found that 37.1% 
of all businesses had at least one additional employee beside the business owner, an 
indication of job creation. This previous study was limited to descriptive analysis and did 
not determine the significance of the findings. This thesis fills that gap and brings 
evidence that MF clients experience better business development in terms of the 
number of businesses, profit, and to some extent in terms of employment. It is important 
to determine if microfinance results in a mutual benefit between the provider of services 
and their recipients. The previous chapter and the discussions in section one and two in 
this chapter have indeed demonstrated that microfinance institutions are doing good 
business in Congo. It is equally important to determine whether they are also better off.  
 
This study’s business development findings corroborate previous studies of Post-
Conflict Microfinance which suggested that microfinance is a tool for microenterprise 
development because it helps reconstruct small enterprises destroyed by armed 
conflicts by providing the necessary capital to consolidate existing businesses or create 
new ones. Indeed, Frasier and Saad (2003) found that in the case of post-conflict 
Mozambique, microfinance enabled the self-employed to resume their economic 
activities. In addition, the findings in this study support Tucker, Nurse, Gailey, Park and 
Bauman (2004) who suggested that in post-conflict Liberia, microfinance emphasized 
building an entrepreneurial sector though structured grants and loans programs.  
 
195 
 
Statistics, however, do not tell the whole story. Indeed, data collection in DRC offered 
an opportunity to deeply understand the environment within which DRC’s micro 
entrepreneurs operate, the structure of their small businesses, their challenges and their 
understanding of the all microcredit business. The study went beyond the structured 
survey to probe and listen to small vendors from both sides (MF clients and Non 
clients). Below are some of their voices. They articulate their views ranging from very 
satisfied to quite dissatisfied client who feel unempowered in the face of financial 
institutions. 
 
Interviewee No. 87, a client of FINCA DRC, is the typical satisfied client whose 
experience with microcredit is positive and constructive. She said: 
  
I love FINCA and will go nowhere else. Access to more money as capital 
has been determinant to increase my sales volume since I joined FINCA. 
The real impact of the lending practice by FINCA has been on improving 
our standard of living, giving us access to more capital that allows us to 
diversify our merchandises and therefore provide us with more income 
and profit, and of course savings. (Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, 
on November 3, 2010).  
 
Interviewee No. 17, a client of (MF-Mufesakin), is another example of satisfied client. He 
said:  
My experience with MF is positive. I think that it’s a good thing. Before 
getting MF money (loan) my business was down. I lost inventory and sales 
were low and I could not make profit. Ever since I got Mufesakin’s loan, 
my business is again prosperous and I am doing pretty well. A friend of 
mine is a FINCA client and he asked me if I could be his witness or 
196 
 
guarantor to get a loan. I agreed and after FINCA’s loan officers visited my 
shop, they gave him the loan. He requested US$ 3,000 but got US$ 2,000. 
He bought a car and does taxi with this car. He got the loan in February 
and he’s on track with repayments and will be done with the full loan soon. 
We know the secret and it helps when you mean business. The key is to 
invest the full loan into your business. We are aware that today things are 
good with microfinance institutions but one day they might change. We 
have seen the government closing banks and MF institutions here, so we 
are not naïve but have no choice than working with institutions that project 
confidence. FINCA and MUFESAKIN are among these institutions. 
(Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, on September 1, 2010).    
 
In contrast, Interviewee No. 14, a client with Procredit and Finca said:  
 
I started with Procredit but now I am also a client with FINCA. I got US$ 
3,000 loan from Procredit and US$ 500 from FINCA. Of course I did not 
report to FINCA that I am a current Procredit Client. The truth is that using 
loans is a tough business. Sales are not as good as they used to be. Profit 
is thin and on top of that loan repayment makes it even tougher. In my 
case, I had to sell household appliances to pay back the loan. I also 
noticed that loan officers have no courtesy when recovering loan in 
arrears. Procredit has decided to stop lending me money due to late 
payments. I do not think that people should be punished because of late 
payment. Loans are good in nature but the conditions under which MFI 
are providing loans in Congo are just untenable. As clients, we feel used 
and weak. We can’t win against them. I do recognize that there are people 
misusing loans by buying cars, home and other assets with MF money. 
But these cases are isolated. In most cases, clients face real difficulties as 
I did and couldn’t keep track with loans repayment (Interview conducted in 
Kinshasa, DRC, on September 1, 2010).  
 
Interviewee No. 50 is more neutral in her position and says:  
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Usually, you invest all in your business and then you can use profit for 
household expenses. Usually, at the beginning of the loan cycle you will 
have a lot of inventory and experience high sales. But, when repayment 
starts, your sales decrease because you do not have any more a 
diversified stall with many products. You do concentrate only on a few 
products which are highly profitable. At the end of the cycle, sales are 
generally much lower. Sometimes you have to take from your own money 
to pay back the last portions of the MF loan. (Interview conducted in 
Kinshasa, DRC, on October 14, 2010). 
 
As discussed in section 1 of this chapter, DRC post-conflict microfinance institutions are 
being criticized for a many reasons, including high interest rates; harsh methods of loan 
recovery; and short time between loan disbursement and loan repayment. These factors 
affect directly clients’ business development. There are indeed a lot of stories at the 
market places and neighborhoods of Kinshasa about microfinance making huge profits 
while clients are being exploited. The voices of clients in the previous sections provide a 
flavor of this issue. During each of the ninety-five interviews conducted in DRC to collect 
these data, when sitting with clients at their stalls for an average of one hour, it became 
obvious that clients of MF are struggling to maintain their status of “good clients” who 
are on-time with loan repayment. Successful clients seem to be those who diversify 
largely their business and engage in lucrative lines such as large distribution (water, 
soda, beer) or buy large stock of clothes and electronics abroad (West Africa, Dubai, 
China). The bulk of small local vendors still struggle to make their payment and in many 
cases do not invest all their loan into their business either because they can’t distribute 
large quantity or because they need a portion of the loan to provide their household with 
food, medicines, or cope with social events. At face value, although they are in general 
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better-off than their peers who are not eligible for – or do not want - micro-credit, 
business development is far from showing real progress for the owners or the 
community. There should be better policies by microfinance institutions and the political 
authority to enable micro-entrepreneurs to live better, sell more products, maintain clean 
and decent environment around their stalls, and dream to become real entrepreneurs 
with adequate capital and perspectives of real business development instead of 
operating in the current survival mode.  
 
6.4. Post-Conflict Microfinance and Education 
 
This study has found low correlations between the experience with formal financial 
institution of a micro or small business entrepreneur and the number of children they 
currently send to school or the number of children clients of microfinance sent to school 
before joining their actual microfinance institution. This study found that these 
correlations were not statistically significant. Both the Mann-Whitney U-Test and the 
Independent-Samples T-Test reveal non-significance levels with p > .05 for both 
variables. The findings did not support this study’s experimental hypothesis, stating that 
micro and small entrepreneurs who are clients of microfinance will send more children 
to school than micro and small entrepreneurs who are not clients of microfinance.                                 
 
The logic behind this hypothesis was that armed conflict like the one that occurred in 
DRC has negative effects on a country’s education system: physical infrastructures are 
usually occupied by military factions and are generally destroyed because they become 
targets by the opposite factions; teachers and students are displaced; and educational 
materials such as books, curricula, and didactical tools are destroyed. When conflict 
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ends and education is reorganized in the post-conflict era, there are many reasons for it 
to be costly and not affordable for people who have lost their business or their jobs. This 
is besides all of the security issues that sometimes prevent parents to send their 
children to school. In this context, Post-Conflict Microfinance can at least resolve the 
affordability issue so that more parents are capable of sending their children to school.  
 
In Kinshasa, the capital city of DRC, this hypothesis was not proved by this study. One 
reason might be that Kinshasa did not experience a lot of physical destruction of 
educational infrastructure because major combat was avoided. Another reason might be 
the colonial legacy in this country where education was made compulsory and free of 
charge in many cases and those parents who have been educated cannot imagine their 
children not going to school. As one of the interviewees said, with or without money 
children must go to school. It’s a “no brainer”, he said. Finally, the “urban” factor can be 
another explanation. In urban areas, there are little reasons not to send children to 
school and there is some kind of social pressure on families when they keep their 
children home. Discussions with MF clients and non-clients about this aspect revealed 
that microfinance makes a difference when it comes to the conditions under which 
children study. Interviewee No.1 said:  
 
Before becoming a microfinance (MF) client, we were paying for kids’ 
education almost the same amount we pay now; but it was very difficult to 
afford tuition and school materials. Children used to go to school hungry 
and without money for their lunch. The situation has changed since we 
became MF clients and we can afford children’s education costs easier 
than before. (Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, on June 2, 2010). 
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Interviewee No. 2 also said that: “Tuitions are less now because one child is out 
of school. But other school related expenses are still high. We can afford it now 
with our small business’ activities with Mecrekin”. (Interview conducted in 
Kinshasa, DRC, on October 14, 2010).  
 
6.5. Post-Conflict Microfinance and Assets Acquisition 
 
This study concludes that microfinance, as an intervention, has an impact on the value 
of total assets owned by its clients. In fact, this study’s experimental hypothesis, stating 
that micro and small entrepreneurs who are clients of microfinance acquired more 
assets than micro and small entrepreneurs who are not clients of microfinance, has 
been confirmed. Indeed, this study has found a correlation between the experience with 
formal financial institution of a micro or small business entrepreneur and the total value 
of their total assets and both the Mann-Whitney U-Test and the Independent-Samples 
T-Test reveals a significance level of p < .05 for total assets. Total assets were revealed 
to have medium size effect.  
 
In a study conducted among clients of FINCA DRC in 2007, Matabisi, Beyene, and 
Kiremijan (2007) suggested that “asset ownership has been long recognized as an 
important measurement tool for determining poverty levels as it provides information 
about an individual’s ability to smooth consumption over time as well as future economic 
burdens” (page 17). Their study found that:  
 
Of the sixty nine individual loan clients interviewed, where the average 
loan size was USD 2,349 the likelihood of owning luxury assets such as 
cars, cameras, stereo, colour TVs, DVD players, and 
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refrigerators/freezers, outweighed Village Banking clients by 44%, 22%, 
31%, 15%, 34%, and 35%, respectively.   Moreover, Village Banking 
clients surpass individual loan clients only in the possession of livestock 
such as chickens and ducks by a margin of 10% and 4% (Matabisi & al., 
2007, p. 18). 
 
Although the study did not proceed to inferential analysis to determine significance, this 
study provided an indication of a correlation between the volume of a loan a client 
receives and the level of her or his asset. They concluded that:  
     
As such, the takeaways that can be inferred from this information are that 
Individual Loan clients generally lead more luxurious lives and can afford 
more luxurious assets.  As a result, they are more readily adapted to 
continue their state of well-being in the face of downturns in business or 
economic prosperity (Matabisi & al., 2007, p. 18).   
 
 
The preliminary findings by Matabisi & al. (2007) corroborate the findings in this study 
which provide additional evidence to suggest that clients who have access to financial 
services, most of all loans, end up with more assets than those who are not recipients of 
external money in the form of loans and other financial services. Interviewee No. 71, 
belonging to Procredit and Finca said: “what I have acquired as assets from FINCA are: 
flooring my house, a freezer, and my savings with two microfinance institutions” 
(Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, on October 21, 2010).    
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Many clients interviewed had mentioned that it’s hard to acquire assets while 
maintaining a sound business, paying back loans on time, and providing for the 
household. Interviewee 72, a Finca client said: “It’s hard to acquire assets with FINCA’s 
money. So far, I have got just a freezer. The remaining has gone into food and 
schooling”. Of course, a freezer makes a big difference in term of its monetary value 
and therefore, even though clients feel like it is difficult to acquire assets, they do and 
this makes a difference in their number compared to their peers who are non-clients.  
 
What was learned during the interviews was that the burden of loan repayment leaves 
clients little margin to regularly acquire luxury assets. During a loan cycle, essential 
items such as food and schooling are prioritized while the compulsory savings allow the 
client to have money aside. At the end of the cycle, usually clients take some portion of 
their savings and buy luxury or business related assets, such as a freezer, TV, Radio, 
DVD, mattress, new cellphone, and so on. This is an opportunity that non clients 
generally do not have. Another explanation might be that microfinance revenues help to 
stabilize the basic needs of the household such as food, clothes, medicines, and 
education. In a household with more than one income, the extra income that served to 
cover these basic needs can serve to acquire assets and thus make a significant 
difference between a household involved in microfinance and another one depending 
only on traditional sources of income.  
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One last explanation might be that some clients acquire assets at first with a portion of 
their loan but do not report it because microfinance institutions forbid such behavior. If 
so, the assets acquired should also make a difference between clients and non-clients 
because the latter do not have such an opportunity. Interviewee No. 14 said the 
following:  
 
People will tell you that they invest all their loans into their business, but 
the truth is that almost everyone put some portion of their loan into 
household expenses, mostly food and in some case house appliances. 
We can’t report that to MF institutions because we know that they ask us 
not to do so (Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, on September 1, 
2010). 
 
 
6.6. Post-Conflict Microfinance and Standard of Living   
 
This study has found that microfinance, as an intervention, improves the standard of 
living of their clients in comparison to non-clients. This study’s experimental hypothesis, 
stating that micro and small entrepreneurs who are clients of microfinance have a 
higher standard of living in term of their individual monthly income and their household 
total expenditures was retained. In fact, this study has found a correlation between the 
experience with formal financial institution of a micro or small business entrepreneur 
and their standard of living, in terms of household expenditures and individual monthly 
income. Moreover, this study found that the differences between MF Clients and Non 
Clients were statistically significant and both the Mann-Whitney U-Test and the 
Independent-Samples T-Test reveals a significance level of p < .05 for both variables. 
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Individual monthly income has a medium effect, but household expenditures have a 
large effect.  
 
This study’s findings corroborate Matul & Tsilikounas’ (2004) claim that post-conflict 
microfinance is a household reconstruction tool. Indeed, they found that “micro-
enterprise credit in Bosnia-Herzegovina stimulated household reconstruction as it 
provided an efficient and long lasting coping mechanism for household after war” (Matul 
& Tsilikounas, 2004, p. 1). As in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Post-Conflict 
Microfinance DRC has provided individual clients and their families with the resources 
needed to jumpstart household economies destroyed by years of armed conflicts. At the 
end of a conflict, households are in a situation of high vulnerability to risks and “income 
generated from micro-enterprises was perceived during the research as the most 
efficient coping mechanism among households affected by conflict so as to fill some of 
their most important needs over the reconstruction period” (Matul & Tsilikounas, 2004, 
p.1). As suggested earlier, reducing vulnerability of risks experienced by the poor and 
the poorest is one of the fundamentals of microfinance. This study’s findings provide 
evidence that this fundamental stands especially in post-conflict setting.  
 
Throughout data collection, over ninety percent microfinance clients agreed that 
microfinance’s first and concrete outcome is some improvement in the household’s 
standard of living.  Interviewee No.10 expressed it as following: “our solidarity group is 
new and we hope to bridge the gap between our poor salary and high living expenses”. 
(Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, on September 9, 2010).  
205 
 
6.7. Post-Conflict Microfinance and Savings 
 
This study has concluded that microfinance, as an intervention, acts as a trigger for 
savings. Indeed, a correlation has been found between the experience with formal 
financial institution of a micro or small business entrepreneur and the total amount she 
or he saves. It has also been found that the amount of savings of clients of MF 
institutions was higher and statistically significant compared to savings of non-clients. 
Both the Mann-Whitney U-Test and the Independent-Samples T-Test reveals a 
significance level of p < .05 for savings. This study’s hypothesis, stating that micro and 
small entrepreneurs who are clients of microfinance will save more than micro and small 
entrepreneurs who are not clients of microfinance, has been retained. Savings were 
revealed to have a medium effect and accounted for 6% of variability between MF 
clients and Non Clients.  
 
Savings are usually considered as an asset like home, appliances, land, and 
automobile; it could indeed be included in the Asset Acquisition section of this study. 
Savings are however a key component of microfinance. Together with loans or 
microcredits, they are in fact the two “entry” products offered by microfinance institutions 
when they start their operations. Moreover, saving has become a specific approach to 
microfinance and has resulted in a specific branch of the microfinance industry called 
saving-led microfinance institutions (Ashe, 2007). Oxfam America, CARE, and Catholic 
Relief Services (CRS) are among the organizations that have embraced this 
methodology and have made it a cornerstone of their microfinance operations. In the 
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field of microfinance, saving seems not to be another asset but the real asset, the 
starting point and the ending point for clients. This is why the survey submitted to 
respondents of this study had a special section related to savings.  
 
Major DRC Post-Conflict Microfinance institutions could be defined as lending-led 
microfinance institutions when they started their operations in post-conflict DRC 
because their key product had been loans to micro and small entrepreneurs. Until 
recently, many MFI were not allow to collect savings or deposits from their client due to 
their Not for Profit status. Finca has been collecting compulsory savings since its 
beginning. The savings were not legally considered as savings but as some type of 
collateral and did not bear interests. Recently, Finca has been authorized by the Central 
Bank of Congo to collect savings and deposits. So far or at least until recently, Hope 
International and Paidek were also not allowed to collect savings but just provide loans 
and eventually a certain percentage of the loan disbursed was often required. Procredit 
bank and Advans bank have both been collecting savings since inception thanks to their 
status of banks which allow them to do so. Procredit has grown faster than all the other 
microfinance institutions during its five years of existence due partially to its strategy 
emphasizing provision of a complete menu of financial services to its clients that 
includes the collection of savings and deposits while also disbursing larger amount of 
loans to individuals, small and medium enterprises.    
 
Savings is in itself a critical element of post-conflict reconstruction and it is an important 
finding of this study. In the framework of Post-Conflict Microfinance, savings help the 
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financial institutions to grow quickly (as seen with Procredit) because it has a multiplier 
effect: proper funds for lending to clients, less dependence on foreign capital and 
therefore a low cost of capital, help introducing other financial products such as debit 
and credit cards, lines of credit, and guarantee or collateral to mortgage or letter of 
credit. At the same time, microfinance clients must save and be motivated to save 
because it also has a multiplier effect on the side of MF clients: less dependence on 
MFI loans with high interest rate (up to 60% annually) in the long term because proper 
fund can be used to conduct business, promote business development, allow assets 
acquisition, and provide household with reserve to cope with risks and shocks. 
 
Clients and Non Clients expressed commitment to savings as revealed in their 
comments when probing during data collection. Interviewee No. 32, a non-client said:  
 
I am afraid of debt. I do not like owing someone. I heard about Procredit 
Bank but I am still not sure if I have to take their money. We use “Carte” or 
“Likelemba” to save some portion of our daily profit in order to have a 
margin at the end of the month. Household and business expenses are 
mingled and without this strategy, one will definitely put all the profit into 
household expenses (Interview conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, on October 
11, 2010). 
   
Interviewees No. 49 and 87 who are clients with Finca said that they continue to 
practice “Likelemba” and “Carte” (traditional saving and deposit practices closed to 
ROSCAS) while also saving with Finca. When asked why, Interviewee No. 87 said that 
it’s a response to Finca policy that a saving account cannot be accessed until a loan 
cycle ended. Obviously, with the new Savings Program introduced by Finca, clients will 
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be having proper savings accounts in addition to the “savings-collateral” that have 
existed so far. Again, interviewee No. 87 said what many MF clients repeated during the 
interviews:  
 
The real impact of the lending practice of FINCA has been on improving 
standard of living, access to more capital that allows diversification and 
therefore more income and profit, and of course savings. (Interview 
conducted in Kinshasa, DRC, on November 3, 2010). 
 
 
6.10. Post-Conflict Microfinance and Poverty Level  
 
This study concluded that, in terms of poverty level, households of clients of 
microfinance institutions are less poor and financially better off compared to households 
of non-clients. Indeed, it was found that only 28% households of MF Clients lived in 
either severe or moderate poverty vs. 43% households of Non-Clients; inversely, 72% 
households of MF Clients are vulnerable or Non Poor vs. 57% households of Non-
Clients.  
 
The findings of this study corroborate the fundamentals of microfinance that emerged as 
a tool for poverty alleviation through the provision of financial services to the poor 
bypassing formal financial services. One of the major development goals found in the 
Grameen’s sixteen decisions was to bring prosperity to families (Yunus & Jolis, 2003). 
Hulme & Moore (2006) observes indeed that microfinance programs and institutions 
have become an increasingly important component of strategies to reduce poverty or 
promote micro and small enterprise development. As said earlier, from the Grameen, 
Aka Khan, ACCION, FINCA’s lending approach through recent innovation of OXFAM, 
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CARE and many other programs using a savings-led approach, microfinance’s major 
and ultimate goal has been the reduction of vulnerability of risks experienced by the 
poor and the poorest. This postulate makes sense in peaceful areas of intervention and 
this study thought that it should also be valid in conflict and post-conflict zones of 
intervention, using microfinance as a tool. The findings in this study have indeed 
supported this postulate.   
 
In a previous study conducted by Matabisi, Beyene, and Kiremijan (2007) among clients 
of Finca DRC only, it was found that 13% lived in severe poverty, 43% in moderate 
poverty, 21% were vulnerable, and 23% non-poor. This study, conducting three years 
later came up with sample of MF clients, only half of whom belonged to Finca. The other 
half was a mixture of clients of other microfinance institutions such as Mecreco, 
Mufesakin, Procredit, Advans, and Charite. Using the same DPCE measure used in the 
2007 study, this study found 2.2% of the total microfinance clients in the sample live in 
severe poverty, 26.1% live in moderate poverty, 23.9% are vulnerable, and 47.8% are 
non-poor.  Table 6.5 summarizes the key findings of the 2007 vs. the 2010 studies.  
 
Table 6.5: Household Poverty Level of MF Clients (2007 vs. 2010) 
Poverty  
Level 
2007 Study 2010 Study 
% Cumulative % % Cumulative % 
Severe 
Moderate 
Vulnerable 
Non poor 
13 
43 
21 
23 
     13  
     56 
     77 
   100 
  2 
26 
24 
48 
       2 
     28 
     52 
   100 
Total 100    100 100    100 
Source: Matabisi & al. (2007); and Primary data from Survey conducted in Congo in 
2010. 
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The 2007 study found a large number of severe and moderate poor (56%) among MF 
clients compared to the 2010 study that has found only half of the 2007 level (28%). 
Inversely, the 2007 study found 46% of vulnerable or non-poor while the 2010 study 
counted around 72% of combined vulnerable and non-poor. Obviously, this study 
cannot conclude that the difference reflects the improvement of poverty level as a result 
of microfinance because the two studies were conducted using different sample frame 
and the 2007 study was indeed a single case study of only Finca clients. Nevertheless, 
this might be an indication of the effect of microfinance. Further research should be 
conducted to monitor the poverty level of microfinance clients in order to determine 
whether or not poverty is alleviated as a result of microfinance as a mode of 
intervention. This dissertation went beyond the classical DPCE (poverty level based on 
household expenditures) to introduce a measure of the level of poverty based on MF 
income only, called MDPCE (Microfinance Daily per Capita Expenditures), which 
reveals the net contribution of microfinance client’s share in the household total income. 
This study found that 34.4% of the sample’s households would live in severe poverty 
(less than US$ 1) if the household came to depend on only the MF client’s income; 
33.3% in moderate poverty (between US$1 and less than US$ 2); 11.6% would be 
considered as vulnerable (spend between US$ 2 and less than US$3 per day); and 
20.4% could be considered non poor because they would live with US$3 or higher 
amount per day. Calculation of MDPCE reveals that when other incomes are not 
considered, MF households are poorer and indeed microfinance by its own still has a 
way to go to eliminate poverty, which is one among its many goals.  
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6.11. Post-Conflict Microfinance versus Non-Conflict Microfinance  
 
Stiefel (1999) has argued that problems faced by different societies emerging from war 
are similar to development issues such as access, growth, proper management, 
inclusiveness, stability, sustainability, poverty, and many others. Conflict is however a 
key variable when it comes to compare a non-conflict to a conflict situation. Indeed, in 
post-conflict communities, existing development issues are amplified and compounded 
by the impacts and legacies of the conflict. When addressing post-conflict issues, which 
on face value might appear to be similar to development issues, appropriate policies 
and studies must take into account the impacts and legacies of conflict. This argument 
should also apply to microfinance when operating or studied in a conflict or post-conflict 
situations versus a non-conflict situation. According to Santos (2003): 
 
Despite the promise of microfinance in terms of poverty alleviation and 
small business development and some of the good results obtained in 
developing countries, particular attention has to be given to the 
specificities of post-conflict situations (PCS). In fact, PCS impose new 
challenges to microfinance operations and, more generally to the 
development of financial institutions. The post-conflict transition 
encompasses several stages from emergency to development with 
different degrees of overlap according to each particular situation, as well 
as speed of transition, which need to be accounted for. Examples of 
specific problems to post-conflict situations are political uncertainty, 
macro-economic instability and economic policy distortions, disrespect for 
the rule of law, rapid growth of the informal sector, depleted physical 
infrastructure and human capital, damaged financial system, population 
movements, disruption of social capital, and lack of collateral (pp. 24-28).  
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One illustration can be provided in the area of political uncertainty. Santos suggested 
that “in many PCS, the initial stage of relief is accompanied by intense political struggle 
for power among the different factions” (Santos, 2003, p. 24). In fact, the post-conflict 
DRC experienced a lot of political struggle among different factions in conflict. Indeed, 
free and democratic election was planned and held in 2006 with the help of the UN 
Mission in Congo. Most factions in conflict have agreed that the outcome of this general 
election should be accepted by all and those elected should be considered as the 
legitimate authorities of the post-conflict DRC. Things did not happen exactly as 
planned. Indeed, in the middle of post-conflict period, at a time where all current major 
microfinance institutions were operating at full speed in Kinshasa, war broke in 
Kinshasa between the factions of the two main presidential candidates, Joseph Kabila 
and Jean-Pierre Bemba, creating a temporarily disruption of microfinance institutions’ 
activities. Petrikova (2008) observed that “the field of post-crisis microfinance is still 
young but the existing literature has already defined the roles of microfinance in crises 
in an extensive and fairly congruent manner.” Indeed, Petrikova (2008) characterized 
the literature on post-conflict microfinance (PCM) as showing an ‘ideological unity’ going 
from country case-studies in the 1990s to best-practices recommendations nowadays. 
Still, Petrikova (2008) suggests that: “Authors interested in contributing to the pool of 
post-crisis microfinance literature should strive to improve the best-practice set on one 
hand by carrying out case studies of countries that have been thus far ignored, and on 
the other hand by conducting comprehensive impact and financial evaluations of the 
case studies already published (Petrovika, 2008, p.7). This dissertation should be 
considered as an answer to Petrikova’s call.   
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6.12. Post-Conflict Microfinance and the Cooperative Financial System  
 
From the 1970s to the post-conflict period, financial cooperatives, most of them known 
as COOPEC (Cooperatives d”Epargne et de Credit or Savings and Credit Cooperative) 
have been associated with the field of microfinance. According to Santos (2003), “the 
main Congolese traditional type of financing institution reaching small and medium 
enterprises even in more remote areas is the COOPEC. The majority of COOPECs 
have started operations in the 1970s and in the 1980s expanded to low-accessibility 
areas where the banking system was not present, through leveraging the infrastructure 
of schools and religious centres” (p. 51). 
 
Historically, financial cooperatives have played an important role in the provision of 
financial services in the DRC before being disrupted by the country’s economic crisis 
and the political and armed conflicts that followed. According to Santos (2003):  
 
Most COOPECs were affiliated to a union, the UCCEC (central union of 
the credit and savings cooperatives). In 1987, these cooperatives 
accounted for 7% of the total savings of the country’s banking sector and 
in 1989 the UCCEC included five regional networks totalling 145 
cooperatives, more than 270,000 members and US$ 4.9 million in 
savings. In the early 1990s, the joint effect of plundering, hyper-inflation 
and political instability have caused severe damage to the COOPEC 
system, which lost around 80% of their clients and 66% of the funds 
placed with commercial banks between 1991 and 1993. In 1993, the 
monetary reform to implement the new currency, “new Zaire”, also hurt the 
COOPECs, as most of its bank accounts were frozen and became 
inconvertible. At present, it is difficult to know how much of the COOPEC 
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system is still on its feet, but it has become much smaller and faces 
severe problems, in particular, lack of trust from the population due to the 
dramatic episodes of the early 1990s (Santos, 2003, p. 51).  
 
When major conflict ended in DRC in 2003, only a few COOPECs were functional. 
Those are the ones that survived the long conflict period and the economic turbulances 
of the 1990s. In the earlier post-conflict period, while current major microfinance 
institutions (Hope, Finca, Procredit, and others) were entering the DRC market, the 
overall cooperative system, and particularly financial cooperatives, started again to 
reorganize. Santos (2003) reported that the RIFIDEC (Regroupement des Institutions 
de Financement Décentralisé or Association of Decentralized Financial Institutions), 
created in 2000 with financing from the GTZ (German Cooperation for Development), 
registered at the beginning of 2003, 75 effective members (of which 15 COOPECs) and 
126 non-effective members (of which 13 COOPECs). In 2007, the CGAP (2007) 
reported that “only 38 COOPECs were licensed as of March 2007, although the Central 
Bank of Congo estimated that there were around 500 cooperatives throughout the 
country, with many among them no longer being active” (p. 6). Finally, the Central Bank 
of Congo’s Annual Report of 2009 mentioned that “as of December 2009, the Central 
Bank had authorized 96 savings and credit cooperatives” (p. 205); and an internal 
document from the Microfinance Unit of the Central Bank of Congo reported that as of 
March 2010, the Central Bank of Congo registered 112 Saving and Credit cooperatives 
(including two cooperative networks: COOCEC MECRECO and COOCEC NORD 
KIVU). 
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Clearly, in the DRC, some financial cooperatives are considered as part of the formal 
and legal microfincance industry while many others are considered as part of the 
informal financial sector because they are not registered by the Central Bank of Congo. 
In this dissertation, legal and recognized financial cooperatives were considered as part 
of the microfinance industry. Unfortunately, most of them did not have complete and 
reported financial data that could fit the analysis proposed in this dissertation. The one 
with data that fit part of this study’s trend analysis was MECRECO (Mutual of Savings 
and Credit Institutions of Congo) and its data have been used in the discussion chapter. 
At this stage, this dissertation’s findings and conclusions should also apply to financial 
cooperatives which are recognized as part of the DRC’s microfinance industry. 
Nevertheless, further studies should be conducted within the financial cooperative 
industry to determine the size of the industry, the players and their competitiveness vis-
à-vis classical microfinance institutions such as Finca, Procredit, Paidek, Hekima, 
Advans, or Hope. Moreover, in most cases, COOPECs are local financial institutions 
initiated and managed by Congolese while major classic microfinance institutions are 
foreign financial institutions, initiated by international institutions, and so far managed by 
foreigners. Financial cooperatives should therefore be encouraged, helped, promoted, 
and be competitive if the DRC shall count on a sustainable microfinance industry where 
decisions are local and are taken by local actors who will not close doors as soon as 
new conflicts arise. So far, this is not the case in the DRC, except for very rare cases 
such as MECRECO which appears to compete with Finca and performs better than 
Hope-DRC and other foreign microfinance institutions. The MECRECO model should be 
carefully studied and replicate for a sustainable microfinance industry in the DRC.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
 
This study’s main hypothesis was that microfinance (MF) plays an important role a 
financial service reconstruction tool in post-conflict communities. It displays more rapid 
and profound increases in outreach and financial performance during consecutive years 
in a post-conflict situation, and its services translated into reconstruction. In particular, 
MF is a particularly better tool than traditional Financial Services (TFS) at the earlier 
stages of post-conflict reconstruction because MF displays more rapid increases in 
outreach and financial performance and faster reconstruction during the immediate 
years post-conflict when compared to TFS. 
 
The results, analyses, and discussions in previous chapters have brought evidence that 
microfinance - as a mode of financial services provision is active, agile, and is a better 
tool than traditional financial services in terms of outreach and some aspects of financial 
performance in a post-conflict reconstruction, at least in the early interim phases of 
reconstruction. The findings in this study demonstrate that MF takes less time to set up 
after conflict than TFS; it reaches more people faster through its proactive methodology, 
which induces MF to employ more people than do TFS. MF also reaches out to a 
portion of the population that has been excluded from TFS even in peace time. MF acts 
as an entry point to loans and savings for a portion of the low-income population and 
allows the general population to access financial services after a significant conflict. 
Moreover, MF acts also as a re-entry mechanism for former clients who left the financial 
service industry due to mistrust of traditional institutions and the loss of their financial 
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assets. Above all, the findings show that MF acts as a bridge between the informal 
sector and the commercial banking sector while being a trigger for higher savings 
among its clients. MF seems to provide the financial services sector with a solution to 
the exclusion of some segments of the population in accessing mainstream financial 
services encountered in many developing countries such as the DRC. When compared 
to non-clients, this study found that clients of microfinance institutions experience 
greater business development, acquire more assets, save more, and enjoy a higher 
standard of living. This study did not find a difference in the area of education. Clearly, 
MF should be emphasized as an intervention in the early stages of reconstruction of 
financial services. 
 
Traditional Financial Services (TFS) also have shown increases, altough at rates 
generally lower than microfinance institutions. While their rates are lower, they generally 
have higher volume and amount of currency and therefore are important to continue 
servicing the government and state enterprises in post-conflict. It is imperative however 
that after cleaning up their systems, structures, and after regaining stability following 
destruction by conflicts, they reach out to the bulk of the population that have been 
brought to the industry by microfinance institutions at the earlier stage of post-conflict 
period. In that way, while inequality in accessing financial services may still exist, it can 
be reduced by using a hybrid model of financial services provision following a conflict. 
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Towards a Hybrid Model of Financial Services Provision in Post-Conflict 
Situation:   
 
When it comes to reconstructing financial services in poor post-conflict communities, a 
microfinance approach appears to be an effective tool at the beginning of the post-
conflict period. Microfinance is agile, proactive and its shop is easy to set up, taking 
multiple-forms: Non Profit, Cooperative, or bank. These financial institutions known as 
Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) start to rebuild confidence destroyed by years of 
conflict and disruption of the community life. Microfinance brings key ingredients needed 
to revitalize a destroyed financial system: trust, financial rigor, and financial education. 
 
MFIs rebuild trust by using a proactive behavior in providing financial services. Indeed, 
MFIs reach out towards people and don’t wait for people to come to the institution. Two 
activities are keys for that purpose: lending and deposit or saving. MFI generally provide 
loans to their clients without rigorous collateral and in many cases without any collateral. 
Instead of traditional collateral required by commercial banks, MFI build on mutual trust 
at two levels: MFI vis-à-vis the group or individuals, and group’s member vis-à-vis each 
other.  
 
Financial rigor is built through one of the three techniques of microfinance methodology: 
village banking, solidarity group, or individual client. In each case, MFI use an “intensive 
care” type of training and/or group creation. Members of village banking and solidarity 
groups are chosen among peers (professional, kinship, neighborhood, or sharing a 
market place). In most cases, members of a group guarantee the repayment of each 
and every one. When one defaults, the other members must pay. For individual clients, 
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referrals are used as a social pressure mechanism or repayment guarantee. This rigor 
has proven to be effective as it can be observed through MFI’s portfolio at risk (PAR). 
 
Financial education is supposed to be an equal component of the microfinance 
methodology. In general, loan officers are keys in putting or help putting together 
groups, training them and making sure that the prerequisites are fulfilled before loans 
are disbursed. Every repayment session is an opportunity to financial education.  
 
When well done, these ingredients create a “buzz” within post-conflict communities and 
word-of-mouth plays a crucial role in advertising the new opportunity for financial and 
business improvements. In many cases, membership grows fast and sometimes it 
reaches 100% increase rate per year. This buzz creates two effects: first, some 
commercial banks start adopting or adapting their approaches in providing financial 
services. They either create new products that attract the social strata targeted by MFI 
or sometimes introduce flexibility in their lending policies. On the other hand, strata of 
the population that never experienced financial services provision by commercial banks 
and felt excluded suddenly find themselves wanted by both MFI and commercial banks 
through the proactive work of bankers and loan officers. They are offered a chance to 
integrate into the financial services industry. For those clients already operating within 
the industry as MFI clients, they also suddenly discover that they can move into 
commercial banks, offering almost the same products as MFI but offering better rates of 
interest with bigger loans than MFI and also saving accounts that bear interests 
compared to some MFI which collect deposit or savings without paying interest. 
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While this process occurs, the post-conflict reconstruction process also brings new 
assets to the economy of the community, most of all an improved economic 
environment bringing more investors, private as well as public. Indeed, a post-conflict 
economy offers great opportunities for investors, considering that everything is to be 
rebuilt. New companies and entrepreneurs enter the new economy. Within the country, 
a few local entrepreneurs emerge and need commercial banks for their operations in a 
market hungry of all types of services and goods. At the same time, successful 
microfinance institutions also start becoming more aggressive in having more individual 
clients with higher loan amounts, relying less and less on groups whose members 
generally borrow lower amounts. Another trend is a geographical expansion when MFIs 
start covering territories outside their niche.   
 
After more or less five years, commercial banks become competitive and start again to 
become the dominant feature of the post-conflict financial services provision, toppling 
the hegemony experienced by MFIs at the early years of the post-conflict period. It is 
commercial banks that put in place the right infrastructure, study carefully the financial 
market opportunities that quickly become the most beneficial of the booming financial 
services sector because they can operate at different levels of the market, servicing 
small, medium and large entrepreneurs as well as top-dollar individual clients who 
suddenly take advantage of both a better post-conflict macro-economy, opportunities 
offered by the post-conflict reconstruction period and, most importantly, the new and 
growing trust of the country’s population towards financial services institutions.  
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Policy Suggestions 
 
a. Listern to the Voices of the Citizens 
The provision of financial services is people’s business, based on mutual trust 
between the provider and the recipient of the service. Bankers often forget this 
simple truth when they are behind their desks. People make the institution grow, 
succeed and mature. It is vital to listen to the people we serve. The DRC’s post-
conflict financial services reconstruction appears to be a success story. Still, there is 
a lot to be done by the providers to maintain its success. Appendix 5 displays a 
summary of the comments, complains, and suggestions of the people who were 
interviewed between 6/2/2010 and 11/11/2010 in Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, by probing and asking unstructured questions when collecting quantitative 
data using the “MFI Clients Post-Conflict Reconstruction Survey”. Reading and 
learning from the voices of the clients appear to be the best policy suggestion this 
study can propose. Further analysis of these qualitative data is planned to 
systematically explore the themes and summarize the findings for publication.  
 
b. Interest Rate 
Interest rates charged by microfinance institutions when providing loans to their 
Congolese clients are more and more subject to controversy. The rates are 
considered to be too high by clients of microfinance institutions. Local press in the 
DRC as well as non-clients of microfinance institutions have echoed this criticism 
which is constatntly referred to when discussing DRC microfinance. It should be 
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clear that lending-led microfinance institutions are the most vulnerable to this 
problem. Financial cooperatives and savings associations are theoretically not 
subject to this issue, considering that members own the funds and lend to 
themselves by determining the the interest rate they are willing to pay to themselves. 
Therefore, the emergence of well designed and managed financial cooperatives and 
savings associations should be encouraged because they can resolve the high 
interest rates’ issue.  
 
The rationale for higher interest rates charged by microfinance institutions is the 
higher cost of loan delivery induced by the proactive methodology to financial 
services delivery by lending-led microfinance institutions. Currently in the DRC, 
annual interest rates vary widely among institutions, ranging from 25% to 60% in 
most cases. Proposing a ceiling would not be a good policy and therefore, 
competitive interest rates as occurring now should be encouraged. It is however 
imperative that microfinance institutions start reducing the interest rates which 
appear to be excessive in most cases. Interst rates as applied nowdays suffocate 
clients and do not allow a faster business development of clients. This dissertation 
has shown that major lending-led microfinance such as Finca and Procredit make a 
lot of money both in terms of yield on their portfolios and in attracting grants from 
donors to help these institutions growing. It is therefore in their interest to have 
clients’ business grow as fast as do the institutions. Higher interest rate as practiced 
today in DRC jeopardizes the long term sustainability of the microfinance industry. 
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There are many ways of reducing interest rates that can be suggested here. The first 
recommendation will be to suggest that all microfinance institutions commit to the 
reduction of interest rate and adopt it as a strategic goal. Second, clients with good 
record should see their rate descreasing because they represent lower risk for the 
loan portfolio, which is anoter rationale for higher interest rates. Third, clients with an 
excellent track record should be subject to a system of “interest only” during the 
cycle and pay back the principal at the end of the cycle. These are few suggestions 
that can help to resolve this issue. 
      
c. Loan Cycle and Recovery 
Loan cycles and recovery as practiced today in the DRC slow business development 
of clients and reduce their ability to make higher profits. Typically, a loan disbursed 
to a village banking or solidarity group client (group lending) has a life cycle of 20 
weeks during which the full amount lend as principal should be pay back on top of 
30 to 60% annual interest rate and in most cases a compulsory saving. The loan 
package (principal+interest+compulsory saving) is divided into ten equal payments 
to be paid every two weeks. Individual clients’ loan life cycle range from 3 to 12 
months in most cases and payments are due monthly following the same model. 
Besides the interest rate issue discussed above, the critical constraint here is that 
after every payment, the client has less capital on hands and experience a decrease 
in its business lines as well as in the level of inventory. As a result, profit is squeezed 
and becomes almost inexistent at the end of the loan cycle. Here too, it is imperative 
that microfinance institutions adopt their client’s business development as a strategic 
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goal to make sure that while loans are recovered and the institution’s portfolio is 
growing, the client sees also its own portfolio and business growing. So far, there is 
no evidence for such a commitment (at least according to clients’ perception) and 
loan recovery is perceived by the clients as the only goal pursuit by microfinance 
institutions.  
 
d. Social and Cultural Context  
“Microfinance has already deep roots built over a long period of time in the DR 
Congo. It has been one of the supporting mechanisms for the Congolese, especially 
in areas far from urban centres”. (Santos, 2003, p. ). There are indeed in DRC many 
types of ‘traditional’ microfinance practices and institutions which are generally 
considered as part of the informal financial sector. The key difference between the 
‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’ microfinance rests on the introduction by modern 
microfinance of concepts such as interest rate, inflation, and risk. One would expect 
that in a society with deep roots of traditional microfinance, modern microfinance will 
be easily embraced and adopted. This assumption has proved to be inaccurate and 
can be partially explained by the introduction of interest rate, inflation, and risk.  
 
Thus, people have been helping each other through traditional microfinance 
schemes such as Likelemba (an adapted type of rotating saving and credit 
association), Moziki (a type of likelemba where each member organize a party on 
the day he or she receives its share), Cotisation (mutual insurance used for 
sickness, death, and sometimes as start-up capital for business), or Carte (type of 
saving account on a daily basis maintained by a trusted member of the community). 
These practices have not considered interest rate and inflation; and risk has been 
mitigated through social pressure. Therefore, the modern microfinance, emphasizing 
on interest rate, inflation, and risk is encountering resistance and is subject to 
criticism because of these new ingredients not accounted for in the traditional 
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microfinance practice. Here, financial education should be emphasized by 
microfinance instttutions. It is important that these concepts be clearly explained and 
be understood by borrowers.  
 
e. Customer Care 
Microfinance institutions are known to create and enhance friendly environment and 
attitude when dealing with their clients. The trend in Kinshasa is more and more of 
unfriend and hostile attitude when dealing with clients. Tellers and customer service 
agents of major microfinance institutions often use offensive language, have 
threatning attitude when recovering loans in rear and do not show respect to their 
clients. As said earlier, people make the institution grow, succeed and mature. 
Microfinance institutions should improve their training of loan officers, tellers, and 
customer service agents. The DRC microfinance industry must adopt a culture of 
“customar care” where clients feel appreciated and understood.  
 
f. Data Reporting, Storage, and Analysis.  
Finally, the financial services industry in the DRC must improve the collection, 
reporting, and analysis of data. It is unacceptable that data related to financial 
institutions are inaccessible and not available to analysts and researchers. An 
independent body should be instituted to systematically collect and store data from 
all financial institutions. This should be a basic requirement and a starting point if the 
industry has to improve its performance in the post-conflict era.  
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APPENDIX 1: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REGISTRED WITH  
                       THE CENTRAL BANK OF CONGO AS OF 
                       DECEMBER 2009 
                       (Source: Central Bank of Congo, Annual Report, 2009, pp. 293-303) 
 
I. BANKS 
 
 
1. Banque Commerciale du Congo (B.C.D.C.) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
2. Banque Congolaise (BC) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
3. Afriland First Bank Congo (First Bank CD) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
4. Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique au Congo (B.I.A.C.) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
5. Citi Group (City Bank) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
6. Stanbic Bank Congo (S.B.C.) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
7. Access Bank (A.B.) 
Headquarters: Goma 
8. Banque Internationale de Crédit (B.I.C.) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
9. Procredit Bank Congo 
Headquartes: Kinshasa 
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10. Raw Bank 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
11. Trust Merchant Bank (T.M.B.) 
Headquarters: Lubumbashi 
12. Solidaire Banque Internationale (SBI) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
13. Ecobank (EC) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
14. Mining Bank Congo (MBC) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
15. First International Bank (FIBank) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
16. Invest Bank Congo 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
17. Sofibanque 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
18. La Cruche Banque 
Headquarters: Goma 
19. Advans Banque Congo 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
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II. NON BANKING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
1. Société Financière de Développement (SOFIDE) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
2. Caisse Générale d’Epargne du Congo (CADECO) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa  
3. Société Nationale d’Assurances (SONAS) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
4. Fonds de Promotion de l’Industrie (F.P.I.) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
5. Office Congolais des Postes et Télécommunications (OCPT) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
6. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit « Amitié Salutiste » (COOPECAS) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
7. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit des Mamans Maraîchères de Kinshasa    
    (COOPEC MAKIN) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
8. Mutuelle d’épargne et de Crédit Bomoko (COOPEC BOMOKO) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
9. Mutuelle des Femmes Sages de Kin (MUFESAKIN/COOPEC) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
10. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit de l’Union pour le Développement 
      Intégral de Pay – Kingandu «COOPEC UDIPAK » 
Headquarters: Bandundu. 
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11. Mutuelle de Crédit et d’Epargne des Femmes de Kikwit 
      «MUCREFEKI/COOPEC» 
Headquarters: Kikwit. 
12. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Saint François Xavier/Cathédrale 
Headquarters: Kikwit. 
13. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit (COOPECCO KINSHASA) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
14. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit de Nyawera «COOPEC NYAWERA» 
Headquarters: Bukavu. 
15. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit (CECI-PME) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
16. Coopérative Financière et de Développement Socio-Economique de Butembo 
      «COODEFI/COOPEC» 
Headquarters: Butembo. 
17. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Kimbanguiste «CECKI» 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
18. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit pour le Développement du Kasaï   
      Occidental «COOPEC DEKOC» 
Headquarters: Kasaï Occidental/Kananga. 
19. Caisse d’Action Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit de Mbanza-Ngungu 
     «CAMEC MBANZA NGUNGU/ COOPEC» 
Headquarters: Mbanza-Ngungu. 
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20. Caisse d’Action Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit de Inkisi «CAMEC 
      INKISI/COOPEC»  
Headquarters: Inkisi. 
21. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit de Kinshasa «MECREKIN/COOPEC» 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
22. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit BOSANGANI «MEC BOSANGANI» 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
23. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit IMARA «COOPEC IMARA» 
Headquarters: Goma. 
24. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit PILOTE «COOPEC PILOTE» 
Headquarters: Bukavu. 
25. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Scolaire «COOPEC’SCO» 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
26. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit BOLINGO « COOPEC BOLINGO» 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
27. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Congolais pour la Reconstruction 
     «COOPEC CR» 
Headquarters: Butembo. 
28. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit de GOMA «MECREGO/COOPEC» 
Headquarters: Goma. 
29. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit de KATINDO «MECRE-KATINDO 
      COOPEC» 
Headquarters: Goma. 
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30. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit de VIRUNGA «MECRE- VIRUNGA/COOPEC» 
Headquarters: Goma. 
31. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Entraide pour le Développement 
      Economique «COOPEC- EDE» 
Headquarters: Goma. 
32. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit de Bukavu « MECREBU/COOPEC » 
Headquarters: Bukavu. 
33. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit pour le Développement « COOPEC EDE » 
Headquarters: Bukavu. 
34. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit de Beni « MECRE-BENI/COOPEC » 
Headquarters: Goma. 
35. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit de Mabanga « MECRE-MABANGA/COOPEC » 
Headquarters: Mabanga. 
36. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit de la Communauté Evangélique 
      de l’Alliance au Congo « COOPEC CEAC-MATETE » 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
37. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit pour le Développement au Congo 
     de Goma « COOPECCO-GOMA » 
Headquarters: Goma. 
38. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit de la KAWA « COOPEC KAWA » 
Headquarters: Bukavu. 
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39. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit pour le Développement au Congo 
     de Vitshumbi « COOPECCO-VITSHUMBI » 
Headquarters: Vitshumbi. 
40. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit pour le Développement au Congo 
     de Buturande « COOPECCO/BUTURANDE » 
Headquarters: Butarande. 
41. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit de Kanyabayonga « COOPEC 
      KANYABAYONGA » 
Headquarters: Kanyabayonga. 
42. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Kiwanja « COOPEC KIWANJA » 
Headquarters: Butarande. 
43. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Tumaini « COOPEC TUMAINI » 
Headquarters: Kavisimbi. 
44. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Rutshuru « COOPEC RUTSHURU » 
Headquarters: Rutshuru. 
45. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit de l’action pour la Promotion Sociale 
      et Culturelle des Artistes Chrétiens « MEC APROSCAC » 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
46. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Congolais d’entraide et d’appui 
      au développement « COOPEC EAD » 
Headquarters: Goma. 
47. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit BOBANDANA « COOPEC BOBANDANA » 
Headquarters: Minova. 
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48. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit CAHI « COOPEC CAHI » 
Headquarters: Bukavu. 
49. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit du Mouvement Ouvrier Chrétien 
     « COOPEC MOCC » 
Headquarters: Bukavu. 
50. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Umoja « COOPEC UMOJA » 
Headquarters: Butembo. 
51. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Kirumba « COOPEC KIRUMBA » 
Headquarters: Lubero. 
52. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Beni « COOPEC BENI » 
Headquarters: Bungulu. 
53. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit « MECRECO/COOCEC» 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
54. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit de l’Eglise du Christ au Congo 
      « COOPEC ECC/Kikwit » COOPEC ECC/Kikwit » 
Headquarters: Kikwit. 
55. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit CEAC Kinzau Mvuete « COOPEC CEAC      
      KINZAU MVUETE » 
Headquarters: Kinza-Mvuete. 
56. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit BIRERE « MECRE BIRERE/COOPEC ». 
Headquarters: Goma. 
57. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit DIBAYA-LUBWE « COOPEC DILU » 
Headquarters: Dibaya Lubwe. 
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58. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit ECOLE « COOPEC ECOLE » 
Headquarters: Kikwit. 
59. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit LUKOLELA « COOPEC LUKOLELA » 
Headquarters: Kikwit. 
60. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit MOKALA « COOPEC MOKALA » 
Headquarters: Mokala. 
61. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit CEAC KINTAMBO 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
62. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit CEAC Boma/Ville « COOPEC CEAC 
      BOMA/VILLE » 
Headquarters: Boma. 
63. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit des Femmes Mennonites au Congo « MEC   
      FMC/COOPEC » 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
64. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit « MUTECREDE/COOPEC» 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
65. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Caisse pour la Promotion sociale 
      « MEC-CAPROS/COOPEC » 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
66. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit de Masi Manimba « COOPEC MASI 
      MANIMBA » 
Headquarters: Masi Manimba. 
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67. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit de Kalundu « COOPEC KALUNDU » 
Headquarters: Uvira. 
68. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit de Gungu « COOPEC GUNGU » 
Headquarters: Gungu. 
69. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Chrétiens Unis « COOPEC CU » 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
70. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit pour le Développement Communautaire   
      au Congo « MEC DECO/COOPEC » 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
71. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit de Ngaliema – UPN « MECRE NGALIEMA 
      UPN/COOPEC » 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
72. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit de la Gombe « MECRE GOMBE/COOPEC » 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
73. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit de Kintambo Magasin « MECRE KINTAMBO 
      MAGASIN » 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
74. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit de Masina « MECRE MASINA/COOPEC » 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
75. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Actions de Développement par l’Epargne 
      et le Crédit « COOPEC/ADEC » 
Headquarters: Goma. 
76. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit de Bagira « COOPEC BAGIRA » 
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Headquarters: Bukavu. 
77. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Nyalukemba « COOPEC NYALUKEMBA » 
Headquarters: Ibanda. 
78. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit Agro-Pastorale Le Grenier « COOPEC  
      AGROPAS LE GRENIER/GOMA » 
Headquarters: Goma. 
79. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit TUJENGE PAMOJA « COOPEC TUJENGE 
      PAMOJA » 
Headquarters: Goma. 
80. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit « COOPEC MOLENDE » 
Headquarters: Kinshasa. 
81. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit « COOPEC EDE/KINDU » 
Headquarters: Kindu. 
82. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit « COOPEC MSAADA WETU» 
Headquarters: Kindu. 
83. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit « COOPECCO OICHA» 
Headquarters: OICHA. 
84. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit «COOPEC BENI» 
Headquarters: Beni. 
85. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit «COOPEC LA SEMENCE» 
Headquarters: Butembo. 
86. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit «COOPEC KESHENI » 
Headquarters: Goma. 
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87. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit «COOPEC UNITE» 
Headquarters: Goma. 
88. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit « COOPECCO-KIRUMBA» 
Headquarters: Kirumba. 
89. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit «COOPECCO-LUBERO» 
Headquarters: Lubero. 
90. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit «MUTEC/COOPEC» 
Headquarters: Bukavu. 
91. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit «COOPEC BURHIBA-KASHA» 
Headquarters: Sud-Kivu. 
92. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit «COOPEC CIMPUNDA» 
Headquarters: Sud-Kivu. 
93. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit «COOPEC FOMULAC KATANA» 
Headquarters: Sud-Kivu. 
94. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit «COOPEC KAVIMVIRA» 
Headquarters: Sud-Kivu. 
95. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit «COOPEC KAZIMIA» 
Headquarters: Sud-Kivu. 
96. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit «COOPEC LUHWINDJA» 
Headquarters: Sud-Kivu. 
97. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit «COOPEC UVIRA» 
Headquarters: Sud-Kivu. 
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98. Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit «COOPEC/BARAKA» 
Headquarters: Sud-Kivu. 
99. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit « MECRE IBANDA/COOPEC» 
Headquarters: Sud-Kivu. 
100. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit « MECRE KADUTU/COOPEC» 
Headquarters: Sud-Kivu. 
101. Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit « MECRE UVIRA/COOPEC» 
Headquarters: Sud-Kivu. 
 
 
III. MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
 
1. IMF HOPE RDC 
Headquarters: Kinshasa/Ngaliema 
2. Société de Microfinances Maendeleo 
Headquarters: Nord-Kivu/Goma 
3. IMF LIFE-VEST 
Headquarters: Kinshasa/Gombe 
4. Société de Microfinances FINCA RDC 
Headquarters: Kinshasa/Gombe 
5. IMF ESPERENCE 
Headquarters: Katanga/Likasi 
6. Solidarité pour le Développement Communautaire (SODEC IMF) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa/Ngiri-Ngiri 
7. Association pour le Développement du Kasaï Oriental (ADEKOR/IMF 
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Headquarters: Kasaï Oriental/Mbuji-Mayi 
8. Entreprise de Micro-Crédit de 1ère catégorie « IMF HEKIMA » 
Headquarters: Goma 
9. Entreprise de Micro Crédit de 2ème catégorie AFRICAN PEOPLE FINANCE 
    (IMF A.P.F) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa/Gombe 
10. Entreprise de Micro Crédit de 2ème catégorie VIA NOVA sprl 
     (IMF VIA NOVA sprl) 
Siège: Kinshasa/Gombe 
11. IMF APF 
Headquarters: Kinshasa/Gombe 
12. Société de Micro Finance « IMF BARAKA/PRESE » 
Headquarters: Goma 
13. Société de Micro Finance « GALA LETU IMF » 
Headquarters: Goma 
14. Société de Micro Finance « SOMIFI REJEDE » 
Headquarters: BUTEMBO. 
15. Société de Micro Finance «IMF BUSINA MICROCREDIT sprl» 
Headquarters: BOMA. 
16. Société de Micro Finance «IMF COMIF» 
Headquarters: KINSHASA. 
17. Société de Micro Finance «IMF RACREDIT SARL» 
Headquarters: KINSHASA. 
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IV. CHANGE AGENCIES  
1. Malu Change 
2. Solidarite Change 
3. Free Business Change 
4. Soficom Change 
5. Modestie Change 
6. Mamie Laure 
7. Monex 
8. Christel Change 
9. A.B.S. Change 
10. La Reference Change 
11. Kilefu SPRL 
12. Ewedje Exchange RDC 
 
V. MONEY TRANSFERTS AGENCIES 
 
1. Money Trans RDC 
2. Golden Money Trust 
3. Kin Express Multiservices 
4. Soficom Transfert 
5. Kin Personnel Mail 
6. Solidaire Transfert 
7. Maison Lupi 
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8. Groupe Lambert de Paris SPRL 
9. Societe de Transport Compagnies SPRL 
10. Sikar Finances 
11. Agence Aiglon Service 
12. Berval Express 
13. Colikin 
14. Trans Cash 
15. Amis Fideles  
16. African Express SPRL 
17. Express Union 
18. Societe Jesus Seul 
19. Agence Grace D. World Business SPRL 
20. Transfert de Fonds Ewedje RDC 
21. Winkele Business Agency 
22. Axes Services 
23. Datco 
24. Justin et CIE SPRL 
25. Apocalypse 22 
26. Colombe Services SPRL 
27. Zifa – FT 
28. Malu Transfert 
29. New Way FR Agency 
30. Graines des Ass SPRL 
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Appendix 2: MFI Clients Post-Conflict Reconstruction Survey 
                     Interview Schedule. 
 
Date of Interview      : __________________ 
Interview Number      : __________________ 
Interviewer Name      : __________________  
Client Name or ID         : __________________ 
Financial Institution       : __________________ 
Locality Name      : __________________ 
 
INFORMED CONSENT 
CLIENTS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES OPERATING IN CONGO (DRC) 
 
Consent to Participate in Research 
Study Title: MICROFINANCE AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: IS 
MICROFINANCE A FINANCIAL SERVICES RECONSTRUCTION TOOL IN POST-
CONFLICT COMMUNITIES? 
 
Principal Investigator:  Lukumu Nicodème Matabisi, PhD Candidate: 
(lukumu.matabisi@snhu.edu).  
 
The Research Supervision and Dissertation Committee include:  
 Catherine Rielly, PhD: c.rielly@snhu.edu) 
 Jeffrey Ashe, Director at Oxfam America: (JAshe@oxfamamerica.org) 
 Christina Clamp, PhD: C.Clamp@snhu.edu  
 Charles Hotchkiss, PhD (c.hotchkiss@snhu.edu)  
  
Sponsor:  PhD Program, School of Community Economic Development, Southern New 
Hampshire University.  
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  Your participation is 
voluntary.  Your decision to participate will have no effect on your ability to access 
services to which you are otherwise entitled. Please ask questions if there is anything 
you don’t understand. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to determine the role that various types of financial 
institutions play in the reconstruction process of financial services, following the end of a 
conflict. The results will be used to write a doctoral dissertation. 
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What does this study involve? 
The study involves interviewing 150 people individually to talk about issues related to 
access or not to financial services such as loan, saving, or deposit; issues related to 
clients’ business activities, if relevant, education, assets acquisition; and expenditures. 
You will be asked to respond to a series of multiple choices and open-ended questions 
related to these subjects.  
 
Data Collection:  
Interviews are designed to seek information about your experiences, knowledge, 
opinions, and attitudes about the following topics: 
 
 a) Loan, saving and deposit activities through a financial services provider. 
           b) Development of your small or medium enterprise, if you have one. 
 c) Education of your children in your household.  
 d) Types and number of assets belonging to your household.  
 e) Individual and family incomes. 
 f) Household Expenditure. 
 
 
The interview will take approximately 30 to 45 minutes to complete.   
 
Are there any benefits from participating in this study? 
You may receive no benefit from participating in this study.  However, input from the 
interview may be incorporated in future program and policy changes in an effort to 
improve the provision of financial services in the DRC.  
 
How is this different from what will happen if you do not participate in this study? 
Your decision not to participate in this study will have no effect on the services you are 
eligible to receive. 
 
What are the risks involved with being enrolled in this study? 
There are very minimal risks involved with your participation, due to the fact that this is a 
one-on-one conversation with me and that your responses and comments are 
confidential. Your name will not be used but instead you will be given an ID number to 
protect the confidentiality of your identity. However, I cannot guarantee that your 
financial institution, if for some reason it knows about this interview, will not ask you to 
tell what this interview was about. However, there is almost no chance for this to 
happen. If it happens and you are questioned about this interview, tell whoever that I 
instructed you not to discuss the content of this interview and please refer them to me 
and tell them that I am the only one who can answer any question. Provide them with 
my phone number: 0814421124 (DRC) or +15084083847 (USA). Remember that you 
do not have to tell anyone about this interview. However, before the interview starts, 
SNHU researchers ask participants in interviews to agree to a Statement of 
Confidentiality.  
Other important things you should know 
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Withdrawal 
You may choose to stop your participation in this study at any time without penalty or 
prejudice. 
 
Confidentiality 
I or any person I choose to handle this study’s data or materials will be committed to 
confidentiality and will make every effort to protect the confidentiality of your 
involvement in the survey. Moreover, your name will not be used but instead you will be 
provided with an ID number to use instead of your name or other personally identifiable 
information. This makes it almost impossible for anyone else but me to identify you. 
  
Data Storage: 
I or any person I choose to handle this study’s data or materials will maintain data 
collected in this study in the manner that follows, for the time required by the School of 
Community Economic Development at Southern New Hampshire University:  
 1.) Interview will be audio or video-recorded. 
 2.) Access to data will be limited to those I will appoint and to my Dissertation 
Committee after they have agreed and adhered to the terms of this study’s 
confidentiality commitment and agreement.   
 3.) Data will be stored in a password protected computer. 
 4.) Your name will not appear in any publication that may result from this                
study. As said above, your name will not be used but instead you will be provided with 
an ID number to use instead of your name or other personally identifiable information. 
 
Number of participants: 
We expect approximately 150 people to participate in this study: 50 are clients of 
microfinance institutions, 50 are clients of traditional financial institutions, and 50 are 
non clients and belong to none of any type of financial services provider.  
 
Who should you call with questions about this study? 
Questions about this study should be directed to Dr. Charles Hotchkiss, Dean of the 
School and PhD program Director at 001-603-644-3181 (Phone)/ 001-603-644-3130 
(Fax) or via email: c.hotchkiss@snhu.edu . You can also ask for Dr. Catherine Rielly, 
Chair of my Dissertation Committee at 001-603-644-3156 (Phone)/ 001-603-644-3130 
(Fax) or via email: c.rielly@snhu.edu, both are at the School of Community Economic 
Development at Southern New Hampshire University in the United States of America. 
The Principal Investigator who oversees all aspects of this research is me (Lukumu 
Nicodème Matabisi) of the PhD Program at the School of Community Economic 
Development at Southern New Hampshire University. You can reach me anytime at 081 
4421124 (DRC) or 001-508-408-3847 (USA) or lukumu.matabisi@snhu.edu. 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you can contact the 
Chair of the university’s Institutional Review Board, during office hours at 001-800-668-
1249 to discuss them in confidence. 
 
What about the costs of this study? 
There are no costs to participating in this study besides your time.  
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SPONSOR POLICY:  
This study is conducted with the goal of obtaining a PhD degree and its results will be 
used to write a doctoral dissertation. The School of Community Economic Development 
at Southern New Hampshire University has covered part of the research costs.  
 
CONSENT 
 
 I have read or listen the above information about the Interview 
 I understand the possible benefits that may be accrued from this research and 
how it may affect me or others. 
 I understand that I am being asked to offer my opinion about my access or not to 
financial services such as loan, saving, or deposit; business activities if relevant; 
education, assets acquisition; and expenditures. 
 I understand the discussion during the interview will be recorded. 
 I understand the discussion in the interview will be summarized or transcribed 
(typed word for word). 
 I understand that my name will not be used but instead I will be given an ID 
number to protect the confidentiality of my identity. However, there is a possibility 
that other sources (non-study team members) may ask me about the interview’s 
content. If it happens, I do not have to tell them and will refer them to you by 
providing them with your phone numbers, and tell them that you are the only one 
who can answer questions related to this interview. 
 I understand that my consent to participate is entirely voluntary, and that my 
refusal to participate will involve no prejudice or loss of benefits to which I am 
entitled. 
 I confirm that no coercion of any kind was used in seeking my participation. 
 I understand that I will not be paid to participate in this study. 
 I understand that information about this project will be provided to me by the 
Principal Investigator upon written request at the conclusion of the project. 
 I certify that I have read or listen and fully understand the purpose of this research 
study and its risks and benefits for me as stated above. 
PRINT NAME: 
I (signature) ________________________________  Date:   
CONSENT/AGREE to participate in this research project. 
 
I (signature) ________________________________  Date:   
REFUSE/DO NOT AGREE to participate in this research project. 
Witness:  (signature) _________________________  Date:   
 
Client Profile 
 
Q1. Indicate respondent’s gender:  
  1= Male     
2= Female 
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Q2. What is your current marital status? Would you say you currently are…………… 
(Read answers and enter just one).  
   1= Married   3= Widow 
 2= Separated/Divorced 4= Single/Never Married 
 
Q3. How old are you?_________ 
 Specify number of years  99= Do not know (DNK).  
 
Q4. How many years of schooling have you completed? 
 Number of years: _______ 
 
Q5. What is your experience with formal financial services? Would you say you are:  
       1= client of a commercial bank (Go to question 7)   
       2= client of a microfinance institution (ask question 6)    
       3= not a client of either type of financial institution. (Go to question 8) 
 
Q6. What type of client are you: 
       1= Village banking     
       2= Solidarity group   
       3= Individual client. 
 
Q7. How long have you been a client with your current financial institution? 
Number of months: ______ (If answer in years, calculate and enter in months). 
 
Q8. What would you define as your main occupation? 
 Specify type of occupation   : _____ 
 Specify amount earned/month in $US : _____ 
 
Q9. How many persons in your household live together and share a meal with 
       you? Of these, how many are:  
Adults (16 years of age and older) : _____ 
Children (Less than 16 years of age) : _____  
 
Q10. How many persons in your household are engaged in work that allows 
         them to earn income? _______ 
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Business Development 
Q11. (If a client of a financial institution). Have you ever received a loan from your 
         financial institution?  
1=No (Go to question 14). 
2=Yes (Ask questions 12-13).   
Q12. What is the amount of the most recent loan you have received? 
          ___________________________ (Record amount in $US)  
Q13. What is the loan amount you have received before this most recent loan?  
         Interviewer: Repeat this question until you get the maximum information the client 
                             can provide. Record them in the table below and compute later the 
                             total number of loans and the total amount of loans received.    
 
Loan Amount Loan Length  
(in Weeks) 
Interest Rate 
(Annual) 
Repayment 
Schedule 
1=Weekly 
2=Bi-Weekly 
3=Monthly 
Loan 1     
Loan 2     
Loan 3     
Loan 4     
Total =    N/A 
 
Q14. Are you involved in any kinds of businesses? (Explain that this is any activity 
         where you earned money for yourself by selling something you made, or grew, or 
         goods that you purchased and resold) 
            1=No (Go to question 20). 
            2=Yes    
 
Q14a.  What kinds of businesses are you involved in? 
 
 
Category of Business Specific Type of 
business  
Number of businesses 
of this type: 
1= Commerce/Trade/ 
Retail (includes petty trade) 
  
2= Manufacturing 
(includes food processing, textile 
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production, crafts) 
3=Service (includes 
hairdressing, restaurants, food stalls, 
cleaning services) 
  
4=Agriculture/Livestock 
(includes food or other crop 
production, animal raising) 
  
5=Other 
(specify)_____________ 
 
  
Q14b. Which among these businesses earned you the most money?________ 
Q14c. Is this business….? (Read answers and enter one). 
          1= Primarily your own 
          2= Primarily a household enterprise 
          3= Joint business with outside the family. 
 
Q14d. Did you spend time working at this business over the past four weeks? 
1 = No         
2 = Yes     
99=DNK  
 
Q15. What investments have you made in your business over the last year? 
         (check all that apply) 
AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL RAISING TRADE/SERVICE/MANUFACTURING 
15a.Purchased goats/pork  16a. Added new products    
15b. Purchased chickens/ducks  16b. Hired more workers   
15c. Grew more vegetables to sell  16c. Bought wholesale or in greater 
volume  
 
15d. Increased the types of 
vegetables/fruits you sell 
 16d. Added new line of products   
15e. Purchased small tools such as 
hoes, shovels 
 16e. Purchased small 
tools/equipment  
 
15f. Hired more workers  16f. Purchased major equipment  
15g. Purchased a bicycle/cart to 
transport my goods to market 
 16g. Invested in a structure for your 
kiosk or shop  
 
15h. Leased/purchased more land to 
farm 
 16h. Purchased a bicycle/cart for 
your business  
 
15i. Purchased fertilizer and 
pesticides 
 16i. Rented space for your business   
15j. Other ______________  16j. Other: ____________  
 
Q17. Compared to last year your sales (circle one): 
1= have decreased a lot   
2= have decreased a little   
3= are about the same 
4= increased a little bite 
5= increased a lot 
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Q18. How much of your loan from your financial institution was invested into your 
business? 
1= None     
2=Less than Half   
3=Half 
4=More than Half 
5=All 
Q19. If not all, did you use any portion of your MFI loan to: 
1. Buy food? 
1=No   2=Yes  99=DNK  
2. Buy clothes or other household items? 
1=No   2=Yes  99=DNK  
3. Give or loan the money to someone else? 
1=No   2=Yes  99=DNK  
4. Keep money on hand in case of an emergency or to repay the loan? 
1=No   2=Yes  99=DNK  
5. Spend money on medicines or healthy care for your family? 
1=No   2=Yes  99=DNK  
6. Organize a party or social event? 
1=No   2=Yes  99=DNK  
7. Any other activity? Specify __________________  
1=No   2=Yes  99=DNK  
8. Not Applicable. 
 
Q20. Apart from being a client of your current financial institution, are you a client of 
another financial institution of any type (bank, MFI, NGO)?  
  
1= No.  
2= Yes (ask questions 21-24) 
 
Q21. Did you borrow from them while being a member of your current financial 
institution? 
 
1= No.  
2= Yes (ask questions 22-24)  
 
Q22. How much did you borrow?  
Specify amount in $US: _______ 
 
Q23. How much of this other loan (not your financial institution) was invested into your 
business? 
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1= None     
2=Less than Half   
3=Half 
4=More than Half 
5=All 
 
 
 
 
Q24. If not all, did you use any portion of your MFI last loan to: 
 
1. Buy food? 
1=No   2=Yes  99=DNK  
2. Buy clothes or other household items? 
1=No   2=Yes  99=DNK   
3. Give or loan the money to someone else? 
1=No   2=Yes  99=DNK   
4. Keep money on hand in case of an emergency or to repay the loan? 
1=No   2=Yes  99=DNK   
5. Spend money on medicines or healthy care for your family? 
1=No   2=Yes  99=DNK   
6. Organize a party or social event? 
1=No   2=Yes  99=DNK   
7. Any other activity? Specify ______________  
1=No   2=Yes  99=DNK   
8. Not Applicable. 
Q25. Did you have a business before joining your current financial institution?      
 
1= No   
2= Yes  
 
Q26. (If yes). Since you joined (Name of MFI) are your sales: 
            
1= Much lower      
2= A little lower    
3= The same 
4= A little higher 
5= A lot higher 
 
Q27. Do you record your expenses and your sales in a ledger book?  
 
1= No.  
2= Yes  
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Q28. Regarding your major businesses, please provide the following as 
         accurate as possible. (Interviewer: Probe to obtain each value and record 
         in the table bellow. Follow the legend when questioning and probing).  
 
 
 
 
Categories PP PE SP SE GP 
Business 1      
Business 
Cycle Period 
     
Loan  Cycle 
Period 
     
Loan Cycle 
Total 
     
 
Legend 
 PP: Purchase Price of Merchandises (Ask: How much did you buy) 
 PE: Expenses related to Purchase of Merchandises (Ask: What were your expenses while 
buying). 
 SP: Sales of Merchandises (Ask: How much did you sell) 
 SE: Expenses related to Sales of Merchandises (Ask: What were your expenses while selling) 
 GP: Gross Profit (Interviewer: Subtract sales from expenses for Gross profit). 
 GP= (SP-SE) – (PP+PE) 
 Business Cycle Period (BCP) or sales cycle : daily, weekly, monthly or else to be computed on a 
weekly basis 
 Loan Cycle Period (LCP) in weeks 
 Loan Cycle Total = BCP * LCP 
 
Q29. Beside yourself, do you employ another person part-time or full-time?  
1=Yes   2=No  (Go to question 31) 
Q30. (If yes). Can you provide details (Interviewer: Fill Table bellow):    
 
Total Number How many work 
full time? 
How many work 
part time? 
How many are 
family members? 
How many are 
non-family 
members? 
     
 
Education 
 
Q31. How many children does your household send to school? 
         ___________________________          (Record the number) 
 
Q32. How many children were you sending to school before becoming client of 
         your current financial institution? 
         ___________________________          (Record the number) 
Q33. If the number has changed, why? (check all that apply) 
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1= Children became older  3=I have more money now and 
          can afford that 
 2= I got external help from family  4= Other reason___________ 
 
Q34. Since you joined your current MFI, did the amount you spend for school: 
1= Decreased a lot   3= Stayed the same   5= Increased a lot 
2= Decreased   4= Increase  
 
Assets 
 
Q35. Now I have some questions about items that your household might own.  I will 
read a list of items and I would like you to indicate if your household owns any of these 
items. 
 
 
Asset Type Yes =1 
No   =0 
Number owned 
now 
Owned Before 
joining MFI: 
1=Yes 
0= No 
Purchase value at 
current market 
price 
General Assets     
House or land to build     
Sofa set     
Table     
Chair     
Bed     
Mattress     
Gold Jewelry     
Clothes Closet     
Mobile Phone     
Appliances & Electronics     
Television     
Videocassette recorder     
DVD     
Refrigerator/Freezer     
Electric Cooker/Stove     
Washing machine     
Radio     
Watch     
Computer     
Transportation-related     
Car     
Motorcycle     
Bicycle     
Cart     
Agriculture-related     
Land     
Cattle/Goat/Pork      
Poultry     
Material and Fertilizer      
Other     
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Standard of Living  
 
Q36. Did any special event occur in the past two days (for example a family reunion, a 
family party)? 
               1=No (ask next question)      2=Yes (ask question 38) 
 
Q37. If no, how many meals were served to the household members during the last two 
days? _________________ (Record Number). 
          
Q38. Were there any special events in the last seven days? 
               1=No (ask next question)      2=Yes (ask the nearest week without event). 
 
Q39. If no, how many meals were served to the household members during the last two 
days? _________________ (Record Number). 
          
Q40. During the last seven days, for how many days were the following foods served in 
a main meal eaten by the household? 
 
Luxury food Number of days served 
Luxury food 1           (Fish)  
Luxury food 2           (chicken)  
Luxury food 3           (Meat)  
 
Q41. During the last seven days, for how many days did a main meal consist of an 
inferior food only? 
 
Inferior food Number of days served 
Inferior food 1           (vegetable only)  
Inferior food 2           (Rice only)  
Inferior food 3           (Bread + beverage)  
 
Q42. During the last 30 days, how many days did your household not have enough to 
eat everyday? _________________ (Record Number).  
 
 
Q43. Now I have some questions about your household’s last month expenses. I will 
read a list of items and I would like you to indicate how much you spend every month.  
 
Interviewer: Please use the chart below and record expense for each specific item using  
                    the second column. Ask if this amount decreased, stayed the same, or 
                    increased from its Pre-MF level and fill in the third column. 
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Categories Amounts (Current) Compare this amount to Pre-
MF situation: 
      1= decreased 
      2= stayed the same 
      3= Increased 
Home (rent/mortgage) 43a. 44a. 
Furniture/Appliances 43b. 44b. 
Utilities 43c. 44c. 
Cooking fuel cost 43d. 44d. 
Food purchase expense 43e. 44e. 
Household production of food 43f. 44f. 
Personal products expense 43g. 44g. 
Clothing and shoes 43h. 44h. 
Total school/Education expense 43i. 44i. 
Transport expense 43j. 44j. 
Health care expense 43k. 44k. 
Charitable giving expenditures 43l. 44l. 
Money to family and friends 43m. 44m. 
Taxes/bribes 43n. 44n. 
Special events expenditures 43o. 44o. 
Leisure expense 43p 44p. 
Other expenses 43q. 44q. 
 
 
Q45.  How much is your (as an individual) monthly income. You can give me a figure 
____________ or I can read a list of categories and you can tell me which category you 
fall into.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
$0-30 $31-60 $61-90 $91-
250 
$251-
500 
$501-
750 
$751-
1,000 
$1,001-
2,500 
$2,501-
5,000 
$5,001-
10,000 
 
 
Q46.  Thinking about how much income you have now compared to your expenses, 
would you say that you have… 
1= Much less than enough 
2= A little less than enough 
3= Just enough 
4= A little more than enough 
5= Much more than enough 
 
 
Q47.  (If client of a financial institution). Thinking about how much income you have now 
compared to your income before joining your current financial institution, would you say 
you have… 
1= Much lower than before      
2= A little lower than before    
3= The same than before 
4= A little higher than before 
5= A lot higher than before 
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Q48. Do you have any savings or money deposited somewhere?  
1= No    
2= Yes  
 
Q49. If yes, how much approximately?  You can give me a figure __________ or I can 
read a list of categories and you can tell me which category you fall into within $500. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
$0-30 $31-60 $61-90 $91-
250 
$251-
500 
$501-
750 
$751-
1,000 
$1,001-
2,500 
$2,501-
5,000 
$5,001-
10,000 
 
Q50.  (If client of a financial institution). Think about the time before you join your actual 
financial institution, did you have savings or deposits? 
 
1= No    
2= Yes   
 
Q51.  (If yes). Think about the time before you join your actual financial institution, 
would you say that your current savings or deposits are:  
 
1= Much lower      
2= A little lower    
3= The same 
4= A little higher 
5= A lot higher 
 
Q52.  When putting together income of all the members of your household, how much is 
your household’s monthly income? You can give me a figure ____________ or I can 
read a list of categories and you can tell me which category you fall into.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
$0-30 $31-60 $61-90 $91-
250 
$251-
500 
$501-
750 
$751-
1,000 
$1,001-
2,500 
$2,501-
5,000 
$5,001-
10,000 
 
 
Thank you very much. This is the end of this interview. I do appreciate your help. 
Do you have any question? 
 
If “yes”, write down respondent’s question (s) and answer the question as accurate as 
you can or let the interviewee understands that you do not know the answer.  
 
If “no”, thank the interviewee and end the interview.  
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APPENDIX 3: SELECTED SPSS OUTPUT 
                        (TABLES AND FIGURES) FROM THE SURVEY 
 
Table A3.1: Respondent Gender per Experience with Formal Financial Services  
 
Experience with Formal Financial 
Services 
Total 
Client of 
Microfinance 
Institution 
Not a Client of 
either type of 
Financial 
Institution 
Respondent Gender Male Count 9 13 22 
% within Experience with 
Formal Financial Services 
19.6% 27.7% 23.7% 
Female Count 37 34 71 
% within Experience with 
Formal Financial Services 
80.4% 72.3% 76.3% 
Total Count 46 47 93 
% within Experience with 
Formal Financial Services 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table A3.2: Respondent Gender per Type of Client  
 Type of Client 
Total Village Banking Solidarity Group Individual Client 
Respondent Gender Male Count 2 3 4 9 
% within Type of Client 8.3% 30.0% 33.3% 19.6% 
Female Count 22 7 8 37 
% within Type of Client 91.7% 70.0% 66.7% 80.4% 
Total Count 24 10 12 46 
% within Type of Client 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table A3.3: Marital Status 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Married 55 59.1 59.1 59.1 
Separated 6 6.5 6.5 65.6 
Widow 9 9.7 9.7 75.3 
Single - Never Married 23 24.7 24.7 100.0 
Total 93 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Table A3.4: Respondents Age 
N Valid 93 
Missing 0 
Mean 39.24 
Median 40.00 
Mode 35a 
Std. Deviation 9.881 
Variance 97.639 
Range 46 
Minimum 18 
Maximum 64 
 
 
 
Table A3.5: Type of Clients of Microfinance Institutions    
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Village Banking 24 52.2 52.2 52.2 
Solidarity Group 10 21.7 21.7 73.9 
Individual Client 12 26.1 26.1 100.0 
Total 46 100.0 100.0  
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Table A3.6: Client Main Occupation 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Public Servant 7 7.5 7.5 7.5 
Small Business Owner 76 81.7 81.7 89.2 
Owner of a Non-Profit 
Organization or Medium size 
company 
5 5.4 5.4 94.6 
Student 5 5.4 5.4 100.0 
Total 93 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Table A3.7: Categories of Main Businesses 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Commerce/Trade/Retail 43 46.2 46.7 46.7 
Manufacturing 3 3.2 3.3 50.0 
Service 46 49.5 50.0 100.0 
Total 92 98.9 100.0  
Missing Not Applicable 1 1.1   
Total 93 100.0   
 
Table A3.8: Type of Main Business 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Food Distribution 29 31.2 31.5 31.5 
Terrace or Beverage kiosk 11 11.8 12.0 43.5 
Friperie or Used Clothes 
Lines 
17 18.3 18.5 62.0 
Ligablo or Mini-Convenient 
Store 
1 1.1 1.1 63.0 
Malewa or Local restaurant 16 17.2 17.4 80.4 
Agricultural products 1 1.1 1.1 81.5 
Cabine or Phone Kiosk 7 7.5 7.6 89.1 
Agricultural Products 1 1.1 1.1 90.2 
Electronics 2 2.2 2.2 92.4 
Moulin or Grains Mill 1 1.1 1.1 93.5 
Local Pharmacy 5 5.4 5.4 98.9 
Taxi or Cab 1 1.1 1.1 100.0 
Total 92 98.9 100.0  
Missing Not Applicable 1 1.1   
Total 93 100.0   
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Table A3.9: Sales Performance 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Have decreased a lot 12 12.9 13.0 13.0 
Have decreased a little 29 31.2 31.5 44.6 
Are about the same 26 28.0 28.3 72.8 
Increased a little bite 24 25.8 26.1 98.9 
Increased a lot 1 1.1 1.1 100.0 
Total 92 98.9 100.0  
Missing 98 1 1.1   
Total 93 100.0   
 
Table A3.10: Ever Received Loan from Financial Institution 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 57 61.3 61.3 61.3 
Yes 36 38.7 38.7 100.0 
Total 93 100.0 100.0  
Table A3.11: Repayment Schedule 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Weekly 3 3.2 8.3 8.3 
Bi-Weekly 21 22.6 58.3 66.7 
Monthly 12 12.9 33.3 100.0 
Total 36 38.7 100.0  
Missing Not Applicable 57 61.3   
Total 93 100.0   
 
Table A3.12: Portion of Loan Invested in Business 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Half 2 2.2 5.6 5.6 
More than half 8 8.6 22.2 27.8 
All 26 28.0 72.2 100.0 
Total 36 38.7 100.0  
Missing Not Applicable 57 61.3   
Total 93 100.0   
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Table A3.13. Repayment Schedule 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Weekly 3 3.2 8.3 8.3 
Bi-Weekly 21 22.6 58.3 66.7 
Monthly 12 12.9 33.3 100.0 
Total 36 38.7 100.0  
Missing Not Applicable 57 61.3   
Total 93 100.0   
 
Table A3.14: Belonging to More than one Institution 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 39 41.9 84.8 84.8 
Yes 7 7.5 15.2 100.0 
Total 46 49.5 100.0  
Missing 98 47 50.5   
Total 93 100.0   
 
 
Table A3.15: Sales Performance since Member of financial Institution 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Much lower 1 1.1 2.2 2.2 
A little lower 6 6.5 13.3 15.6 
The same 8 8.6 17.8 33.3 
A little higher 17 18.3 37.8 71.1 
A lot higher 13 14.0 28.9 100.0 
Total 45 48.4 100.0  
Missing Not Applicable 48 51.6   
Total 93 100.0   
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Table A3.16: Compare actual Income and Pre-Financial Institution 
Income 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid A little lower than before 5 5.4 5.4 5.4 
The same as before 9 9.7 9.7 15.1 
A little more than before 23 24.7 24.7 39.8 
A lot of higher than before 9 9.7 9.7 49.5 
Not Applicable 47 50.5 50.5 100.0 
Total 93 100.0 100.0  
 
Table A3. 17: Have Savings 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 42 45.2 45.2 45.2 
Yes 51 54.8 54.8 100.0 
Total 93 100.0 100.0  
 
Table A3.18: Had Savings before Joining Financial Institution 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 37 39.8 80.4 80.4 
Yes 9 9.7 19.6 100.0 
Total 46 49.5 100.0  
Not 
Applicable 
 47 50.5   
Total 93 100.0   
 
Table A3.19: Compare Actual Savings and Pre-Financial Institution Savings 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid A little lower 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
The same 11 11.8 11.8 12.9 
A little higher 18 19.4 19.4 32.3 
A lot higher 16 17.2 17.2 49.5 
Not Applicable 47 50.5 50.5 100.0 
Total 93 100.0 100.0  
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Figure A3.1: Business Development Scatterplots 
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Figure A3.2: Normal Q-Q and Detrended Normal Q-Q Plots of Business Development.  
  
 
 
  
 
Figure A3.3: Scatterplots and Boxplots of Children sent to School  
277 
 
   
 
Figure A3.4: Scatterplot for Total Assets Acquisition of Respondents. 
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Figure A3.5: Normal Q-Q and Detrended Normal Q-Q for Total Assets 
  
 
Figure A3.6: Scatterplots for Standard of Living 
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Figure A3.7: Normal Q-Q and Detrended Q-Q Plots for Individual Income and Total 
Household Expenditures.     
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Table A3.20: Savings Key Statistics 
 Experience with Formal Financial Services Statistic 
Amount of Savings Client of Microfinance 
Institution 
Mean 397.20 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 157.37 
Upper Bound 637.02 
5% Trimmed Mean 247.49 
Median 115.00 
Variance 652191.050 
Std. Deviation 807.583 
Minimum 0 
Maximum 3750 
Range 3750 
Interquartile Range 340 
Skewness 3.448 
Kurtosis 12.194 
Not a Client of either type of 
Financial Institution 
Mean 97.83 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 35.31 
Upper Bound 160.35 
5% Trimmed Mean 68.07 
Median .00 
Variance 45337.666 
Std. Deviation 212.926 
Minimum 0 
Maximum 875 
Range 875 
Interquartile Range 75 
Skewness 2.433 
Kurtosis 4.969 
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Figure A3.8: Scatterplot and Boxplot for Amount of Savings  
 
 
Figure A3.9: Normal Q-Q and Detrended Q-Q Plots for Savings 
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APPENDIX 4: BANKS CURRENTLY OPERATING AND BANKS 
CLOSED BY THE CENTRAL BANK OF CONGO AS OF DECEMBER 
2009 (Source: www.bcc.cd, 2011) 
 
I. BANKS CURRENTLY REGISTERED AND OPERATING 
 
1. Banque Commerciale du Congo (B.C.D.C.) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
2. Banque Congolaise (BC) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
3. Afriland First Bank Congo (First Bank CD) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
4. Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique au Congo (B.I.A.C.) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
5. Citi Group (City Bank) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
6. Stanbic Bank Congo (S.B.C.) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
7. Access Bank (A.B.) 
Headquarters: Goma 
8. Banque Internationale de Crédit (B.I.C.) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
9. Procredit Bank Congo 
Headquartes: Kinshasa 
10. Raw Bank 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
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11. Trust Merchant Bank (T.M.B.) 
Headquarters: Lubumbashi 
12. Solidaire Banque Internationale (SBI) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
13. Ecobank (EC) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
14. Mining Bank Congo (MBC) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
15. First International Bank (FIBank) 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
16. Invest Bank Congo 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
17. Sofibanque 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
18. La Cruche Banque 
Headquarters: Goma 
19. Advans Banque Congo 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
20. Bank of Africa 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
21. Crane Bank of Congo 
Headquarters: Kinshasa 
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II. BANKS CLOSED 
 
1. African Trade Bank 
2. Banque à la Confiance d'Or 
3. Banque Congolaise de Commerce Extérieur 
4. Banque Continentale du Congo 
5. Banque de Commerce et de Développement 
6. Banque de Crédit Agricole 
7. Compagnie Bancaire de Commerce et de crédit (Ancienne SOZABANQUE) 
8. First Bank Congo Corporation 
9. Nouvelle Banque de Kinshasa 
10. Ryad Banque 
11. Union des Banques Congolaises 
12. Banque Continentale au Zaïre 
13. Banque de placement au Zaïre 
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APPENDIX 5: SUMMARIES OF UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
                        WITH SELECTED CLIENTS  
 
Source: Primary data collected by Lukumu Nicodème Matabisi between 6/2/2010 and 
11/11/2010 in Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, by probing and asking 
unstructured questions when collecting quantitative data using the “MFI Clients Post-
Conflict Reconstruction Survey”, designed by Matabisi, L.N (2010) as part of a 
Dissertation Proposal, submitted to and approved by Southern New Hampshire 
University.  
 
1. Interviewee 1: (MF-Mecrekin) 
a. Q34: Before becoming microfinance (MF) client, we were paying for kids’ 
education almost the same amount we pay now; but it was very difficult to 
afford tuition and school materials. Children used to go to school hungry and 
without money for their lunch. The situation has changed since we became 
MF clients and we can afford children’s education costs easier than before.    
b. I suggest that Mecrekin increases the amount of credit. 10,000 US dollars will 
make more sense than what we get now (around 3,000 US dollars). 
 
2. Interviewee 2: (MF-Mecrekin) 
a. Q34: Tuitions are less now because one child is out of school. But other 
school related expenses are still high. We can afford it now with our small 
business’ activities with Mecrekin. 
b. I suggest that Mecrekin provides agricultural loans.  
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3. Interviewee 3: (MF-Mufesakin) 
a. Q5. So far I have been depending only on my salary but it’s getting harder 
and harder. I have decided to try with loans from an MFI and in this case 
Mecrekin. I have followed a solidarity group created by few of my colleagues 
who get loans from Mecrekin and my conclusion has been that it helps. I have 
created my solidarity group with 4 other colleagues and we are waiting to get 
our first loan. My wife used to be FINCA client but she had a bad experience 
and lost around $200. Mecrekin seems to have a better approach and I have 
decided to try it.   
   
4. Interviewee 9: (MF-Mecrekin) 
a. Q34: Being part of an MF helps a bit and I must be honest to recognize that it 
would be harder without extra income from loan’s activities with Mecrekin.  
b. Q35: There is almost no asset acquisition from MF activities. It helps to feed 
the family, schooling and in some cases with medical bills. The burden of 
loans does not allow assets acquisition. Those who tried to acquire assets 
with loans money are in trouble and could not pay back their loans.  
c. Agricultural loans will be helpful to improve our lives in the long term.  
 
5. Interviewee 10: (MF-Mufesakin) 
a. Our solidarity group is new and we decided to name it “Boyokani” which 
means “Mutual understanding” and we hope to bridge the gap between our 
poor salary and high living expenses. I have witnessed a lot of issues among 
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women involved in this microfinance business. MFI does not care about 
people. Even if your relative dies you have to pay back their loan on that day. 
This is not human. In addition, I heard that in the groups (village bank or 
solidarity group) if one member does not pay their loan, the entire group must 
pay it. I find it cruel. I prefer doing “Likelemba” (ROSCAS) because here 
women help themselves and not someone else to become rich on their backs.   
 
6. Interviewee 12: (Non Member) 
a. I do not trust financial institutions because they exploit people. They make a 
lot of money on the back of poor people. It’s like you are just working for 
them.    
 
7. Interviewee 13: (MF-Mufesakin) 
a. I am a client of an MF institution call “Mutuelle des Femmes Sages de 
Kinshasa” (Mutual of Wise Women of Kinshasa). So far, I just deposit and 
save; I haven’t yet experienced loan or credit. I still have enough capital. I 
prefer saving because it helps when business gets into trouble. A loan is a 
huge burden and I am not yet ready for that.  
b. Q17: Sales are low because money is not circulated. People have no money 
on their hands because the economy seems to slow down.  
c. The issues with current MFI loans are: (1) women are not well trained and 
informed about credit and loan. Many of these women have been selling their 
stuff with their own capital of less than 20 dollars. When suddenly they have 
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on hands twice or even 5 times this amount, well they should be troubled with 
such amount of money and might start spending it crazy! A second issue is 
that someone who has never been selling big quantity will experience 
difficulties in doing so. So, I am not surprised that many of them are in trouble 
and get their household’s assets confiscated. Some have left their houses 
and hide somewhere in the city. This is not good. (2) MF institutions are 
behaving just like commercial banks. They only care about their money and 
not about the women. (3) Then the reimbursement cycle is even worse. How 
can you lend someone money to invest in business and start requesting 
repayment a week after? This is insane. (4) Profit is not very significant for all 
of us selling due to macroeconomic difficulties. When in addition, you must 
pay back loans, it is hard. One should also notice that in Congo, business and 
household’s life are mixed; they are handled from the same income source 
which takes care of loan reimbursement, household expense and business 
capital. This is a huge challenge. I feel sorry for these women. (5) Having a 
loan is very stressful. Women are very tense when the reimbursement day is 
approaching. Many of them are not healthy and are developing high potency 
(high blood pressure) because of loan reimbursement. (6) There is also a 
moral issue here because parents who cannot afford to pay back loans ask 
their children to lie to loan officers when their parents are hiding. (7) Of course 
there are also women who are dishonest because they take money while they 
know that they will not or cannot pay back. They think that it’s free money.  
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d. If you ask my suggestions, I think that (1) MF institutions must be very 
professional and identify women who are capable of paying them back their 
loans. (2) MF must give enough time to women to work with the money 
borrowed before starting repayment of loans. (3) I have heard that their 
interest rate is high compared to banks. If they really want to help people, 
they should not ask for so much interest. (4) There is more and more 
competition among microfinance institutions and they are just taking whoever 
as clients and therefore they can’t get their money back on time. Loans 
should be given to women with experience in sales and money management.  
e. You ask me my preference between Likelemba (traditional ROSCAS) and MF 
loans through groups (Village Bank or Solidarity Group). Well, both are based 
on trust, but you do not take whoever and let them become Likelemba 
member. We know each other and usually we know who is honest, reliable, 
and capable of making profit from doing business. What I see with MF groups 
is fierce competition among institutions and therefore they have groups which 
are not homogenous.   
 
8. Interviewee 16: (MF-Procredit) 
a. Q18: people will tell you that they invest all their loans into their business, but 
the truth is that almost everyone spends some portion into household 
expenses, mostly food and in some case house appliances. We can’t report 
that to MF institutions because we know that they ask not to do so. 
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b. I started with Procredit but now I am also a client with FINCA. I got US$ 3000 
loan from Procredit and US$ 500 from FINCA. Of course I did not report to 
FINCA that I am a current Procredit Client.  
c. The truth is that using loans is a tough business. Sales are not as good as 
they used to be. Profit is thin and on top of that loan repayment makes it even 
tougher. In my case, I had to sell household appliances to pay back the loan. I 
also noticed that loan officers have no courtesy when recovering loan in rear. 
Procredit has decided to stop lending me money due to late payments. I do 
not think that people should be punished because of late payment.  
d. Loans are good in nature but the conditions under which MFI are providing 
loans in Congo are just untenable. As clients, we feel used and weak. We 
can’t win against them.  
e. I do recognize that there are people misusing loans by buying cars, home and 
other assets with MF money. But these cases are isolated. In most cases, 
clients face really difficulties as I had to keep track with loans repayment.   
  
9. Interviewee 17: (MF-Mufesakin) 
a. My experience with MF is positive. I think that it’s a good thing. Before getting 
MF money (loan) my business was down. I lost inventory and sales were low 
and I could not make profit. Ever since I got Mufesakin’s loan, my business is 
again prosperous and I am doing pretty well.  
b. A friend of mine is a FINCA client and he asked me if I could be his witness or 
guarantor to get a loan. I agreed and after FINCA’s loan officers visited my 
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shop, they gave him the loan. He requested US$ 3,000 but got US$ 2,000. 
He bought a car and does taxi with this car. He got the loan in February and 
he’s on track with reimbursement and will be done in September. We know 
the secret and it helps when you mean business.  
c. We are aware that today things are good but one day they might change. We 
have seen the government closing banks and MF institutions here, so we are 
not naïve but have no choice than working with institutions that project 
confidence. FINCA and MUFESAKIN are among these institutions.    
d. “During the interview, a state tax collector stopped by and was very 
complaisant with the client. He told him that he’s a good boy and he sees that 
his business is growing… keep it that way, he said, and I will talk to you 
later… Indeed, he meant that he will be back when I am gone to get his tip 
(corruption) which will not be reported as state tax.  
 
10. Interviewee 19: (Non Members) 
a. Q5. We are not clients of any MF institution. We try our best to work with our 
own money and face circumstances without loans from financial institutions. 
There are issues in both the client side and the financial institution side. 
Hardship in this city makes people careless about financial commitment. They 
take money as loan but misuse or mismanage it. At the group level also, there 
are some leaders of solidarity groups or village banks who have left with 
money, penalizing members. On the other hand, financial institutions are not 
fair about their loans. Their reimbursement cycle is too tide and their interest 
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rate on loans are too high. The all system seems not helping people to grow 
their business.  
b. Loans and credit in general are not bad things. It is the system which is not 
friendly to us. A friend of us is pushing us to get loans but we are still 
hesitating about this commitment. We see people getting into trouble and 
losing their belongings because they owe money.  
c. One of our major issues in embarking into the village banking business is the 
group’s responsibility when one or few members default. We do not see why 
we shall pay for an insolvent member.  
d. Q.17. Money is not circulated and we do not know why. 
e. Q48. We have saving but not with a financial institution but we keep it home 
in a safe place. In the past, almost twenty years ago, we used to save money 
with a financial institution but we lost that money and never recovered from 
that lost. That’s why we are very careful with financial institutions, whether 
banks or MFI.  
     
11. Interviewee 20: (Non Member) 
a. Q5. I have been approached by many friends and loan officers to get into the 
loans business. I am still thinking about it and haven’t yet decided whether to 
go with that. I have a trust issue. In the past, cooperatives have been a 
disgrace because they lost people’s deposits. Recently in 2002, a microcredit 
in Kingabwa collected people’s deposits and savings but they just disappear 
and again people lost money.  
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12. Interviewee 21: (Non Member) 
a. Q5. I have tried MF experience in 2007 with an MFI and got US$ 100 loan to 
pay US$ 130 (It should be FINCA). I paid back all their money but understood 
that this just a form of exploitation of the poor working for an institution that 
get richer while small vendors get poorer. I stopped after one cycle and I am 
not ready to go through this stress again.  
b. If you ask me about any positive impact of microfinance, I can say that the 
fact of lending money at their rate (although high) compared to street lender is 
a good think. In the street, you borrow money for almost 100% monthly 
interest. Still, from my experience, the MFI is not better. With street vendor, 
you have the full month to work with the money borrowed but with MFI 
money, you have to start paying back the week following the loan.  
c. Q14a. Diversification in selling goods allows us to survive. With my “Ligablo”, 
I offer a variety of goods and at the end of the day I can sell for US$ 50 or 
more. 
   
d. Q17. The national economy seems not very functional. We do not sell as we 
did in the past. If you ask me why, I would say (1) competition is getting 
tougher because everyone wants to sell. Five years ago, I was the only 
vendor in this corner. Today you can see that we are more than five bagging 
for the same client. (2) It seems also that the government does not pay 
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people so there are less and less buyers. (3) People’s purchasing power has 
decreased due to inflation.  
e. Q43. Food and education are the priority and we are cutting on other stuff 
such as clothing and leisure.   
f. Q46. we do survive by God’s will. I have a big family and sometimes I do not 
understand how we make it to the end of the month.  
 
13. Interviewee 22: (Non Member) 
a. Q11. I have a bank account with Procredit but never asked for a loan. I do not 
think I am ready for that. My current sales, profit and income do not allow me 
to afford a loan.  
b. I used to work for a phone company. I just quit because the salary is lower 
than transportation expense. There is no benefit. I prefer concentrate my 
efforts to grow my own business. Still it is very difficult. 
 
14. Interviewee 24: (MF-FINCA DRC) 
a. I do business together with my wife and we work with FINCA and Procredit. 
So far, we have no issues with their loans. We find it very helpful. We sell big 
volume and pay back without any problem.  
b. Q18. You do not play game with loans by buying stuff with that money the day 
you get it from the bank or MFI. You are better off if all is invested and then 
profit can be used for household expenses.  
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15. Interviewee 25: (Non Member) 
a. Q17. Money is not circulated. State employees are not paid.   
 
16. Interviewee 28: (Non Member) 
a. Q5. I am not aware of MF activities. I might become a member if I have 
information and if I conclude that it will help my business to grow. 
 
17. Interviewee 30: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q5. I was a member of a microcredit institution located at UZAM place in 
Limete (neighborhood of Kinshasa). After 5 years, the microcredit closed and 
their managers disappeared. People lost their savings, including myself. I 
became later a client of FINCA.  
b. In general, things are well organized with FINCA. I just was not lucky and 
became ill; my sales decreased and I could not pay regularly my loan back. 
However, FINCA’s approach is good and helpful.  
c. Q26. Due to illness. The one think I do not like with FINCA is that they do not 
care about people’s health. Even if you are seriously ill you have to pay back 
your loan on time. I owed FINCA US$ 20 and received threats from loan 
officers. According to them even a dead body must pay back their loan.    
 
18. Interviewee 31: (Non Member) 
a. Q5. I do not like banker. They use people and steal their money. My friend 
was hurt by a bank or microfinance and never recovered his money. These 
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people are nice when they want your money. As soon as your money is in 
their hands, they become arrogant and sometimes disappear with people’s 
money.  
  
19. Interviewee 32: (Non Member) 
a. I am afraid of debt. I do not like owing someone. I heard about Procredit Bank 
but I am still not sure if I have to take their money.  
b. Q28. We use “Carte” or “Likelemba” to save some portion of our daily profit in 
order to have a margin at the end of the month. Household and business 
expenses are mingled and without this strategy, one will definitely put all the 
profit into household expenses.  
c. Q46. we survive by the will of God. It’s hard in this country. Every time when 
you have to deal with family expenses, you have headache.  
d. Q48. I use Carte and Likelemba as a way of saving money. There is no local 
bank in the neighborhood and so I am using the traditional strategy so far. I 
am thinking about opening an account but I am not yet sure.  
   
20. Interviewee 33: (Non Member) 
a. Q5. You ask why I am not an MF client. Well, I am interested but still checking 
on finding a good institution.  
b. Q.17. Sales have decreased due to a slow economy but also at this specific 
time because kids are going back to school. Usually during this period, people 
spend for school and less for other household items.  
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21. Interviewee 34: (MF FINCA) 
a. Q11. Loans help a lot. Prior to FINCA and other MF institutions, people lend 
money asking 50% interest monthly. Finca’s rate is 4 or 5% monthly. This is 
good. The fact is that it’s tough to find someone lending you money in this 
city.  
b. I will take a break and won’t take a new loan. If you want to know why, loan 
repayment is stressful. I need a break. Paying back loans every two weeks is 
very challenging. I am more in favor of a monthly repayment cycle. I will be 
back with Finca if they adopt a monthly repayment policy for groups.  
c. Q20. MF institutions are growing but clients are suffering and not making 
good progress.    
d. Q26. Sales are usually little higher when you just start your loan cycle. After 
few repayments, sales decrease drastically because most of the capital is 
going back to MF as part of loan reimbursement. 
e. Q35. It’s hard to buy things (assets) with loans. I hope to buy a freezer with 
my savings with Finca.  
  
22. Interviewee 35: (Non Member) 
a. Q5. I have a bad experience with MF institutions. First with FINCA where I 
was a good client but few people in our group did not pay back their last 
portion of loans; so FINCA decided to punish all of us. This was a debacle for 
my business. I was expecting to get US$ 1000 to grow my business but they 
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wanted the recreate a new group and start over with less loans. I just took my 
US$ 250 savings and left. Another microcredit called “GALALET” promised to 
lend people money after they open an account and deposit 10% of the 
requested loan. I wanted to try them first and deposited US$ 10 to get 100 
dollars. The microcredit was closed and I never recovered my money.  
b. I cannot understand why MFI and banks are trying to make money on us. We 
are small entrepreneurs and poor people and how come they want to become 
rich using us.  
c. I heard about Procredit and many people say good things about them, but I 
do not have experience with them. People still do not trust financial 
institutions as they did in the past (80s). My only hope is that this time people 
won’t be again victims of the state and banks mismanagement.  
 
23. Interviewee 37: (Non Member) 
a. Q5. I am interested in borrowing US$ 5000 but I do not know where to go. In 
the past, I tried an institution called “GALALET” but they failed and closed 
doors. I got a US$ 500 for a 6 months period.  
24. Interviewee 40: (Non Member) 
a. Q5. Loan is very problematic. When you take a loan and use it, you get in 
trouble in paying it back.  
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25. Interviewee 41: (Non Member) 
a. Q5. I do not like loans. Some people got involved into this loan business and 
are in trouble. I prefer working with my own capital than taking loans.  
b. Q.48. I have some savings but I keep it home, not with a financial institution.  
 
26. Interviewee 42: (Non Member) 
a. Q5. I have never heard about MF activities.  
b. Q48. I have some saving under my mattress, not with a financial institution. 
   
27. Interviewee 45: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q11. I am a client of FINCA and have no issue with their loan methodology. 
However, I feel stress out and want to stop or at least take a break. Sales are 
down and it is getting harder to pay back loans on a timely basis. Currently, 
US$ 90 was taken from my saving account with FINCA to cover a portion of 
my loan that was not paid on time. If sales improved, I hope to be back on 
track but it is hard.  
b. Q26. Before joining FINCA my sales were great, may be due to good 
economic conditions in the country. Nowadays, it is not the same anymore. 
Commerce is becoming a tough business. When you add up loans and their 
repayment cycle, you feel suffocated.  
c. Q26. Sales are down because the social classes of people who buy our 
goods are not paid on time, if at all. Their purchasing power diminishes every 
day. We had higher expectations with the post-conflict era but we are 
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disappointed. The gap between rich and poor are growing faster. Foreigners 
(Indian, Chinese and few other Asian nationalities) are competing with us at 
lower price and some time in a better working environment, attracting those 
with money. Low income people who are supposed to buy our goods are not 
paid and have no money. In this environment, our sales keep plunging deeper 
and deeper.  
 
28. Interviewee 47: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q5. Before joining FINCA, I heard a lot of bad things about microfinance. But 
since I joined, I am ok and have no problem. There is nothing to be afraid of.  
b. What we appreciate more with FINCA is that they are honest with their clients’ 
money. If you decide to leave and have saving with them they give you back 
your money without question.  
c. “The interviewer observed that client had only one product (rice) on a stall 
while she usually sells 5 to 6 diversified products. It was revealed that the 
client was at the end of a loan cycle. Usually, it was explained, at the 
beginning of a loan cycle, MF clients buy a lot of merchandise (inventory) but 
with loan repayment and household expense, their inventory starts 
decreasing and get sometimes to a single item. Clients expect to start over 
the cycle with the new loan cycle. The problem with this strategy is that 
sometime MF does not give clients the level of loan expected to be back on 
track with inventory. Most of time, they get less due to issues with individual 
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clients or the group during the repayment cycle. With less money than 
expected, people get frustrated and experience decrease in their activities.” 
d. Q35. The major asset clients seem to have is savings with MF. There seems 
to be no really assets acquisition with loans (Interviewer’s presumption at this 
stage).  
e. Q48. I had a deposit/saving account with Banque du Peuple in 1997 but lost 
this money with the financial crisis of the 90s and the change of regime. So I 
have never worked with a financial institution ever since until came FINCA. I 
am still scared but hope this time to have a better experience.   
 
29. Interviewee 49: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q5. My husband was against the idea to become client of a MF institution. He 
told me that their money was not regular capital but superstitious magical 
money that has bad consequences. You will never make profit out of this 
money, he said.  
b. Q5. I still practice “Likelemba” and “Carte” (traditional saving and deposit 
practices closed to ROSCAS).  
c. Q18. I don’t play game with FINCA money. I am very scared and put all into 
my business.  
d. Q44. With the burden of loan, very little is put in improving standard of living. 
Essential items such as food and schooling see some improvement but in 
general MF clients concentrate on paying back loans on time and save as 
much as they can (Interviewer early observation).  
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30. Interviewee 50: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q17. Money is not circulated among buyers. 
b. Q18. Usually, you invest all in your business and then you can use profit for 
household expenses.  
c. Q26. I say the same because usually at the beginning of the loan cycle you 
will have a lot of inventory and experience high sales. But, when repayment 
starts your sales decrease because you do not have any more a diversified 
stall with many products. You do concentrate only on few products which are 
highly profitable. At the end of the cycle, sales are generally much lower. 
Sometimes you have to take from your own money to pay back the last 
portions of the MF loan.  
d. Q35. You do not try to acquire assets with loans but concentrate on saving as 
much as you can.  
e. Q42. The day prior to loan repayment, a household depending only on the 
woman business can experience a complete diet with almost nothing to eat.  
f. “Remittance seems to be part of a survival strategy with household. When you 
compare stated income and the expenses in Q43 you realize that their expenses 
are higher than their income” (Interviewer’s earlier observation). 
     
31. Interviewee 56: (Non Member) 
a. Q5. I do not like MF institutions. If you take their money, they will confiscate 
all your goods. I prefer borrow from friends than financial institutions. It’s very 
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attractive to take money, but paying back is not easy. In addition, MF 
institutions repayment cycle is very stressful.  
b. Q48. I do not save with financial institutions but use “Carte” or “Likelemba”.  
   
32. Interviewee 59: (Non Member) 
a. Q48. I save through “Likelemba” or “Carte” but not with MF institution. 
   
33. Interviewee 61: (Non Member) 
a. Q48. I have savings but I cannot tell you where. I haven’t taken loan yet but 
just save.   
 
34. Interviewee 62: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q11. I wish to have higher amount of loans to buy higher volume of inventory. 
Loans can help if used properly. My feeling is that we don’t know the value of 
loans or credits. Most of us have issues with credits because we mix 
household and business expenses. You see for instance that when someone 
gets a US$ 400 loan they will put US$ 100 in household expenses.  
b. Loans’ money should remain into commerce. If business and household are 
mixed, this is a recipe for trouble.  
c. I also do work with Procredit, a bank practicing microfinance. I received loans 
from Procredit while working with Finca. I am ok with that.  
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35. Interviewee 63: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q5. I am a FINCA client but I have issues with their higher interest rate and 
repayment cycle. I think that Procredit has a better policy in terms of 
repayment. One month repayment cycle seems reasonable.   
 
36. Interviewee 64: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q11. I am a veteran of Finca and had good record until recently when I 
experienced illness in the family. My child was sick and later died. During my 
child’s illness I couldn’t afford to pay back my loan on time. I owed US$ 130 
but had US$ 140 of savings with FINCA. What happened is that I requested 
that FINCA takes my savings and then I took a break because my credit 
score with them was so bad and I was so stressful. After a break, I resumed 
and started from scratch.  
b. One thing is not clear to me: FINCA requests that clients provide 25% of the 
requested loan as a deposit or saving prior to loan disbursement. This 
amount does not bear interest but clients pay back money borrowed with 
interest. This is not fair.  
c. Q18. Learning from my previous experience with FINCA, I invest ¾ of the 
loan and keep ¼ with me. Even with my savings, I always keep most of that 
home and not with FINCA.  
d. On a positive note, one should recognize that prior to FINCA street lenders 
requested US$50 on top of every US$ 100 loan per month.  
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e. Q35. It’s almost impossible to buy assets with FINCA’s money. It helps with 
food, some clothes and in case of sickness. Saving is what we concentrate 
on. Sales are low and therefore profit is also very low. You can’t amass 
assets with FINCA money.  
       
37. Interviewee 65: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q5. I love FINCA, they are great. We need such institutions to help us with 
capital money for our business to grow. The key or secret is to invest in 
business and not use some money for personal or household needs.  
b. Sales here are cyclical. They are up during certain period of the year and 
down during others. Those without commerce experience complain but 
veterans like us know that during this time of the year, sales are low.  
     
38. Interviewee 66: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q18. I am a Christian and do not like to lie. To be honest, most of us do not 
put 100% of loans into business. You invest into your business what you feel 
necessary and spend some money for other needs.  
b. Q20. Currently, I am not a client of another financial institution. In the past, I 
tried working with a financial institution called CODEV but they disappeared 
with people’s money. After that another microfinance institution called 
“GALLALET” promised to lend money after a deposit. I tried with US$ 10 but 
they also disappeared with people’s money.  
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c. Q26. My sales decreased due to illness. I became sick as I started working 
with FINCA. Hospital bills, household expenses and the burden of loan just 
were too much for me.  
d. Q35. The only asset I had with FINCA’s money is a suitcase. The remaining 
went to food, clothes and some savings 
e. Q47. Income is not higher if you consider that you have to pay back your loan 
with a portion of this income.  
         
39. Interviewee 67: (Non Member) 
a. I am not a client of a microfinance or bank but many of my followers in the 
church are clients of MF institutions. I understand that they borrow money as 
a group and when one person defaults the other pay. This is not fair and I 
guess this is why more and more people are skeptical with MF institutions. 
Group punishment is not a fair practice. I heard a lot of bad stories about MF: 
people’s belongings are taken if they are late or do not pay back loans; some 
are hiding or moving to other neighborhoods; savings are retained and not 
given easily.   
 
40. Interviewee 70: (MF-FINCA) 
a. You ask me the pros and cons of FINCA: FINCA is a good institution and they 
really help us to access capital for our business to grow. However, it mostly 
helps to pay for food, clothes and in some extend medical expenses and 
school. Savings is a good component of their approach because it forces you 
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to save. More and more women concentrate their efforts in saving as much as 
they can and then at the end of the loan cycle part of this saving can be used 
to acquire an asset or reinforce your capital. To be successful, it is good to 
have your own capital first from which you take care of your household and 
then leave FINCA money alone until you complete your loan cycle. 
  
b. Q18. I invest the full amount of my loan into my business but I have a 
strategy: if for instance I get US$450, I will put first US$ 300 and keep the rest 
on hands. When inventory decreases I then use the other US$ 150 to boost 
my business.  
   
41. Interviewee 71: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q13. Monthly repayment schedule will be more helpful to us. The bi-weekly 
system is very difficult and doesn’t help us.  
b. I became a Procredit client now 5 months. I combine membership with both 
microfinance institutions. So far, I am just saving with Procredit and haven’t 
yet taken a loan from them.  
c.  The interviewer noticed that a village banking receiving loan is not always a 
homogenous group. Generally, there is a core of rooted business women, like 
Mrs. Tshibidi, who bring other women to fulfill the requirement of MFI to have 
around 25 women per village banking. The core group of women has stable 
businesses with previous existing capital but is in need of more capital for 
diversification or larger inventory. The remaining women have less 
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prosperous businesses and in some cases are new in handling small 
business. These are the type of clients who usually defaults during the loan 
cycle. The core prosperous women therefore take the risk of bringing less 
experienced women to fulfill MFI requirement and in many cases they pay for 
few defaults. However, the core women seem to reduce this risk by borrowing 
more capital than the less experienced women. In a typical banking village, 
the top borrower can easily get US$ 500 while the bottom one takes US$ 50 
dollars. Of course, the group uses social pressure to recover the money they 
paid for defaulted clients.  
d. What I have acquired as assets from FINCA are: flooring my house, a freezer, 
and my savings with two microfinance institutions: FINCA and Procredit.   
   
42. Interviewee 72: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q11. I have only one complains against FINCA which is that they don’t pay 
interest on our savings but we do pay interest on their loans. You are talking 
about risks, yes, but they are better off because they keep our savings and 
use them for their own purpose.  
b. Q13. A monthly repayment will be more reasonable than the current bi-weekly 
repayment schedule.  
c. Q35. It’s hard to acquire assets with FINCA’s money. So far, I have got just a 
freezer. The remaining has gone into food and schooling.   
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43. Interviewee 73: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q5. We are stuck with FINCA and Procredit because they are so far the sole 
financial institutions inspiring confidence. We have been disappointed with 
many financial institutions in the past.  
b. Q11. I have however to mention that I went recently through a very frustrated 
experience with FINCA. I was expected to receive US$ 1500 loan for this 
cycle. This is the result of a long period of discipline I have shown as a good 
and reliable client. Instead I got only US$ 950. The reason was that I had 
questioned our loan officer’s way of treating women and I guess it was a way 
to punish me for being outspoken.   
 
44. Interviewee 74: (Non Member) 
a. Q5. I don’t know about microfinance and never thought becoming a member.  
b. Q17. Sales are very low due to a standstill of the national economy. People 
are not paid and money doesn’t circulate.  
c. Q48. I don’t have formal saving but I practice “Carte” and “Likelemba” as a 
way to save.  
   
45. Interviewee 75: (Non Member) 
a. Q5. I am an independent businessman and I am in the bakery business. As 
you can see I employ four full time employees and employ eighteen women 
part-time who are my distributors. I have the infrastructure and the market to 
produce and distribute up to five hundred dollars production value of cakes 
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per day. However, I have a lot of constraints, mainly the lack of an oven that 
is capable for such production.  
b. I am not a client of either a bank or an MFI. In this country, you must avoid 
enrolling or be part of financial institutions because your own money can 
become your enemy.  
c. As a principle, I am not against loans or credits. My only issue with current 
MFI is that their cap is to low and small for me. I sometimes joke with FINCA 
women and tell them that instead of borrowing from FINCA they can borrow 
from me. But, they don’t take me seriously while I am indeed capable of 
lending them what they get from FINCA. When it comes to me, I think that if I 
have to engage into loans business, I need more that what is currently offered 
by microfinance institutions.  
d. Q17. My sales are very high and have increased a lot during the last year. I 
haven’t done any advertisement but more word-of-mouth among distributors 
and I am really well positioned to sell even more than what I am producing 
currently.  
e. Q48. I have pretty good savings. 
46. Interviewee 76: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q35: I lost my furniture during last year’s flood that occurred in my 
neighborhood. In any circumstance, it’s difficult to buy furniture or appliances 
with FINCA’s money, either the loan itself or its profit. I also have noticed that 
FINCA does not care about its clients’ social development. They just care 
about their money.  
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47. Interviewee 77: (Non Member) 
a. Q5. I have heard about FINCA and few other microcredit institutions. I will 
never be part of them because I was informed that even if a family member 
passes away on the day you have to pay back their loan they don’t care and 
expect to get their money on that same day.  
b. In the past, we have seen financial scams like that where people lost their 
money because they trust these institutions. I don’t trust them.  
c. Definitely I need money to boost my small business because with my current 
capital it’s tough to develop my business.  
48. Interviewee 78: (Bank of Africa)  
a. Q5. I work with Bank of Africa and have just an account where I deposit 
money. I haven’t borrowed their money. FINCA’s clients have a lot of 
problems. Many people consider the all microcredit business as dirty 
business.  
49. Interviewee 79: (Non Member) 
a. It’s very difficult to live in this country. Can you tell Americans that we’re 
suffering and that we need help? Can you imagine that kids in this country 
have a chance to eat meat and drink soda only in December during the 
holidays? The government in this country is irresponsible. My husband was a 
police and was killed by a car. None helped with his funeral and no insurance 
has been paid. I am myself a policewoman and can you imagine that I got 
only US$ 50 for salary?   
b. Q5. I would like to access capital and run a restaurant. 
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50. Interviewee 81: (Non Member) 
a. Q.5. I am currently client with no financial institution. I used to be FINCA’s 
client but left. I experienced hardship during the last cycle and couldn’t keep 
track with repayment. All my savings were taken and I received only US$ 10 
when leaving.  
b. Q11. Usually, you experience serious difficulties during the last month of the 
loan cycle: your inventory is gone, the principal is gone, your own capital is at 
its lowest, and sales are very low because you do not have enough and 
diversified inventory. Loan brings you a lot of stress. I am a Christian and I am 
supposed to be happy with the standard of living God allows me to have, but 
the day before paying back your loan you feel so low that even prayers do not 
help. I feel better now that I am out of that loans’ business.  
c. Q35. I don’t remember buying assets with FINCA’s money. How can you 
acquire something when working under these conditions? 
 
51. Interviewee 82: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q5. FINCA is helping people here in Kinshasa. FINCA gives you money 
without collateral and takes the risk of losing its money.  
b. Q18. You must invest all in your business otherwise you will get into trouble. 
  
52. Interviewee 85: (MF-Procredit) 
a. Q5. Procredit is the financial institution that has brought people back to the 
financial services industry. Procredit has projected trust and confidence by 
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providing loans, allowing deposits, introduce debit cards and ATM in 
Kinshasa. No institution has done what Procredit has done. Procredit is the 
leading financial institution. 
b. The down side is the reimbursement schedule: client start paying back loans 
one month following the disbursement of the loan. When for instance 
someone gets US$ 7500 loans with a repayment schedule of US$ 1000 per 
month; this doesn’t allow invest the all money into your business. Usually, 
people will invest just US$ 6500 and keep a thousand to pay back the first 
payment. When you compare to Europe or America, this is exploitation and 
not help. FINCA is even worse because they request repayment two weeks 
after the disbursement of loans (Notice: two weeks only apply for village 
banking or group lending. Individual borrowers pay back after one month as 
required by Procredit). 
c.   Q18. When looking at this carefully, loans as provided by MFI destroyed 
people’s businesses in the long term. When the repayment is due people just 
do irrational things to be able to pay back the loan: down prices, borrow at 
interest from other sources, or even selling their belongings.     
 
53. Interviewee 86: (MF-Advans) 
a. Q5. When Advans Director asks why in a city of almost 10 million people, his 
bank has only a thousand clients after one year of operations; well, the 
answer is not complicated: first, loans’ conditions are beyond the capacity of 
almost all the people of this city. His bank must be flexible. (2) The amount 
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given is too low to suit our business’ needs. Usually, you don’t get the amount 
you request. It’s always less than what is requested. What financial 
institutions do not know is that when you request a specific amount, this is 
because you think that it will fit your business needs. When you get less than 
your business monetary needs, everything is to be revised and we are not 
happy with this behavior by financial institutions. Procredit started well and 
used to be an excellent partner, but now they have also becoming like others.  
b. Q17. The political situation in this country is bad and this is not good for 
businesses. The macroeconomic environment is not improving, people are 
not paid regularly and this impacts our businesses.  
c. Q20. Yes, I have an account with Trust merchant Bank. I applied for US$ 
15000 loans but I am still waiting to hear from them. This is frustrating. 
Indeed, I am thinking to stop working with banks and just count on my own 
funds.  
d. Q26. When you start the loan cycle, you feel like you have a lot of inventory 
and sales are good; but when you start paying back the loan, sales decrease 
considerably.  
e. Q51. The truth is that every passing day I am worse off. I can’t put all on MFI. 
I think that it’s the combination of bad politics, mediocre macroeconomic 
environment, and of course MFI lending policies.  
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54. Interviewee 87: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q20. I love FINCA and will go nowhere else. I heard about their new savings 
program and I am looking forward to have a saving account.   
b. Q.26. Access to more money as capital has been determinant to increase my 
sales volume since I joined FINCA. 
c. Q35. The real impact of the lending practice of FINCA has been on improving 
standard of living, access to more capital that allows diversification and 
therefore more income and profit, and of course savings. It’s not easy to buy 
household assets with FINCA money.  
d. Q48. I have to mention that due to the current policy surrounding the saving 
account (you can’t access this money until the end of the loan cycle), usually 
we always keep some savings home, practice “Likelemba” and “Carte” as 
alternative savings mechanisms.   
 
55. Interviewee 89: (MF-FINCA) 
a. Q5. In my first group, the loan officer (Papa Pierre) always asked us to right 
down all our assets and capital on a paper sheet so that we are aware of our 
capacity and responsibility while borrowing money from FINCA. 
b. Q11. I am proud of FINCA because they help reduce poverty in our country 
and request very low interest rate when you compared it to street lenders.  
c. Q20. I am just with FINCA and afraid of other financial institutions. Although I 
take FINCA’s loan I do not like debt.  
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d. Q35. What I can say that I acquired with FINCA’s money is a freezer, a fan, 
and glasses. Overall however, FINCA has changed my life in a very positive 
way.  
   
56. Interviewee 90: (MF-Advans) 
a. Q13. When it comes to repayment, MFI imposes its conditions which are not 
flexible.  
b. Q17. Sales are lower if compared to last year due mostly to economic crisis in 
the country.  
c. Q35. Overall, loans haven’t really helped me to acquire assets. Most of what I 
have as assets existed before getting into Advans Bank business.  
d. Q47. I am not so satisfied with the all package with Advans because I am not 
getting where I need to be. I have a project that requires more than US$ 
25000 but I can’t find a financial institution to finance that. 
e. When Advans Director asks why in a city of almost 10 million people, his bank 
has only a thousand clients after a year; well, let me elaborate a bit on that: 
 Confidence issue: what motivated people to get involved with financial 
institutions in the post-conflict DRC is first the fact that MFI offered loans 
and were searching for clients, coming to neighborhoods and markets to 
find clients. The “credit” or “loan” component attracted people of all strata, 
those who have never experienced financial services before and those 
who have lost their money in the past when the entire system bankrupted. 
Indeed, when someone is ready to make first a move in an untrusted 
317 
 
environment, this brings some level of confidence. As you can notice, 
people go to PROCREDIT, ADVANS and FINCA. Very few go to BCDC 
(DRC’s largest commercial bank). 
 Decrease of Confidence: when MFI started their business in DRC, all were 
great and fine: they gave as much money as people wanted and the 
numbers were growing faster at all levels (clients, loans, and deposits). 
Today, things have changed. MFI understood that they are so wanted by a 
population so motivated to trust again financial institutions that they have 
changed their behavior to start operating like commercial banks. Clients 
are getting frustrated with MFI. When you request a certain amount, you 
always receive less than requested, disrupting your business plan 
provisions. In this country, and especially in the capital city of Kinshasa, 
word-of-mouth is a very effective advertisement means. People talk and 
understand slowly that MFI are changing and therefore they must also 
change their behavior towards MFI.  
 Stress: In this country, social life is mingled with business. It happens 
often that on the day of repayment, a client has a funeral, a sickness or 
other social emergency. Here, MFI are not flexible at all and loan officers 
behave unprofessionally, sometimes threatening people. As I told you 
before, word-of-mouth is an effective communication tool. People talk and 
know about what others are going through and as a result people are 
becoming reluctant vis-à-vis the financial institutions. Advans, a newcomer 
microfinance institution, is therefore a victim of this phenomenon.  
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 Interest Rate: if it’s true that MFI rates are lower when compared to street 
lenders, clearly it’s more and more obvious that MFI exploit us. They lend 
us money using monthly interest rate (5% more or less) but when you 
translate it into yearly rate, you find out that we pay 30%, 40% and 
sometimes 60%. This is a shame because none pays such a rate in 
Europe and in America.     
 What is the future: I do encourage what’s happening in the financial 
services industry. Indeed, MFI have created jobs by providing the 
necessary funding for small businesses to remain operative and also for 
new people to enter the market and new lines to be part of the DRC’s 
business framework. We need more MFI to enter the country in order for 
competition to take place and improve the entire financial services 
provision environment.  
        
57. Interviewee 91: (MF-Advans) 
a. Interviewer understood from the field that “Diversification” is a critical variable 
allowing MFI clients to have higher profits than non MFI clients. Access to 
additional capital, through MFI, provides clients with an opportunity to add up 
new lines of business which in turn increase sales volume and consequently 
profit.  
b. Q5. Individuals do not go to BCDC. Only companies and government officials 
work with them. In fact, those commercial banks are not interested to work 
with small businesses like us.  
319 
 
c. Q5. I am Advans’ first client and I feel privileged doing business with them. I 
am in my third loan and overall I have borrowed around US$ 40000 with the. 
Their loans have helped boosting my business and I have not experienced 
problems paying them back.  
d. When Advans Director asks why in a city of almost 10 million people, his bank 
has only a thousand clients after a year; well, this is what I can say: their 
loan’s requirements are not easy to fulfill. I remember that the first time when I 
requested to borrow US$ 7600, I had to surrender my house’s ownership. 
Advans requests collateral for higher amount. In addition, advans never gives 
you the requested amount. The first time I requested US$ 15000 but got half; 
the second time I requested US$ 25000 and got also half. This third time I 
wanted US$ 35000 but got just US$ 25000.  
e. I can understand why Advans is careful with loans because there are really 
issues with people in this city. There are some who just take money without 
planning how to pay it back. At the same time, there are good people and 
hard workers who cannot access loans because of collateral. I agree with the 
bank that we need to maintain the system and therefore banks shall make 
sure that they can get their money back to continue operating in the country.  
58. Interviewee 92: (MF-Cooperative CHARITE). 
a. Q11. Loans help in some extent but our business needs are higher than what 
MFI propose. 
b. Yes, I am still a Procredit client but I have experienced a lot of problems with 
them. I have been a client with Procredit for years and had good record with 
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them. I first got US$ 4000, then US$ 8000 and finally US$ 13500. I travel to 
Western African countries and Dubai to buy stuff to sell here in Kinshasa. I 
have some ten years in this business. Lastly, I lost my merchandises with the 
freight company. I had 28 bags of merchandises and came back to Kinshasa 
waiting for my goods to arrive. My merchandises never arrived and therefore I 
was unable to pay back my loan. I explained to Procredit that I was unable to 
pay but they did not understand. Until now, I have this issue with them. I told 
them that they could give me another loan to replace the capital I have lost so 
that I will be able to pay back their loans. They refused. I went to two other 
banks (TMB and Advans) but they denied my request. Finally I was approved 
by a cooperative that lend me US$ 4000 to pay back in three months. 
  
59. Interviewee 93: (MF-Procredit) 
a. Q5. I am a Procredit client since this Mf institution started its operations in this 
country.  I have recently requested a grace period of three months so that I 
can pay only interests and not the principal.  
b. Q11. After many years with Procredit, I have concluded that banks barely 
help us. They don’t care about our businesses’ health. I haven’t seen my 
personal capital growing as a result of using Procredit’s loans. I am indeed 
tempted to stop borrowing money and work with my own money. First of all, 
MFI do not give us enough time to work with the loans and require that one 
month after you start paying back the money. Second, I cannot take stress 
anymore. Repayment week is very stressful.  
